

THE AFRICANDERS

A Century of
DUTCH-ENGLISH FEUD
In South Africa




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THE AFRICANDERS.



CAPE TOWN, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

A CENTURY OF
DUTCH-ENGLISH FEUD
IN SOUTH AFRICA

BY
LE ROY HOOKER,
AUTHOR OF
"ENOCH, THE PHILISTINE," "BALDOON,"
ETC.



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FOREWORD.

This is the history, briefly told, of the great Dutch-English feud in South Africa, up to the beginning of the Afrianders' second war of independence with Great Britain, which opened on the 11th of October, 1899.

In writing these pages I have not felt conscious of being in controversy with any one. If I had been susceptible to influences that create prejudice, nearly three centuries of American descent from purely Anglo-Saxon progenitors with no admixture of any other blood would have predisposed me to magnify everything in this long feud that exemplified the prowess and the honor of that race, and to minify in the telling whatever faults it had committed. It will be for such readers of my work as are conversant with the ultimate authorities on the subject treated of to judge how far I have succeeded or failed in presenting a "plain, unvarnished" tale.

I acknowledge, with much gratitude, indebtedness for data to the following distinguished writers :

Canon W. J. Little, M. A., author of "South Africa"; George McCall Theal, M. A., Official Historiographer and sometime Keeper of the Archives at Cape Town; Professor James Bryce, author of "Impressions of South Africa," "The American Commonwealth," etc.; F. Reginald Statham, author of "South Africa as It Is"; Olive Schreiner, author of "The South African Question"; the British Blue Books and other sources of reliable information.

THE AUTHOR.

THE AFRICANDERS.

CHAPTER I.

THE DUTCH AT THE CAPE.

(1652-1795.)

This is the story, briefly told, of the Dutch Boers in South Africa.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to visit the shores of South and Southeastern Africa, but they made no attempt to settle the country south of Delagoa Bay. They were traders. The Hottentots had little to sell that they cared to purchase. The route for Portuguese commerce with the East was west of Madagascar, consequently they found it unnecessary to put into Table Bay; the voyage from St. Helena to Mozambique could be made comfortably without seeking a port of supply.

But when the Dutch wrested the eastern trade

from the Portuguese, the southeastern portion of Africa assumed an importance to them that it had never before possessed in the esteem of any other nation. Their sea route to the East was south of Madagascar, and it was all but imperative that they should have a port of supply at the turning point of the long voyage between Holland and Batavia. It soon became their practice to call at Table Bay for the purpose of obtaining news, taking in fresh water, catching fish, and bartering with the natives for cattle—in which they were seldom successful.

In 1650 the Dutch East India Company, acting upon the reports and suggestions of influential men who had visited Table Bay and resided in Table Valley several months, determined to establish at Table Bay such a victualing station as had been recommended. In accordance therewith the ships *Reiger* and *Dromedaris* and the yacht *Goede Hoop*—all then lying in the harbor of Amsterdam—were put in commission to carry the party of occupation to Table Bay, under the general command of Jan Van Riebeeck.

On Sunday, 24th of December, 1651, the expedition sailed, accompanied by a large fleet of merchant vessels. On the morning of Sunday, the 7th of April, 1652, after a voyage of one

hundred and four days, the site of their future home greeted the eyes of the sea-worn emigrants, —Table Mountain, 3,816 feet high, being the central and impressive feature of the landscape. In due time preparations were made to land and begin the necessary operations in establishing themselves in the new and entirely uncivilized country.

The organization of the Dutch East India Company was on a thoroughly military system. It graduated downward from the home Assembly of Seventeen—who were supreme—to a governor-general of India and his council resident in Batavia, and, ranking next below him in their order, to a vast number of admirals, governors and commanders—each having his own council, and acting under the strict rule that whenever these came in contact the lower in rank must give place and render obedience to the higher. It is important to bear this in mind, as it gives a clear insight into the mode of government under which the occupation took place, and which prevailed with little variation for more than a hundred years. The ranking officer of the expedition was Jan Van Riebeeck, and next to him in authority were the three commanders as his council in founding the settlement.

Van Riebeeck and the three skippers, having inspected Table Valley, selected a site for the fort a little in rear of the ground on which the general postoffice of Cape Town now stands. On that spot a great stronghold was built in the form of a square strengthened by bastions at its angles. Each face of the fort measured 252 Rhynland feet—about 260 feet English measure. The walls were built of earth, twelve feet high, twenty feet in thickness at the base, tapering to sixteen feet at the top, and were surmounted by a parapet. Surrounding the whole structure was a moat, into which the water of Fresh River could be turned. Within the walls were dwellings, barracks, storehouses and other conveniences that might be required in a state of siege. Around the fort were clustered a walled kraal for cattle, a separate inclosure for workshops, and the tents in which the settlers began their life in Africa.

On the 28th of January, 1653, the last of the ships, the *Dromedaris*, sailed away and left the colonists to their own resources.

The history in detail of this first European settlement in South Africa is of surpassing interest; but, here, it must be sketched in the briefest outline possible, up to the first contact of Boer with Briton.

For the first twenty-five years the aim of the colonists was to keep within easy reach of the fort at the Cape. Up to 1680 the most distant agricultural settlement was at Stellenbosch, about twenty-five miles from the Cape. Not till the end of the century did they push pioneering enterprises beyond the first range of mountains.

There was a steady though not very rapid increase of population. As early as 1658 the disastrous step was taken of introducing slave labor, performed at first by West African negroes—a step which encouraged in the whites an indisposition to work, and doomed that part of Africa to be dependent on the toil of slaves. To their African slaves the Dutch East India Company added numbers of Malay convicts from Java and other parts of its East Indian territories. These Malays took wives from the female convicts of their own race, and to some extent intermarried with the native African slave-women. From such marriages there arose a mongrel, dark people of the servile order, which became a considerable element in the population of Cape Town and its neighboring regions.

In 1689 some three hundred French Huguenots came from Holland in a body and joined the colonists at the Cape. These were a valuable

acquisition as an offset to the rapidly increasing servile element. They were mostly persons of refinement, and brought with them habits of industry, strong attachment to the Protestant faith, and a supreme love of liberty. Many of the more respectable colonial families are descended from that stock.

The somewhat intolerant government of the Company hastened the blending of the various classes of the population in one. The Huguenots loved their language and their peculiar faith, and greatly desired to found a separate religious community. But the Company forbade the use of French in official documents and in religious services. As a result of this narrow but far-seeing policy, by the middle of the eighteenth century the Huguenots had amalgamated with their Dutch fellow-colonists in language, religion and politics. It was not until 1780 that the Company's government permitted the opening of a Lutheran church, although many Germans of that persuasion had emigrated to the Cape.

The distinctive Afriander type of character began to appear at the time when the settlers began to move from the coast into the interior of the country. There was everything to favor the rapid development of a new type of humanity.

For the most part the Dutch and the Germans belonged to the humbler classes; the situation was isolated; the home ties were few; the voyage to Europe was so long that communication was difficult and expensive; and so they maintained little connection with—and soon lost all feeling for—the fatherlands. As for the Huguenots, they had no home country to look to. France had banished them, and they were not of Holland—neither in blood nor in speech. Thus it came to pass that the whites of South Africa who went into the interior as pioneers went consenting to the feeling that every bond between Europe and themselves was severed—that they were a new people whose true home and destiny, to the latest generations, were to be in Africa.

Many of them became stockmen, roaming with their flocks and herds over vast tracts of grazing lands, for which they paid a nominal rent to the Company. Some of them became mighty hunters of big game—like Nimrod; and even those who herded cattle and sheep were forced to protect themselves and their live stock against lions and leopards and the savage Bushmen who waged a constant warfare in which quarter was neither given nor expected. In such circumstances it is not wonderful that the people who

had in their veins the blended blood of Holland and Navarre developed to an almost unparalleled degree courage, self-reliance and love of independence, coupled with a passion for solitude and isolation.

As inevitable results of the life they led—so isolated and wild—the children grew up untaught; the women, being served by slaves, lost both the Dutch and French habits of thrift and cleanliness; and the men became indifferent to the elegancies of life, and grew more and more stern and narrow-minded on all questions of public policy and religion. But there was no declension of religious fervor. In all their wanderings the Bible went with them as an oracle to be consulted on all subjects, and the altar of family worship never lacked its morning and evening sacrifice. And they retained a passionate love of personal freedom which no effort of the Company's government could bring under perfect discipline.

Magistrates and assessors were appointed in some of the distant stations, but they failed to control the wandering stockmen, who were called Trek Boers because they "trekked" from place to place. Being good marksmen and inured to conflict with wild beasts and wilder

men, they formed among themselves companies of fighting men whose duty it was to disperse or destroy the savage Bushmen. These independent military organizations the government recognized and approved by appointing over them a field commander for each district and a subordinate called a field cornet for each subdivision of a district. These officers and their respective commands became permanent features of the system of local government, and the war bands—called commandos—have always been recognized in the records of military operations by the Boers.

The administration, through a governor and council appointed by the Dutch East India Company in Holland, was never popular with the colonists. The governor was in no sense responsible to the people he governed. This was one of the causes which prompted the Boers to go out into the wilderness, where distance from the center of authority secured to them greater freedom.

In 1779 the disaffected colonists sent commissioners to Holland to demand of the States-General redress of the grievances suffered under the rule of the Dutch East India Company and a share in the government of the colony. This action was due, in part, to actual wrongs inflicted

on a liberty-loving people, and, in part, to the spirit of independence which characterized the temper of the age and had led the British colonists in North America to throw off the control of their mother country.

After prolonged negotiations the States-General sent out two commissioners to investigate the state of affairs in the Cape colony and to recommend measures of reform. The degree of relief proposed was considered inadequate—especially by those who dwelt in the more distant settlements. Therefore, in 1795, the people of the interior rose up in revolt against the Company's government—professing, however, unabated loyalty to the mother country. The magistrates appointed by the company were deposed, and little republics were set up, each with a representative assembly. It would have been an easy matter for the government at the Cape to have suppressed these uprisings by cutting off their food supplies. But just then other events claimed the attention of both the governor and the governed—events which drew South Africa into the tumultuous tide of European politics and led to the immediate contact of Boer and Briton, and initiated a struggle between the two

which has been renewed at intervals, with varying fortunes, for more than a hundred years.

Before going forward to the event of 1795—the first contact of Boer and Briton—it will be well to note some of the more important features of the condition in which that contact found the Boer.

The total Boer population of South Africa in 1795 was about seventeen thousand, with a rapid rate of increase. In the mixed blood of the people the proportions of national elements were: Dutch, a little less than two-thirds; French, one-sixth; the remainder was principally German, with a sprinkling of other nationalities.

The popular language differed largely from that of Holland at the close of the eighteenth century. The amalgamation with a large body of foreigners, the scant instruction in book learning, and above all the necessity of speaking to the slaves and Hottentots in the simplest manner possible had all tended to the destruction of grammatical forms. The language in common use by the Boer had become a mere dialect, having a very limited vocabulary. But the Dutch Bible—a book that every one read—greatly increased the number of words with which he was familiar. With this addition, how-

ever, most of the uneducated South African colonists were unable to understand fully the contents of a newspaper of the time printed in Holland, or a book treating of a subject unfamiliar to them. Naturally this dialect of the Dutch was greatly beloved by the people using it—it was the language of mother, of lover, of friend to friend in parting to meet no more.

In no other country were women more completely on an equality with men than in South Africa. Property belonging to a woman while she was single, or acquired by her after marriage, was secured to her in perpetuity so that her husband could neither squander it nor dispose of it in any way without her consent. Neither was it subject to seizure for debts contracted by him, but was as absolutely hers as if no marriage existed.

The rights of children to be provided for were sacredly guarded. An individual having five or more children could only dispose by will of half the estate; the remainder belonged to the children, and upon the death of the parent it was equally divided among them; if any were minors their share was taken in trust for them by guardians provided by law. If there were

not more than four children the parent could dispose by will of two-thirds of the estate.

The industrial pursuits of the people outside of Cape Town were almost entirely agricultural and pastoral. There were no mining interests. There was abundance of fish, but the taking of them was discouraged by government prohibitions of fishing in any waters but Table Bay in summer and False Bay in winter. This measure was taken to save the Company the expense of providing military protection for fishermen at a distance from the fort. In 1718 it was permitted to fish in Saldanha Bay, also, but as one-fifth of the product was exacted as a tax the license was not accepted.

The making of wagons and carts of the peculiar kind needed in Africa at that time was carried to great perfection. This, however, was the only important manufacturing industry in the country. For the most part families supplied themselves with homemade articles of use, such as soap, candles, furniture, leather, cloth, harness and farming implements. Everything thus produced was crude and clumsy, but the articles were durable and served the purpose fairly well.

All in all, they were a worthy and a very

peculiar people—these Boers. They differed largely from all others in habits, language and ideals; but they were loyal to their ideals, and acted with rare good sense and manly energy in carrying them into effect. They were so far free from the prevailing spirit of religious bigotry that in 1795, besides the Dutch Reformed Church—in a sense the national church—the Lutheran and the Moravian denominations were tolerated.

The territory in South Africa that had been explored, up to 1795, included the Cape colony, the western coast as far north as Walfish Bay, the eastern coast to the Zambesi River and the Zambesi Valley to a point above Tete, and a few localities in the region now known as Rhodesia. Possibly some roving elephant hunters had crossed the Orange River, but, if so, they were silent as to any discoveries made.

The Bushmen had retired from the populous parts of the Colony, and were numerous only along the mountain range in the interior. The Hottentots had dwindled away to a few thousand. The thinning out of these native races was due not so much to mortal conflict with the whites as to the ravages of smallpox and strong drink. Like all savage people they

seemed to melt away before these scourges as stubble before flames.

And here we close this chapter of the history of the Boers. We leave them, for the moment, divided as to the government of the Dutch East India Company, but a homogeneous people seventeen thousand strong, and having developed out of the elements mixed in their blood and the peculiar environment and experiences in which they lived a new race of civilized men to be known in the history of commerce, diplomacy and war as *Africanders*.

CHAPTER II.

FIRST CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON IN
DIPLOMACY.

(1795.)

Colonel Robert Jacob Gordon was in chief command of all the regular military forces maintained in the Cape colony. These consisted of a regiment of infantry numbering twenty-five officers and five hundred and forty-six rank and file, an artillery corps mustering twenty-seven officers and four hundred and three rank and file, fifty-seven men stationed at the regimental depots Meuron and Wurttemberg and a corps of mountaineer soldiers, called pandours, numbering two hundred and ten.

It is important to remember that at this time the colonists were divided in sentiment as to the government of the Dutch East India Company, but united in loyalty to the States-General and the Stadtholder of Holland. In the interior the people had risen up in a mild revolt, had dis-

missed the local magistrates who were the appointees of the Company, and had instituted incipient republics under the government of representative assemblies. Even in Stellenbosch and Cape Town the majority sympathized with these movements, and only waited a favorable opportunity to declare against the Company's rule.

It is equally important to know that the military, also, were divided in sentiment on this subject. Of the infantry, the officers were loyal to the Orange party, but the rank and file were mercenaries from nearly every country in the north of Europe, and were zealous for that party or nation from whom they could draw the highest pay. The artillery corps, on the contrary, was composed almost entirely of Netherlanders, with a few French and Germans. These men were attached to the mother country. A large majority of them, however, sympathized with the republican movement in Europe, and would have preferred alliance with the French rather than with the English, for, at that time, the lead of France was toward republicanism.

Thus weakened by internal divisions, the Colony presented an open door to invasion by any power that might covet a point of so great

strategic importance on the ocean thoroughfare between Europe and the Orient.

The English government, when about to enter into hostilities with France, became apprehensive that the French would perceive the value of the Cape colony and instantly take forcible possession of it. This they determined to prevent at any cost; for the military occupancy of the Cape by the French would bring England's highway to India under the control of her hereditary foe.

As early as the 2d of February, 1793, negotiations were opened between the British government and the Dutch home and colonial authorities concerning a strengthening of the garrison at the Cape by a contingent of British troops from St. Helena. The States-General and the Dutch East India Company, in response to this proposal, signified their desire for aid in the form of warships to guard the coast of the Cape peninsula, and that in case such assistance could not be given they would accept the offered troops.

While this correspondence was going on events were transpiring that occasioned ill-feeling between the Dutch and the English, although they were in alliance against the French. Being

paralyzed by dissensions among their own people, the States-General made urgent appeals to the British government for more efficient aid in both men and money. To these appeals the answer of the English authorities was a bitter complaint that their troops were already bearing the brunt of the war in defense of the Netherlands, and that the Stadtholder and his government were not making proper exertions to raise men and money at home.

In making such answer, the British ministers seemed to be willfully blind to the prostrate condition of the Dutch government. The French had put the army of invasion under the command of Pichegru, one of the ablest generals of his time. One after another the Dutch strongholds were falling before him. The province of Friesland was threatening to make a separate peace with France if the States-General did not hasten to act in that direction for all Holland. The patriot party felt such antipathy to their English allies that it was difficult to get hospital accommodation in Dutch towns for the wounded British soldiers. And notwithstanding all these circumstances the English authorities asserted that the Stadtholder's failure to put in the field a large and well-equipped force was due to

apathy in his own cause rather than to weakness. The one measure of additional help offered was that if the Dutch government would furnish five hundred to a thousand troops for the better defense of Cape Colony the English East India Company would transport them thither free of charge. It being impossible for the Dutch to furnish the men, the negotiations came to an end.

Meanwhile, as was signified in the attitude of Friesland, the Dutch people were considering the question of changing sides in the war. That fact—without the knowledge of the Stadtholder—was informally communicated to the governor of Cape Colony in a letter written by the chief advocate of the Dutch East India Company, with the approbation of the directors. The letter reached the Cape on the 7th of February, 1795, informing the colonists that in all probability Holland might soon dissolve the alliance with the English and make common cause with France. The letter stated that matters at home were in an uncertain condition; that the French armies were advancing and already had occupied a part of the country, and that it would be necessary to be vigilant so as not to be surprised by any European power. The warning, though not

specific as to what power, evidently referred to England.

Later reports informed the colonists that a French army under Pichegru was besieging Breda and threatening the region across the Maas. But these reports were not in the nature of official dispatches. They were communicated verbally by Captain Dekker of the frigate *Medenblik*, which arrived at the Cape on the 12th of April, 1795.

The next intelligence from Europe was calculated to perplex and alarm the colonists to a high degree. On the 11th of June, 1795, successive reports came by messengers from Simons-town to the castle to the effect that several ships of unknown nationality were beating into False Bay; later that the ships had cast anchor, and at ten in the evening that Captain Dekker had sent a boat to one of the stranger ships to ascertain particulars, directing the lieutenant in charge to wave a flag if he found them friendly, and that no such signal had been made, nor had the boat returned.

The situation so suddenly developed was, to say the least, disturbing. The governor called his council together to consider it. After conference the signals of danger were made sum-

moning the Burghers of the country districts to Cape Town. Lieutenant-Colonel De Lille was ordered to proceed at once to Simonstown with two hundred infantry and a hundred gunners to strengthen the garrison there. The troops left the castle within an hour and reached Simonstown before noon of the next day.

The council continued in session until past midnight, and after adjournment remained at the castle in readiness to deal with any emergency that might arise. At half-past two in the morning of the 12th they were called together again to consider a letter just received from Simonstown. The communication was from Mr. Brand, the official resident at Simonstown, and contained interesting news. Captain Dekker's boat had returned from its long visit to the strange fleet. With it had come a Mr. Ross, bearing letters for the head of the Cape government from the English admiral, Sir George Keith Elphinstone and Major-General James Henry Craig.

Mr. Ross, having been supplied with a horse and a guide, reached the castle and delivered the letters in due time. They proved to be three complimentary notes from directors of the English East India Company to Commissioner

Sluysken, governor of the colony. Mr. Ross also presented an invitation from Admiral Elphinstone to the Commissioner and Colonel Gordon to visit his ship, intimating that there they would receive important information and a missive from the Stadtholder of the Netherlands. It was noted that in the conversation Mr. Ross was careful to evade all questions concerning the state of affairs in Europe and the destination and business of the fleet.

While the council pondered these things, Lieutenant Van Vegezak, who had visited the English admiral's ship, arrived at the castle. He had little information to impart. There were in the fleet three seventy-four gun ships, three of sixty-four guns each, a frigate of twenty-four guns, two sloops of war carrying the one eighteen and the other sixteen guns; and there were troops on board under the command of Major-General James Henry Craig, but how many he had not been able to learn.

Now, the facts which accounted for the presence at the Cape of this British naval and military force were unknown to the colonists. The Stadtholder's government had been overthrown. The democratic party in Holland had received the French with open arms. The national gov-

ernment had been remodeled. The States-General had abolished the Stadtholderate. And the British ministers, alarmed for their vast possessions in India, and realizing that they must now depend upon their own exertions to keep the French from seizing the port which practically commanded the sea route thither, had fitted out and dispatched with all haste this expedition, with orders to occupy—peacefully if they could, but forcibly if they must—the castle and harbor of Cape Town. The fleet had made a rapid passage. One division sailed on the 13th of March, the other on the 3d of April. The two squadrons met off the Cape on the 10th of June and on the 11th cast anchor in False Bay.

The colonial officers acted with marvelous caution, considering the fact that they were in ignorance of the late events which had led to the appearing of this formidable expedition in South African waters.

To the note inviting the commissioner and Colonel Gordon to visit the English admiral on his ship, they courteously replied that it was impossible for these officers to leave Cape Town, and begged the admiral to send ashore a responsible representative with the promised information and dispatch. They also instructed

the resident at Simonstown to permit the English to provision their ships, but to allow no armed men to land. A force of eighty-four Burghers and thirty gunners, with three field pieces, was posted at Muizenburg in a position to command the road to Simonstown. On the 13th of June the defensive works of Simonstown Bay were strengthened by additional troops, and three hundred and forty infantry and artillerymen were sent to further strengthen the post at Muizenburg.

On the 14th of June there came to the castle a deputation from the Admiral, consisting of Lieutenant-Colonel McKenzie, Captain Hardy of the sloop *Echo* and Mr. Ross, secretary to General Craig.

Mr. Ross handed to Commissioner Sluysken a communication from the prince of Orange—late the Stadtholder of the Netherlands, and supposed to be so still by the colonists. The prince's mandate, dated at Kew on the 7th of February, 1795, ordered the Commissioner to admit the troops of the King of England into the colony and the forts thereof and to admit the British ships of war into the ports, and to treat the British troops and ships of war as the forces of

a power friendly to Holland and sent to protect the colony against the French.

The deputation from the admiral also delivered to the Commissioner a joint letter from Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig, in which was written their account of the then condition of affairs in the Netherlands. They informed him that the winter in Europe had been exceptionally severe; that toward the close of January the rivers had been frozen so hard as to make them passable for armies; that the French had crossed on the ice into Utrecht and Gildersland and had driven the English troops into Germany and compelled the Dutch forces to surrender. They represented that it was a matter of only a few days for the whole of the country to fall into the possession of the French by forced capitulation, without any previous terms of surrender, and that the Stadtholder only escaped capture by taking passage in a fishing boat, which carried him from Scheveningen to England. They further intimated to the Commissioner that this gloomy state of things was only temporary; that Britain and her allies were preparing to enter the field with overwhelming force, and were confident of being

able to drive the French out of Holland in the next campaign.

The letter stopped short of full particulars, leaving the colonial authorities in ignorance of the cordial welcome given to the French by the democratic party in Holland, and of the remodeling of the national government and the abolition of the Stadtholderate. The impression the British officers sought to make was that Holland had been overrun and conquered, and was being treated with the utmost rigor by the French. They carefully withheld the facts that the remodeled government of the Netherlands was still in existence and that the French were regarded as friends by a majority of the people. They wished the colonists to believe that the Prince of Orange was still the Stadtholder of the Netherlands, though temporarily a fugitive in England; that he would be reinstated by the help of his faithful allies in the next campaign, and that loyalty to his prince required the Commissioner of the Cape Colony to throw open the ports and the forts of the colony to the friendly occupation of the British forces.

The council decided that no immediate action should be taken on the prince's mandatory letter. It was the command of a fugitive in a

foreign land and lacked the indorsement of the States-General, and, therefore, had no official force. They were loyal to the House of Orange, but they felt that any present action would be taken in ignorance of the true state of affairs. There was nothing to guide them but this letter of their fugitive prince and the word of these armed and interested visitors who sought to occupy their harbors and strongholds at once. They decided to temporize as far as they could without giving the strangers peaceable possession, hoping that more complete and reliable intelligence from the Netherlands would reach them.

The council's answer to Admiral Elphinstone is an example of rare diplomatic acumen. It assured him that the fleet would be permitted to take in all necessary provisions, but requested that in doing so only small bodies of unarmed men be sent ashore. It also expressed gratitude to the British government for its evident goodwill, and intimated that, while confident of their ability to resist any attack that might be made, they would ask the British for assistance in case the French should attempt to seize the colony. It further requested the admiral to inform the council what number of troops he could furnish,

if any were needed. The admiral replied that General Craig would visit the Commissioner in Cape Town and impart fuller information. Meanwhile the arrival of Burgher forces from Stellenbosch enabled the council to add two hundred horsemen to the post at Muizenburg.

On the 18th of June General Craig met the Commissioner at Cape Town. The next day the general was introduced to the council, and laid before the members the mission upon which he had been sent and his instructions as to the manner of accomplishing it. He stated that the fleet and the troops had been sent by his Britannic Majesty to defend the colony against seizure by the French, or any other power, and that the British occupancy was intended to last only until the government in the Netherlands could be restored to its ancient form, when it was his Majesty's purpose to give up the colony to its proper rulers—the Stadtholder and the States-General of Holland. He assured them that no changes would be made in the laws and customs of the country, nor would any additional taxes be levied without the expressed desire of the people. The colonists would be required to bear no cost but that of their own government as it then existed, and they would be at

liberty to profit largely by trade with England's possessions in India. The colonial troops would be paid by England, on condition that they take an oath of allegiance to his Britannic Majesty—the obligation thereof to last only as long as the British occupancy of the colony. The civil service would remain as it was, and the present incumbents retain their offices until his Majesty's pleasure should be made known.

To this proposal the council made answer in writing, declining it, and notifying the general that they would protect the colony with their own forces against all comers.

Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig responded to this act of the council by a general proclamation to the government and inhabitants of the country, inviting and requiring them to accept his Britannic Majesty's protection in view of the certainty that the French would endeavor to seize the colonial dependencies of the Netherlands.

Three days later the same officers published an address to the inhabitants, in Dutch and German, renewing the offer of protection under the conditions laid before the council by General Craig, and inviting them to send a committee of their own selection to Simonstown to

confer with the heads of the British expedition. The address emphasized the alternative before the people—a French or an English occupation. The former, it affirmed, would introduce a government on Jacobin principles, and would result in anarchy, the guillotine, an insurrection of the slaves with all the horrors that had been enacted at St. Domingo and Guadeloupe, isolation from Europe, the destruction of commerce and a dearth of money and of the necessities of life. But the English occupation, it went on to say, would give them safety under the wing of the only power in Europe that was able to assure protection of person and property under the existing laws, or any others the colonists might choose to enact; it would secure a free market for all their products at the best prices; it would release their trade from the heavy imposts of the Dutch East India Company; it would open and promote commerce by sea and land between all parts of the colony, and it would secure better pay for such of the colonial troops as might choose to enter the British military service.

This appeal directly to the people over the heads of their chief officials, and to the cupidity of their mercenary soldiers, was resented by the council, who notified the British representatives

forthwith that further communication on the subject of British occupancy was not desired.

Nevertheless, on the 26th of June, the admiral and the general sent the colonial authorities another long letter, reiterating therein their former statements to the effect that the Netherlands had been absorbed by France; that if left to itself the Cape colony would be absorbed in like manner, and adding the significant intimation that his Britannic Majesty could not allow it to fall into the hands of his enemies.

The council responded to this letter by prohibiting any further supply of provisions to the British force, and strengthening the post at Muizenburg with Burgher horsemen, pandours and the entire garrison from Boetselaar except one man; he was left to spike the guns in case the English should land. The council also wrote the British commanders that they noted the difference between proffered assistance against an invader and a demand to surrender the colony to the British government.

When the real design of the English was revealed, the disaffected Burghers of the Cape and of Stellenbosch ceased all opposition to the government, and offered to do their utmost in defense of the colony. When the Commissioner

announced that the country would not be surrendered to the English, the people cheered him rapturously in the streets, and saluted him as Father Sluysken.

But notwithstanding these outward signs of unity the high officials and the people were not quite of one mind. A majority of the Burghers had adopted republican ideas, and, if they were to be left to themselves, were ready to welcome the French. Such English visitors as had come to the Cape had exasperated the colonists by boastfully predicting the ultimate subjection of the colony to Great Britain. The Burghers believed that they had now come in the guise of friendship to make good the insulting prediction. On the other hand, the official heads of the colony were lukewarm in doing what they knew and admitted to be their duty for the defense of the colony. Colonel Gordon openly expressed his readiness to admit the English troops whenever the French should threaten an attack. He went so far as to say that even in existing circumstances he would admit them if they would covenant to hold the country for the Prince of Orange, but if their purpose was to take possession of it for Great Britain he would resist them to the utmost of his power. The colonel was

a disappointment to the English, for they had counted upon the Scotch strain in his blood and his well-known Orange partisanship to bring him over to their designs at the first.

Thus three lines of cleavage militated against the perfect solidarity of the colonists. A majority of the Burghers were prepared to resist the British because they preferred the French, if there must be a change of masters. Most of the lower officials and some of the town Burghers were ready to accept the British occupancy, and went about singing Orange party songs because they believed the English were sincere in professing that it was their sole purpose to hold the colony in trust for the Prince of Orange. As for Commissioner Sluysken and Colonel Gordon, while it was their duty to defend the Cape interests against any power that sought to subvert the rule of the Stadtholder and the States-General of Holland, they were not quite sure of the course they ought to pursue with reference to the English, who had come to them professing loyal friendship to the fugitive prince and accredited to them by his mandatory letter. There was possible treason in either admitting or resisting them. These circumstances account for some lack of energy on the part of the civil

and the military heads of the colony in defending it against the British attack that was soon to follow.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON IN
WAR.
(1795.)

Toward the end of June, 1795, it became evident that the British commanders, having failed to obtain peaceable possession of the Cape colony, meant to use all the force necessary to carry out their purpose.

On the 24th of June, three Dutch merchant ships lying in Simon's Bay received instruction from Commissioner Sluysken to proceed to Table Bay, but Admiral Elphinstone forbade them to sail. On the 28th of June, two small vessels sailing under American colors anchored in Simon's Bay. One of these—the *Columbia*—carried Dutch dispatches from Amsterdam to the Cape and Batavia. The English admiral promptly placed the *Columbia* under guard and seized her mails. Such letters and dispatches as related to public affairs were either suppressed

or mutilated, and measures were taken to prevent newspapers from reaching the shore. A single paper, however, was smuggled into the hands of a Burgher, and was the means of conveying astonishing news to the colonists. The most startling of its contents was an official notice by the States-General of Holland, under date of the 4th of March, 1795, absolving from their oaths of allegiance to the Prince of Orange all his former subjects, both in the Netherlands and in the Dutch colonies.

From this notice and from hints left in mutilated letters to private individuals it was learned that so far from being a conquered country under the heel of a rigorous French military administration, Holland was a free and independent republic; that the Stadtholderate had been abolished by the free-will action of the nation, and that France was in friendly diplomatic relations with the Dutch Republic.

Thereupon, the Commissioner and his council determined that it was their duty to hold out against the English. They reasoned that, should the colonial forces be overpowered in the end, the Netherlands would have a better claim to the restoration of the country when peace should be made than would exist if the protection of

Great Britain had been accepted without a struggle. They saw a bare possibility that the British force might be starved into departure by refusing to furnish them with provisions. Moreover, aid from Europe might then be on the way and might reach them in time to save the colony to Holland. In any case, they judged, there was nothing to lose in opposing the British but the control of the colony, whereas, they might lose their heads as traitors should a combined Dutch and French fleet arrive and they be found to have surrendered to the British without a show of resistance. They decided that both duty and personal interest required them to make what preparation they could for defense.

By order of the council, on the night of the 29th of June, Simonstown was abandoned as untenable. All the provisions there were destroyed, the guns were spiked, such ammunition as could not be carried away was thrown into the sea and the troops joined the force at Muizenburg. Not being able to evade the ships blockading Table Bay, the council chartered a cutter then lying at anchor in Saldanha Bay and sent her with dispatches to Batavia informing the Dutch colonists there of the state of things both at the Cape and in Holland.



PRESIDENT KRUGER.

When the call to assemble at the Cape was signaled to the country Burghers, only seventy men from the Swellendam district responded. The nationals, who had been in revolt against the Dutch East India Company's government, declined to obey. Further appeals by letter failed to bring any more of them in. At last, on the 7th of July, in a written communication, it was proposed by the nationals that they would rally to the defense of the country if the government would grant them amnesty for the past and pledge a reasonable redress of their grievances as soon as possible. Among the principal stipulations were these: The nationalists were to be exempted from direct taxation and to have free trade; the cartoon money—a depreciated currency—was to be withdrawn from circulation, and they were to be granted permission to hold in perpetual slavery all Bushmen captured by commandos or individuals.

The nationals had no sooner dispatched the letter containing their overture than it occurred to some of them that their claims would surely be ignored if the British obtained control of the colony. Therefore, without waiting for a response from the government, they resolved to aid in the defense of the country, and at the

same time continue to assert their right to self-government. In accordance therewith a company of one hundred and sixty-eight mounted men was organized under Commandant Delpont and at once set out for Cape Town.

The rally from the country districts of Swellendam, Stellenbosch and Drakenstein brought together a force of eleven hundred and forty horsemen. Two hundred of these were added to the post at Muizenburg. The rest were stationed at Cape Town and along the road to the camp as pickets.

Hostile operations came on very slowly. Admiral Elphinstone seized three more Dutch merchant ships that were lying in Simon's Bay on the 9th of July. On the 14th he landed four hundred and fifty soldiers, who occupied Simonstown, and strengthened the post a week later by adding four hundred marines.

Strangely enough, neither the English commanders nor Commissioner Sluysken chose to regard these movements as acts of war. The Commissioner had been careful to order that no attack should be made on the English, and that nothing whatever should be done that would provoke retaliation or furnish grounds for them to throw the blame of opening hostilities on the

Dutch. It was not until the 3d of August that any act was committed which was by either party construed into an act of war. On that day a Burgher officer fired at an English picket and wounded one of the men. For this he was reprimanded by the Commissioner. General Craig reported it in his dispatches as the beginning of hostilities.

The time soon came when the British officers thought an advance might be made. The Dutch had been remiss in not strengthening their earthwork defenses toward the sea. They had permitted English boats to take soundings off Muizenburg unmolested. And the English commanders had been encouraged to hope that the nationals in the colonial force did not intend to seriously oppose the British advance—that in all probability they would come over in a body to the British side as soon as the first engagement opened. On the other hand, the invading army was utterly without field guns and could not muster more than sixteen hundred men. Re-enforcements were on the way, but no one could foretell the time of their arrival. To advance any part of their military force beyond the range of the guns on the ships would expose the whole expedition to destruction in the event

of a French squadron appearing in Table Bay to co-operate with the Dutch colonists. In view of all the circumstances the British commanders determined to capture Muizenburg, to reopen negotiations with the Cape government from that position and to attempt no further aggressive movement until the arrival of the expected re-enforcements.

On the morning of the 7th of August it became evident to the Dutch officers at Muizenburg that the British were about to attack. A column of sixteen hundred infantry and marines was advancing from Simonstown. Two small gunboats, and the ships' launches, carrying lighter guns, moved close in shore about five hundred yards in advance of the column, to keep the road open. The war vessels *America*, *Stately*, *Echo* and *Rattlesnake* were leading for Muizen Beach.

The Dutch camp was at the foot of the mountain facing False Bay on the west, the camp looking south and east, for it was at the north-west angle of the bay. They had planted eleven pieces of artillery so as to command the road from Simonstown, which ran along the west coast of False Bay. From Kalk Bay to Muizenburg the roadway was narrow, having the water

on one side and the steep mountain, only a few paces away, on the other. The mountain terminates abruptly at Muizenburg, where begin the Cape Flats, a sandy plain stretching across from False Bay to Table Bay. Near the north end of the mountain is a considerable sheet of shallow water called the Sandvlei, fed in the rainy season by an intermittent brook called Keyser's River, emptying into the north side of the vlei.

As soon as they came within range of the post at Kalk Bay the British ships opened fire and the picket stationed there retired over the mountain. On coming abreast of Muizenburg the fleet came to anchor and delivered their broadsides at easy range upon the Dutch camp. The thunders of the first fire had hardly ceased when the national battalion of infantry, and a little later the main body thereof, led by Colonel De Lille, fled from the post through the Sandvlei. One company under Captain Warneke retired more slowly and in a little better order. Many of the artillerymen followed, leaving only a single company under Lieutenant Marnitz to work the two twenty-four pounders. These, being planted on loose soil, were thrown out of position by the recoil of every discharge and could not be fired again until they had been handled back

into place. The firing was, therefore, slow and with uncertain aim. Two men were killed, four wounded and one gun disabled on the *America*, and one man was wounded on the *Stately*, by Lieutenant Marnitz's fire. Whether it was through bad marksmanship or by design one can hardly decide, but the English guns were aimed so high that the shot passed over the camp and lodged in the mountain behind it. Marnitz soon perceived that the post could not be held, and, first spiking the cannon, retired before the charge of the British column. Nothing was saved from the camp but five small field pieces.

The English followed the retreating burghers with a cheer. As soon as they were out of range of the British ships the Dutch endeavored to make a stand, but were quickly driven from it by a bayonet charge. After gaining the shelter of the mountain the Dutch again faced their pursuers, this time with the support of guns brought to bear on the English from the opposite side of the *Sandvlei*, and with such effect that they fell back to *Muizenburg*. In this second collision one English officer, one burgher and two Dutch artillerymen were killed and one pandour was wounded.

Instead of rallying his men and making a

stand behind the Sandvlei, as he might have done with a well-protected front, De Lille continued his flight to Deip River, where he arrived with a fragment of his command, not knowing what had become of his artillerymen and burghers.

As soon as news came that the English were advancing, a detachment of five hundred burgher horsemen was hastened forward from Cape Town to Muizenburg. On the way they learned from the fugitives that Muizenburg, the camp and everything in it had been taken by the British. Then they halted and encamped on the plain in small parties.

Next morning, the 8th of August, De Lille made some show of rallying and returned to the head of the Sandvlei leading a part of the infantry that had been discomfited the day before. The 8th became a day of general panic. The English advanced in column to attack De Lille at the head of the vlei—wading through water that, in places, came above their waists. Notwithstanding the advantage this gave him, De Lille and all his command fled precipitately on their approach. As the British issued from the water and pursued them across the plain they observed a party of burghers coming from behind some sandhills on their flank—the detach-

ment that had come from Cape Town and camped on the plain during the night. Assuming that the flight of De Lille and the movement of this body were in the carrying out of an ambuscade, the British fled, in their turn, and were pursued by the Dutch until they came under the fire of their own cannon, spiked and abandoned by Lieutenant Marnitz, but drilled and placed in service by General Craig. While the English were being driven in by the Cape Town detachment, De Lille and his command fled all day in the opposite direction, and in the evening camped within a mile of the camping ground of the night before, near Deip River.

De Lille's conduct in the field caused widespread indignation. In a formal document drawn up by a number of burgher officers and forwarded to the Commissioner, he was charged with treason. The fiscal who investigated the case acquitted De Lille of treason, there being no proof that he had conspired with the British to betray his trust. And yet he was neither a coward nor an imbecile. His conduct can be explained in no other way than to say that he was a devoted partisan of the House of Orange, that he regarded the nationals as traitors to their legitimate ruler and that he believed the English

were the loyal friends of the rightful sovereign and the ancient government of the Netherlands. For these reasons he would not fight against the British. He held that success in repelling them would result in handing the country over to the colonial national party and to republicanism, which would be an offense against the divine rights of the Prince of Orange. Later he took service with the British and was made barrack master in Cape Town. Thereafter he wore the Orange colors, and openly vented his abhorrence of all Jacobins—whether French, Dutch or South African.

On the 9th of August the expected British re-enforcements began to arrive. On the 12th Admiral Elphinstone and General Craig wrote the Commissioner and his council announcing that already they had received an accession of strength, and that they expected the immediate arrival of three thousand more soldiers. They also repeated the offer to take the Cape colony under British protection on the same terms as were proffered at first, and added, as a threat, that their men were becoming exasperated at the resistance offered and it might become impossible to restrain their fury.

The letter of the British commanders was laid

before the Commissioner's council, the councilors representing the country burghers and the burgher militia; and these were all requested to express their judgment and their wishes freely. With a single exception they were unanimous in adopting a resolution declaring that the colony ought to be and would be defended to the last. In accordance therewith the Commissioner transmitted to the British officers the decision of the people, notifying them that the colony would still be defended.

Notwithstanding the brave front thus presented to the invaders, influences were at work which tended toward the rapid disintegration of the burgher forces. It was being rumored among them that the Bushmen were threatening the interior, and that the Hottentots in Swellendam, and the slaves in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, were about to rise in revolt. True or false, these alarming rumors caused many burghers to forsake the ranks and go to the protection of their homes and their families. In July the burgher cavalry numbered eleven hundred and forty; by the first of September it was reduced to nine hundred. Efforts to keep up the original strength by the enlistment of foreign pandours, native half-breeds and Hottentots were

unsuccessful. Only the burgher infantry, numbering three hundred and fifty, remained intact—being composed of residents of the town.

The colonists were further dispirited by an abortive attempt to capture certain English outposts on the Steenberg. The attack was gallantly made by the burgher militia and pandours, but being unsupported by regular troops and field artillery they were repulsed. On the same day the pandours mutinied. One hundred and seventy of them marched in a body to the castle and made complaint that their families had been ill-treated by the colonists, that their pay was inadequate, that they were insulted by abusive remarks, that a bounty of £40 promised them for good conduct had not been paid, and that their rations of spirits were too small. Commissioner Sluysken so far pacified them with promises of redress that they returned to the ranks, but from that time they were disaffected and sullen, and their service was of little value.

The Dutch officers had planned a night attack in force on the British camp at Muizenburg. When they were about to attempt it, there arrived, on the 4th of September, a fleet of East Indiamen bringing the main body of the British re-enforcements. These consisted of infantry of

the line, engineers and artillerymen, numbering, in all, three thousand troops under the command of General Alured Clarke. This had the effect of so completely discouraging the burgher cavalry that many of them gave up hope and returned to their homes. By the 14th of September only five hundred and twenty-one of this branch of the colonial force remained in the ranks.

Once more, on the 9th of September, the British commanders issued an address to the colonists calling upon them to give peaceable admission to the overwhelming force now at their gates, and warning them that, otherwise, they would take forcible possession. Commissioner Sluysken replied, as before, that he would hold and defend the colony for its rightful owners, for so he was bound to do by his oath of office.

The English army in two columns, between four and five thousand strong, marched from Muizenburg to attack Cape Town, at 9 o'clock in the morning of the 14th of September. This movement was signaled to the colonial officers at the Cape, who ordered all the burgher cavalry, with the exception of one company, to the support of the regular troops at Cape Town. A part of the burgher force was sent out to strengthen the Dutch camp at Wynberg, about

half way from Muizenburg to Cape Town on the route of the British. Some attempt was made to harass the columns on the march, but with so little effect that only one was killed and seventeen were wounded.

Major Van Baalen, then in command of the regular troops at Wynberg, arranged a line of battle that was faulty in the extreme, and planted his cannon in such position that they were practically useless as weapons of offense against the advancing army. Certain officers of the artillery and of the burgher militia contingent remonstrated against his plan of battle, but it was in vain, and when the English came within gun-fire he retreated with the greater part of the regulars. Then followed a scene of confusion. The burghers protested, and cried out that they were being betrayed in every battle. One company of infantry and most of the artillery made a brief stand and then retreated toward Cape Town, leaving the camp and all its belongings to the British.

It had now become clear to the burgher cavalry that Commissioner Sluysken, Colonel Gordon, and most of the officers of the regular force intentionally fought to lose—that so far as the republican government then prevailing in Hol-

land was concerned they were traitors at heart, and that they were willing—after a mere show of resistance—to let the colony fall into the hands of the British in order to have it held in trust by them for the fugitive prince of Orange. The burghers, therefor, not being willing to risk capture or death in battles that were not meant to win by those who directed them, dispersed and returned to their homes. Meantime a British squadron was threatening Cape Town, but keeping out of range of the castle guns.

The commissioner's council was convened at six o'clock in the evening of the 14th of September to consider a very serious situation. A British force of over four thousand men, thoroughly disciplined and equipped, was then in bivouac at Newlands, less than ten miles from Cape Town. The colonial force was only about seventeen hundred strong and nearly half of these had that day retreated before the enemy without giving battle; the remainder were distributed among the fortified posts at Hout Bay, Camp's Bay and Table Valley. If these were all loyal and united in a determination to fight to the last they would certainly be overpowered in the end. But they were not at one in their loyalty. Some were for the deposed and banished prince of Orange, and

therefore favorable to the English who professed to be his friends. Others were strong in their preference for the new republican government in the Netherlands. While thus divided in political sentiments they were without leaders in whom they could place confidence. Further effort at defense seemed unjustifiable in view of certain defeat, and of the useless destruction of property and life it would cause.

One member of the council, Mr. Van Reede von Oudtshoorn, stood out against capitulation, offering to take, with the corps of pennists he commanded, the brunt of a final battle with the English. The other members were unanimous in deciding to send a flag of truce to the British at Newlands, asking for a suspension of hostilities during the next forty-eight hours in order to arrange terms of surrender. General Clarke consented to an armistice of twenty-four hours only, beginning at midnight on the 14th of September.

As a result of conference between the representatives of the Cape government and the British commanders the following terms of capitulation were agreed to: The Dutch troops were to surrender as prisoners of war, but their officers might remain free in Cape Town or re-

turn to Europe on their parole of honor not to serve against Great Britain during the continuance of hostilities. No new taxes were to be levied, and the old imposts were to be reduced as much as possible in order to revive the decaying trade of the colony. All the belongings of the Dutch East India Company were to be handed over to the English, but private rights of property were to be respected. The lands and other properties of the Dutch East India Company were to be held in trust by the new authorities for the redemption of that portion of the company's paper currency which was not secured by mortgage.

Early in the morning of the 16th of July these terms of surrender were officially completed by the signing of the document in which they were written by General Clarke and Admiral Elphinstone. At eleven o'clock on that day the council ordered the publication of the articles, and that official notice of what had been done be sent to the heads of departments and other officers in the country districts. Then the council formally closed its last session and its existence.

The ceremonial in connection with the capitulation took place at three o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, the 16th of September, 1795.

Twelve hundred British infantry and two hundred artillerymen under command of General Craig drew up on the open grounds in front of the castle. The Dutch troops marched out of their late stronghold with colors flying and drums beating, passed by the British line, laid down their arms and surrendered as prisoners of war. Some of them did so in great bitterness of soul, muttering and calling down curses upon Commissioner Sluysken and Colonel Gordon for having betrayed and disgraced them. Lieutenant Marnitz, in writing of these events, emphasized the fact that the only occasion on which the head of the colonial military establishment, Colonel Gordon, drew his sword in the conflict with the English was when he gave the order for the troops he had commanded to lay down their arms.

Thus it was, after an almost bloodless war, that Cape Colony, founded by the Dutch and governed continuously by the Netherlands for one hundred and forty-three years, passed into the possession of Great Britain and became a crown colony thereof. The charges made by some that Commissioner Sluysken and Colonel Gordon were either imbeciles or traitors may not be quite in accordance with the facts. Certainly

there is a wide disparity between the always strong and defiant words in which they announced, to the last moment, their determination to defend the colony, and the puerile efforts they made to do so. The only rational explanation of their conduct is that they preferred yielding to the British, after making a show of resistance, to accepting in the colony the new regime of republicanism that prevailed in the mother country. In all probability their secret thought was that by prolonging a nominal resistance they might gain time enough for something to occur in Europe—where events were moving with bewildering rapidity—something that would reinstate the Prince of Orange as Stadtholder of the Netherlands, and so leave the British no pretext for seizing the colony in his interest.

This chapter may fittingly close with a few brief records of events that lead up to the first trek northwards of the Afrianders.

The Cape colony was restored to the Dutch on the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, in 1802. When war broke out afresh in Europe, in 1806, the English again seized the Cape to prevent Napoleon from occupying so important a naval station and half-way house to the British possessions in India. The second seizure was

accomplished after a single engagement with the Dutch. In 1814 the colony was formally ceded to the British crown together with certain Dutch possessions in South America, by the reinstated Stadtholder of the Netherlands, who received in return therefor a money consideration of thirty million dollars.

CHAPTER IV.

THE AFRICANDERS' FIRST TREK TO THE NORTH.
1806—1838.

When the British took forcible possession of the Cape colony a second time, in 1806, they found a total population of 74,000. Of these 17,000 were native Hottentots, 30,000 were slaves of African, Asiatic and mixed blood, and 27,000 were of European descent—mostly Dutch, with a sprinkling of German and French. Nearly all spoke the dialect of Holland Dutch, into which the speech of a people so mixed and so isolated had degenerated.

In the beginning of the second English regime there was a fair promise of peace and of the gradual fusion of the Africander and the English elements in a homogeneous people. The Dutch, from whom the Africanders were principally descended, and the English were cognate nations. Though separated as to national life and history

by fourteen centuries, they possessed the same fundamental principles that give tone to character—the two languages were so far alike that the one people found it easy to learn the speech of the other; they both loved liberty, and they both held the Protestant faith. On the surface of things there was every reason to expect that the common features in blood, language, political ideals and religion would lead to kindly intercourse, intermarriages, and a thorough blending of the two races in one.

The first few years of experience seemed to strengthen this promise of good into certainty. Two successive British governors were men of righteousness and wisdom. The restrictions upon trade imposed by the Dutch East India Company were removed. Schools were founded. Measures were taken to improve the breed of horses and cattle. The trade in slaves was forbidden, and missionaries were sent among the natives. The administration of this period was careful to leave untouched as far as possible the local institutions, the official use of the Dutch language, and the Dutch-Roman law, which had become the common law of all civilized South Africa, both Dutch and English.

Under these favoring influences the two peo-

ples became friendly and began to intermarry. In 1820 the British government promoted emigration from England and Scotland to South Africa, to the extent of about five thousand. From that time there was a steady increase of the population from Great Britain, and to a much smaller extent from Germany, France and other European nations. The newcomers from continental Europe soon lost their nationality and learned to speak either English or the local Dutch dialect.

The promise of peace, and of the complete fusion of all the elements in one people loyal to the British crown, was not fulfilled. The causes of the failure—then insidious, but now easy to detect and analyze—must be considered at this point, for only in their light can we understand the Africander people and form a just judgment of their subsequent course.

Doubtless the colonists were influenced, to a greater degree than they realized, by the natural dislike of any civilized people to be transferred to the rule of a foreign nation. They were not the kind of people to make much of the fact that the Dutch and the English sprang from a common origin more than fourteen hundred years before—if they had any knowledge of it. To them

the British were a different race, and the British government was a kind of unloved step-father who had first conquered dominion over them by the strong hand and then bought them with money, as perpetual chattels, from their degenerate mother country.

Another cause of the failure to amalgamate was in the now fixed character of the South African Dutch. Few of them dwelt or cared to dwell in village communities. Some were farmers, it is true, living in touch with the towns: but most of them were stockmen roaming in a pastoral life over large tracts of the country—almost without local habitation. At long intervals they saw something of their always distant next neighbor ranchmen, but they saw nothing of the life in the few colonial towns. The intercourse between these pastoral Africanders and the British was so infrequent, and so limited as to scope, that the two races knew but little of one another. As a result, the process of social amalgamation, going on at Cape Town and in some other places where the population lived in communities, made little progress in the country districts where the great majority of the Africanders dwelt.

A single incident, of no great proportions in itself, must be given a separate mention among

the causes of estrangement between the two civilized races in South Africa. It was not so much the cause of a new line of cleavage as it was the wedge driven to the head into one of the existing lines. In 1815 a Boer was accused of seriously injuring a native servant. When the authorities sent out a small force to arrest the accused his neighbors rallied to his defense, and a brief resistance was offered to the serving of the warrant. The uprising—a mere neighborhood affair—was easily suppressed. Several prisoners were taken, six of whom were condemned to death. Five of the condemned were hanged, and their women—who had fought beside them—were compelled to stand by and witness the execution. Some promise of reprieve had been made by the governor, Lord Charles Somerset. The crowd of Afrianders stood about the gallows on the fatal day, hoping to the last moment that their friends would be spared, but no reprieve came. The tragedy was completed, and the story of it went into the Afriander folklore, becoming, and remaining to this day, a part of the nursery education of every Afriander child. They named the ridge on which the execution took place, "Schlachter's Nek," which, being interpreted, is "Butcher's Ridge." Canon




FIGURE 10. ST. DI. RIAN.

Knox Little, in his late work on South Africa, is authority for the statements that Lord Somerset actually reprieved the condemned men, that the reprieve reached the Field-Cornet appointed to carry out the execution in good time to save the victims, and that the Field-Cornet executed the death warrant having the governor's reprieve in his pocket, being actuated to the murderous deed by private spite. The Canon adds that the Field-Cornet was so sure that he, himself, would be punished for his iniquity that he committed suicide. It is to be devoutly hoped that the learned Canon is well informed both as to the governor's purpose of mercy and the Cornet's motive for suicide. Whatever the interior facts may have been, they were unknown to the Afrianders. The cruel act—justified by the doers as a piece of necessary firmness—caused bitter and widespread resentment at the time, and continues to foster anti-British feeling among all the Dutch of South Africa.

Another cause that made for disruption was an unwarrantable and most unwise interference of the British authorities with two cherished and guaranteed rights of the colonists—the old system of local government, and the use of the Dutch language in official documents and legal pro-

ceedings. In the forms of government changes were made which greatly reduced the share formerly enjoyed by the people in the control of their local affairs. The substituting of English for Dutch in official and legal documents was a still more serious grievance to a people of whom not more than one-sixth understood English.

Still another cause of disaffection grew out of wars with the Kaffirs on the eastern border. Between 1779 and 1834 four struggles to the death occurred between the whites and the tribes living beyond Fish river. By dint of hard fighting the Kaffirs were finally subdued and driven forth into the Keiskama river region. But for some reason the home government assumed that the colonists had ill-treated the natives and provoked them to war. The dear bought victories of the whites were rendered sterile by strict orders from the British Colonial Office that the Kaffirs be allowed to return to their old haunts, where they once more became a source of constant apprehension to the border farmers. This action on the part of the home authorities was taken as an evidence of either weakness or hostility to the Afriander population, and led them to think of the British Colonial Office as their enemy.

The final, probably the principal, cause, the one that fanned the slumbering resentment of

many things into active flame, arose out of the slave question. To the great detriment of their manhood and womanhood the early Dutch colonists resorted to slave labor. From 1658 onward slavery had been practiced throughout the colony, as, indeed, it had prevailed in most of the world. Trouble began to grow out of it as early as 1737. In that year the first European mission to the Hottentots was undertaken by the Moravian church. Their work was much obstructed by the colonists, who even compelled one pastor to return to Europe because he had administered Christian baptism to some native converts. In later years most of the missionaries came from England, where the anti-slavery sentiment was fast becoming dominant, and from 1810 the English missionaries were cordially disliked by the colonists because they openly espoused the cause of the slaves and reported every case of cruelty to them that came to their knowledge. Possibly they sometimes exaggerated, as it has been asserted of them, but this may be excused in the only friends the oppressed blacks had. Besides this conflict between the slave-owners and the missionaries, there was a steady increase of disaffection from a cognate cause—the temper and action of the government towards the servile classes. In 1828, to the great

disgust of the colonists, a civil ordinance placed all Hottentots and other free colored people of South Africa on the same footing with the whites as to private civil rights. This was followed by enactments restricting the authority of masters over their slaves, the purpose being to mitigate the sufferings of the enslaved. Then came the abolition of slavery in all British dominions, in 1834. To provide compensation to slave-owners parliament set apart the sum of £20,000,000, to be distributed to the several colonies where slavery had existed. The share of this amount appropriated to the Cape Colony slave-holders was a little over £3,000,000—a sum considerably below the equitable claim for the 39,000 slaves to be set free. Additional irritation was felt when it was found that the certificates for compensation were made payable in London only, so that most of the Cape slave-holders were forced to sell them to speculators at a heavy discount. Many farmers were impoverished by the change, and labor became so scarce and dear that it was impossible to carry on agriculture to profit.

Serious enough was the summing up of the causes that made for the disruption of the Dutch and the English classes in Cape Colony. Hitherto the Africanders had been able to indulge

their love of independence by living apart from the centers of organized government. But now they had come under the conquering hand of an alien and masterful people; they had been sold for money by their mother country; they had been treated with undue sharpness and cruelty—as witness the atrocity of Schlachter's Nek; they had been spied upon and denounced by the missionaries; they had been forced to transact all their official and legal business in a foreign language which few of them understood; the savage native blacks had been put on a level with them; their victory over the Kaffirs at the cost of much blood had been rendered fruitless by the interference of the home government; and now their slave property, which they had acquired under law, had been taken away without adequate compensation, and the further practice of slavery had been interdicted.

Rebellion against the power of Great Britain was hopeless and not to be thought of. But they could go out into the wilderness and begin life anew where they could follow the independent pastoral pursuits they preferred, enjoy the isolation and solitude they loved, preserve all their ancient customs, and deal with whatever native people they might find there in their own way, untrammelled by the English who had un-

dertaken to govern them on principles which they could neither understand nor approve.

Then began the "Great Trek" of 1836—the Africander secession and exodus, leaving their former country to the possession of the English, and seeking towards the north for a country wherein they would be free according to their own ideals of liberty.

To the north and east of the utmost limit of European settlement in 1836 was a region now divided into the Orange Free State, The Transvaal or South African Republic, and the British colony of Natal. A few hunters had penetrated a little way into it, and some enterprising border farmers had occasionally driven their flocks and herds into the southern fringe of it in search of better pasture. It had been described by the few who had explored it as having districts that were well watered and fertile—a country of arable and pasture lands. Within it, and bordering close to it on the northwest, were the fierce Zulus; and it abounded with big game and enormous beasts of prey. But the Africanders knew what it was to battle for place and for life with wild beasts and savage men. They had less dread of these than of the experiences they foresaw for themselves under the new government set up in Cape Colony. They made choice of the

wilderness with all its hardships and perils, and set forth.

One may not be able to laud all their motives for taking this course, as we judge such matters now, after more than half a century during which there has been a constant brightening of the light of moral truth. It must be admitted that their action was taken, in part, because of attachment to slavery. But condemnation of that part of their complex motives should be modified by the thought that the best peoples of the world were just then coming to see with John Wesley that human slavery is "the sum of all villainies." And it should be remembered that nearly thirty years later than the Africander secession and exodus partly in the interest of slavery, fully one-third of the free population of the United States seceded from the Union wholly in the interest of the same "peculiar institution," claiming to hold their lands as well as their slave property, and that it cost the nation a million lives and a thousand million dollars to transmute into American practice the lofty sentiment embodied in the American Declaration of Independence that, being created equal, all men have sacred rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

After discounting fairly the nobility of their

motives in making the "Great Trek," it will be allowed by every unprejudiced mind that with the less laudable were mingled the love of manly independence and a reasonable resentment at injustices done them in several matters, and that they were supported in the hazardous undertaking by a courage equal to that of the Pilgrim Fathers in venturing into the New England wilderness.

Not inaptly they compared themselves to Israel forsaking Egypt and beginning the long wilderness journey to a land of promise, thinking it not unlikely that the British governor, like Pharaoh, would pursue after them and try to turn them back. But their Pharaoh, after consulting his legal adviser, decided to let them go. It was serious, indeed, to lose so many stalwart and useful citizens, but there was no legal way of stopping them; and it would not do to use the strong hand, for Great Britain had just abolished slavery.

Slowly and in small parties the exodus began, for there must not be cattle enough in one train to exhaust the pasture along the route they were to follow. Places of rendezvous were appointed beforehand, where, at necessary intervals of time, all might come together for mutual encouragement and counsel. The men carried

arms for defense and for the killing of game for food. Long experience in shooting, not for sport but for life itself, had made them almost infallible marksmen—an accomplishment that proved their only salvation in the fierce and long continued struggle that was before them.

Between 1836 and 1838 nearly 10,000 Afrianders set forth, traveling in large covered wagons drawn by strings of oxen numbering in some cases ten and even twelve yoke. It is interesting to know that among the few survivors of that historic pilgrimage is Paul Kruger, who, as a boy of ten years, helped to drive his father's cattle across velt and mountain range.

The story of the wanderings of these emigrant Afrianders, and of their conflicts with the warlike aborigines, is romantic to the highest degree, recalling in some of its features the adventures of the eleventh century crusaders and of the Spaniards in Mexico in the sixteenth century.

The first division that trekked, consisting of ninety-eight persons traveling in thirty wagons, suffered defeat and almost ruinous disaster. They had penetrated into the far northeast beyond the Vaal river—the territory of the present South African Republic—where many of their number fell in battle with the natives. The re-

mainder was rapidly thinned out by deaths from fever and from privation caused by the wholesale destruction of their cattle by the tsetse-fly. After incredible sufferings a mere handful escaped eastward to Delagoa Bay.

Another and larger division was formed by the union of several smaller parties at a rocky peak called Thaba 'Ntshu, situated near the eastern border of what is now the Orange Free State, and visible from Blemfontein. This division soon became involved in hostilities with a branch of the fierce Zulu race, known in later history as the Matabele. The chief of this tribe, Mosilekatze, was a general of much talent and energy as well as a brave warrior. The Matabele, regarding the Africanders as trespassers upon their territory, immediately provoked war by attacking and massacreing a small detached body of emigrants. Doubtless the whites were intruders; but they knew that the Matabele had lately slaughtered or driven out of that region the weaker Kaffir tribes, and therefore had no conscientious scruples about meting to them the same treatment they had measured to others. Indeed, the Africanders seem to have regarded their relation to all the natives as being similar to that of the Israelites under Joshua to the tribes of Canaan—they were there to possess the

land, and to reduce the heathen inhabitants to submission and servitude by whatever means it might be necessary to use. They now had an unprovoked and murderous attack to avenge, which they proceeded to do with great promptitude and courage. Hurling their whole strength against Motsilekatze with the utmost fury, they routed his greatly superior force with terrific slaughter, so that he fled before them, far and fast, toward the northwest, not halting in his flight until he had crossed the Limpopo River. There he, in turn, made havoc of the natives dwelling between that stream and the Zambesi River, and established in that region the Matabele kingdom in such strength that it continued a scourge to all neighboring peoples until its overthrow in 1893. By the defeat and expulsion of the Matabele the Africanders obtained possession of the immense territories lying between the Orange River on the south and the Limpopo on the north. The small communities with which they were able to people the country at first grew in numbers until they became in course of time, the population of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic.

Meantime, the largest and best organized of the three pioneering expeditions, under the capable leadership of Peter Retief—a man much

respected by all Africanders to this day—trekked eastward and then southward into the warmer and more fruitful country lying between the Quathlamba range of mountains and the Indian Ocean. Here they found a region practically emptied of native inhabitants, save a not very numerous tribe of Zulus. Native wars had nearly depopulated the country in 1820. They also found a small English settlement at Fort Natal, where the flourishing town of Durban is now situated. These few Englishmen had obtained a cession of the narrow maritime strip they occupied from King Tshaka, and were maintaining a little republic as a temporary form of government until they could obtain the status of a British colony. They had applied for that standing in 1835, with the request that a legislature be granted them. The British government was still considering their request, and was in doubt as to whether it should occupy the fort and establish a colony there, when the Africanders arrived. The settlement was so insignificant, and the prospective action of the British authorities so uncertain that the emigrants paid little attention to it.

Desiring to live on terms of peace with the Zulus the Africanders applied to their king, Dingaan, for a cession of territory, rashly visit-

ing his kraal for that purpose. The king made the grant readily enough, but the next day when they were about to depart after drinking a farewell cup of native beer, he treacherously ordered his warriors to slay his guests, alleging that they were wizards. Pieter Retief, with all who had accompanied him on the embassy perished that day, and the deed was followed up with an attack on a small body of emigrants camped near by. The surprise was complete, and every soul was massacred without mercy.

These atrocities roused the whole body of emigrants to execute vengeance, and they did it so effectually that anniversaries of that day, December 16th, 1838, are still observed by the people of the Transvaal. A mere handful of the Africanders decimated and put to rout King Dingaan's great host. They owed their victory to expert marksmanship and horsemanship as well as to their lion-like bravery and prowess. Riding swiftly into easy range they fired a volley with deadly precision and then wheeled and as swiftly rode out of reach of the Zulu assagais without suffering harm. Several repetitions of this maneuver so reduced the fighting force and the courage of the Zulus that they turned and fled precipitately. Two years later, 1840, the king's brother, Panda, then in rebellion against Din-

gaan, made common cause with the Africanders, and together they drove the warlike king out of Zululand. Panda was then made king in his brother's stead, accepting the relation of vassal to the government of the Natalia Republic established by the Africanders. They began about this time to survey and apportion the land, and founded a city about sixty-five miles inland from Port Natal, known ever since as Pietermaritzburg.

This action, with some others of a like nature, brought about the second contact of Boer and Briton, the subject to be treated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON—
IN NATAL.

The British authorities at Cape Colony suffered the Africanders to go forth in peace on their Great Trek in search of isolation and independence. But the light of succeeding events shows that, without formally announcing it at first, the government held that the Africanders, go where they might, were to be considered British subjects, and that any territory they might occupy would become British territory by virtue of such occupancy.

About the time when the Republic of Natalia was being organized by the Africanders a small detachment of British troops which had been landed at Port Natal was withdrawn. This was construed by the emigrants as an abandonment by the British government of all claim to the country.

It soon became evident, however, that the proceedings of the new settlers in Natal were

narrowly watched by the authorities at the Cape, and that some of the measures taken were looked upon with serious displeasure. The expulsion of the Kaffirs, and an attempt to force them into a territory already occupied by another tribe, were condemned as being likely to provoke further disorder and conflict. And then, the Cape government, since the Great Trek, had asserted over and over again its right to control the Africanders in any region they might occupy, as subjects of the British crown. Their action in establishing a new and independent white state on the coast was viewed with alarm; for it would certainly affect trade with the interior tribes, and it might create a local rival to Britain's maritime supremacy within what had been considered her own borders. Besides, the colonial government held that it was the natural guardian and protector of the natives, and the attack of the Africanders on the Kaffirs living in near neighborhood to the eastern borders of the Cape settlements was regarded as an insolent aggression which ought to be resented and checked.

The Africanders, on the other hand, denied that the Cape government had any authority over them. The British government, they averred, was territorial and had no authority outside



PRESIDENT STEYN, ORANGE FREE STATE.

the region hitherto formally claimed by the British crown. And they had trekked out of the territory to which Great Britain had laid claim purposely to be a separate, free and independent people. England's thirty million dollars had purchased such territorial rights and public improvements in South Africa as were formerly possessed by the Netherlands, but her money had not bought people.

At this time the British government was unwilling to add to its already too extensive colonial possessions and the heavy responsibilities connected with them. Nevertheless, after careful consideration of all that would be involved in not checking the Africander aspirations and movements towards independence, it was determined to establish British dominion over Port Natal and the territory west of it as far as the crest of the Quathlamba chain of mountains and the extension of them to the north. Pursuant to this policy a small military force under Captain Smith was sent to take possession of Port Natal in 1842.

Smith's command was selected from the post garrison at Umgazi River, and consisted of only two hundred men and two field pieces. The route was over nearly three hundred miles of sea coast in a wilderness state, across numerous riv-

ers, and through the habitat of elephants and lions whose fresh spoor the men saw frequently. After an arduous march of thirty-five days, from the 31st of March to the 4th of May, they reached Port Natal and camped on a hill about six miles from the town.

The resident English, while rejoiced to see the soldiers, were both amused and alarmed when they saw how small a force had been sent to deal with a people who could muster 1,500 well-armed men. Nothing daunted, however, Captain Smith took a few of the artillery and marched into the town on the 5th day of May, hauled down the flag of the Natalia Republic, hoisted in its place the British Union Jack, and spiked the one Africander gun found beside the flagstaff.

For the next few days there was much diplomatic correspondence between the Africander leader, A. W. Pretorius, and the English commander—without coming to any terms of agreement. In the meantime the English moved their encampment to a piece of level ground in front of the town, and the Africanders began to gather a force at the old Dutch camping ground on the Congella, about three miles from the British force. Captain Smith had written instructions to give the “emigrant farmers” fifteen days

to come to a decision, which time the farmers used in strengthening their ranks and intrenching their camp.

It will throw light on the policy pursued at this time by the *Àfricanders* to take into view the action of a certain Dutch ship-master who put into Port Natal one day before the arrival of the British. This man, Captain Reus, speaking as one having authority, gave the *Africans* to understand that the Dutch government would espouse their cause and interest other European powers therein. He also advised them to pursue an evasive policy, to avoid collision, and to keep the English in play till their friends in Europe could act. In accordance with this advice the *Africans* drew up a declaration of allegiance to the Dutch government, coupled with a protest against the occupation of the country by the English. With the exception of the occasional lifting of cattle, they refrained from acts of hostility.

Matters continued in this state until the 23d of May—three days in excess of the fifteen allowed the *Africans* for consideration—when a night attack was made on their camp by the British. Captain Smith found his enemy on the alert, and after a sharp engagement in which the British lost 103 men in killed, wounded and miss-

ing, and both the field guns, he retired to the fortified camp near Port Natal.

The Africanders immediately laid siege to the British garrison and, doubtless, would have compelled it to surrender in the end had it not been for the bravery and endurance of a young Englishman named Richard King. It was six hundred miles, across the breadth of Kaffraria, from Port Natal to Grahamstown, the nearest point at which help for the beleaguered garrison could be found. Young King made the distance, crossing two hundred rivers on the way, in ten days—really in eight, for he was compelled by fever to rest two days out of the ten.

Immediately on receipt of the news at Grahamstown, a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete was dispatched by sea, and reached the famished garrison after it had endured a close siege of thirty-one days. The approach of the re-enforcements was resisted in an action in which the British succeeded in landing, drove the Africanders from their positions, and effected a junction with the garrison in Port Natal. The loss of life in this engagement was not severe, but the siege was raised, and no fresh hostilities were undertaken at that time. The Africanders withdrew to a camp about twelve miles from Port Natal, where they awaited develop-

ments—expecting to be attacked. But the British commander was not in a position for immediate aggression. His provisions and ammunition were to be landed, and there were safe magazines to be provided and strategic posts to be established.

On the 30th of June, 1842, A. W. Pretorius, commandant of the Africander force—now four hundred strong—sent a communication to Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete, asking if he wished to confer with them. The reply was to the effect that no negotiations would be entered into without a previous declaration by the Afrianders of their submission to the British government.

On the 3rd of July Mr. Pretorius again wrote the British commander, complaining that the Kaffirs were committing serious outrages upon his people and plundering them of their cattle, which were being sold to the English. He also informed the commander that, anxious as they were to put an end to the war and so prevent all future bloodshed, the Afrianders found it impossible to accede to the condition imposed as a necessary preliminary to negotiations for peace, viz.: that the Afrianders should declare their submission to the British crown. Mr. Pretorius added, as a reason for this, that they had

already made over the country to the king of the Netherlands, and had invoked his protection.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete replied on the same date, deploring the melancholy prospect of continued war, which would doubtless be complicated with such barbarities as the native savages might be expected to perpetrate. But he maintained that the Africanders were themselves responsible for that prospect, because of their determined acts of hostility to the British government. He intimated that, if they were sincere in the professed desire to avert the coming bloodshed, there would be nothing degrading in giving in their submission to her Britannic Majesty's government, and assured them that there was every disposition on the part of the British authorities to make the final adjustment of affairs both just and generous toward the emigrant farmers. He also expressed much regret that they had allowed themselves to be deceived with regard to the intentions of the King of Holland by a person possessed of no authority to act in the matter. He should be happy, he added in closing, to use his best efforts to prevent acts of violence by the Zulus and Kaffirs, but felt his inability to do much in that respect as long as the Africanders continued in arms against her Majesty's authority, and thus gave these tribes reason to think

that whatever injury done to her rebellious subjects must be pleasing to her government.

The diplomatic correspondence was prolonged into 1843, when a meeting between Mr. Pretorius and other Africander leaders and Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete attended by three or four advisers took a place at Pietermaritzburg. The outcome of the conference was a treaty by which Natal was declared a British colony, but it was remarkably indefinite as to other particulars. The Africanders were to acknowledge themselves British subjects, but were not required to take the oath of allegiance to the queen. The guns they had captured, as well as all their own ordnance, were to be given up. All public and private property was to be restored to the rightful owners or custodians. All prisoners were to be released, and a general amnesty was to be proclaimed to all persons who had been engaged in hostilities against her Majesty's troops and authority, with the exception of four persons, among whom was Mr. Pretorius. By a subsequent article in the treaty the lieutenant-colonel included Mr. Pretorius in the amnesty in consideration of his valuable services and co-operation in arranging the final adjustment of the terms of surrender.


The Volksraad of the little Africander repub-

lic submitted to the terms of the treaty, and to the British administration, in much bitterness and wrath, protesting vehemently but without effect against a certain leveling up process, introduced soon after the transfer of authority, by which the savage blacks were given equal civil rights with the whites.

How the Africanders of Natal in general received the new regime, and how they acted under it, will be the subject of another chapter.

The annexation of the young republic by the English defeated the first attempt of the Africanders to secure access to the sea. It seemed to be a turning point in the history of South Africa, for by it Great Britain obtained command of the east coast, and established a new center of British influence in a part of the country which has come to be called the garden of Africa. Moreover, it opened the way for the acquisition of large contiguous territories in Zululand and in Tongaland.

It has been said that if the little Dutch republic had been left to itself the natives would have suffered under a more rigorous treatment than they have experienced at the hands of the British government, and that the internal dissensions which became quite serious during its brief history would have necessitated British interference



THE VAAL RIVER NEAR BARKLY WEST S.A.

THE VAAL RIVER.

in the general interest of European South Africa. But one cannot feel perfect confidence in uninspired prophecy. And one cannot repress the feeling that the people who had trekked into an unclaimed and unoccupied country for the sake of being isolated from the British, who had subdued the savage Zulu tribes and set up a civilized government of their own, were seized of sacred rights to peaceful possession and independence.

CHAPTER VI.

SECOND CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON—
NORTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER.

The Africanders who had trekked into the spreading uplands lying between the Orange River and the Limpopo, west of Natal, were not exempt from the tribulations experienced by their brethren who had turned eastward to the coast. Like them they were forced to wage incessant war with the natives; but the enemies they had to encounter were less formidable than the Zulus. One tribe, however, and their historic chief, Moshesh, were foemen worthy of their steel. In the nineteenth century there were three men of the Kaffir race who were vastly superior to any of their own people, and measured up evenly with the ablest white opponents they met in diplomacy and war. These men were Tshaka the Zulu, Khama of the Bechuanos, and Moshesh the Basuto. It was the fortune of the Orange River emigrants to meet this Moshesh and the Basutos in many a hard-fought battle for the possession of the country.

Moshesh differed from other Kaffir leaders in that he was merciful to his wounded and captive enemies and ruled his own people with mildness and equity. As early as 1832 he opened the way for, and even invited, missionaries to teach the Basutos a better way of life, and they exerted a powerful formative influence on the Basuto nation. The missionaries were all European—some of them were British—which latter fact was made apparent in the result of their work. When the unavoidable conflict between the Basutos and the whites came, the Basutos, guided by their missionaries, were careful to avoid any fatal breach with the British government. Several times Moshesh engaged in war with the Orange River emigrants, but only once with the English.

In 1843 the Africanders of this region were widely scattered over a vast spread of country measuring seven hundred miles in length and three hundred in width. To the southeast it was bounded by the Quathlamba mountains, but on the north and west there were no natural features to delimitate it from the plain which extends to the Zambesi on the north and to the Atlantic Ocean on the west. Within this territory the Africander population, in 1843, was not much more than 15,000. This seems a small

number in view of the fact that the pioneer emigrants of 1836 to 1838 had been largely re-enforced from the Cape colony. But it must be remembered their life was precarious in the extreme; many had died—some from disease, some in conflict with wild beasts, and a still greater number in their frequent wars with the natives. The white population was further recruited between 1843 and 1847 by a second Africander trek from Natal—which will be described in another chapter.

So small a body of people, of whom not more than 4,000 were adult males, occupying so vast a territory, experienced serious difficulties in establishing an efficient government. The difficulties growing out of that cause were enhanced by the very qualities in the Africanders which had led to their emigration from the old colony, and which had made them successful in their wars of conquest in the interior. To an excessive degree they were possessed by a spirit of individual poise and independence. They desired isolation—even from one another. They chafed and grew restive under control of any kind, so much so that they were indisposed to obey even the authorities created by themselves. For warlike expeditions, which yielded them a pleasant excitement, enlarged their territory by

conquest, and enriched them with captured cattle and other spoil, they readily united under their military leaders and rendered them obedience, but any other form of control they found irksome. This predilection towards solitary independence was constantly strengthened by the circumstances in which they lived. The soil, being dry and parched in most places, did not invite agriculture to any considerable extent. Most of the people turned to stock-farming, and the nomadic life it necessitated in seeking change of pasture for the flocks and herds confirmed the disposition to live separate from other people.

Out of these causes grew the determination to make their civil government absolutely popular, and conditioned, entirely, on the will of the governed. But unity of some kind must be had, for their very existence depended on acting together against the natives, and against the repeated claims of the British government to exercise sovereignty over the region they occupied. The first steps towards instituting civil government were taken in the organizing of several small republican communities, the design being that each should manage its own affairs by a general meeting of all the citizens. It was found, however, as the population spread over the country, that such independent neighborhood gov-

ernments failed to secure the necessary unity of the whole people in any matter requiring the aggregate strength of the whole people. To remedy this element of weakness and danger, the Afrianders instituted a kind of federal bond between the little republican communities, in an elective assembly called the Volksraad—a Council of the People composed of delegates from all the sectional governments. This federative tie was of the weakest—its authority resting upon an unwritten understanding and common consent rather than upon formal articles of confederation, and its meaning being always subject to such interpretation as might be suggested by the error or the passion of the passing moment.

The territory beyond the Vaal River, to the far northeast from Cape Colony, was left undisturbed by the British government. The Afrianders living there were hundreds of miles from the nearest British outpost. Their wars with the natives projected no disturbing influence upon the tribes with whom the colonial government was in touch and for whose peace and prosperity it felt responsible. Moreover, the British authorities at the Cape were under instructions from the Colonial Office of the home government to rather contract than expand the scope of British influence in South Africa. For these

reasons the Cape government cared nothing for what took place in the outlying regions beyond the Vaal, unless, indeed, it was some event calculated to disturb the natives dwelling next the colonial borders.

Altogether different, in the esteem of the Cape authorities and of the Colonial office, were the affairs of the region extending southwestward from the Vaal River to the borders of Cape Colony. Within that territory there had been frequent dissensions between Africander communities. And there had been a rapid increase of dangerous elements in the native population. The Basutos had grown powerful. Intermixed with the whites were the Griquas, a half-breed hunting people, sprung from Africander fathers and Hottentot mothers, and partially civilized. The possibility of serious native wars growing out of quarrels between the white emigrants themselves and between them and the mixed colored population was a constant distress to both colonial governors and the home authorities.

At this time the Cape was regarded the least prosperous of all the British colonies, and there was a growing indisposition to annex any more territory in South Africa. The soil was mostly arid. The Africander population was alien. The

Kaffir wars threatened to be endless and very costly in men and in money. This reluctance to enlarge had been overcome in the case of Natal; but Natal was the garden of South Africa and the possession of it gave the British command of the east coast almost to Delagoa Bay. But to the north there seemed to be nothing sufficiently inviting to justify the taking up of new responsibility and expense.

The problem of how to safeguard the peace of the old Cape Colony without undertaking the burdens involved in governing and holding the whole Africander territory to the northeast, including the region beyond the Vaal River, was thought to have been solved by Doctor Philip, an English missionary, who had some influence with the government. The scheme recommended by Doctor Philip was that the government should create a line of native states under British control along the northeast border of Cape Colony. These would act, he claimed, as a barrier to break the influence of the more turbulent Africanders in the regions north of that line on those of their blood who were yet citizens of the old colony, and they would, in like manner, separate between the native tribes in the colony and those in the interior.

Doctor Philip's plan was adopted with much

enthusiasm. A treaty suitable to the purpose contemplated had already been made with a northern Griqua leader named Waterboer. In 1843 two other treaties were made, one with Moshesh of the Basutos and the other with Adam Kok, a leader of the Orange River Griquas. It was fondly believed that these three states, recognized by and in treaty with Great Britain, would isolate the colony from the disturbing and dangerous people to the north of them.

Doctor Philip's promising arrangement disappointed every one. The Africanders living in the territory of the Griquas refused to be bound in any sense by a treaty made by the despised half-breeds, and the former troubles continued. A further effort was made to give effect to the doctor's statesmanship by establishing a military post at Bloemfontein, about half way between the Orange River and the Vaal, for the purpose of enforcing order and of carrying out the provisions of the treaty. This step was followed up in 1848 by the formal annexation to the British dominions in South Africa of the entire country lying between the Orange and the Vaal, under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty. The second contact of Boer and Briton, begun in

Natal in 1842, was thus extended into the Orange River territory.

The Africanders rose up to assert their independence, encouraged and re-enforced by their brethren from beyond the Vaal. Under the able and energetic leadership of Mr. Pretorius, who had opposed the British in Natal, they attacked Bloemfontein, captured the garrison posted there and advanced to the south as far as Orange River.

The governor of Cape Colony, Sir Harry Smith, hastily dispatched a sufficient force, which met and defeated the Africanders at Bloomplats, about seventy-five miles north of the Orange River, on the 29th of August, 1848. The sole result of this battle was the restoration of British authority over the Orange River Sovereignty. The territory was not incorporated with that of Cape Colony, neither were the Africanders dwelling north of the Vaal River further interfered with.

The old conditions of unrest continued. Fresh quarrels among the native tribes seemed to call for British interference, and led them into war with the Basutos under Moshesh. Out of this conflict and its threatened complications grew a deliberate change of imperial policy in

South Africa, which the English have never ceased to regret.

The situation, so pregnant with far-reaching results, may be stated thus, in brief: The British resident at Bloemfontein had no force at his command that could cope with the Basutos under the masterly leadership of Moshesh. The Africanders living in the district were disaffected—even hostile—to the British government. They therefore refused to support the resident, preferring to fight only their own battles and to make their own terms with the Basutos. The situation of the British grew still more critical when Mr. Pretorius—yet a leading spirit among the Africanders north of the Vaal—threatened to make common cause with the Basutos. As for the old colony at the Cape, it was already involved in a fierce conflict with the south coast Kaffirs, and could not spare a man to aid in quieting the northern disturbances.

At this juncture of circumstances Mr. Pretorius made overtures to the colonial authorities, intimating that he and the northern Africanders desired to make some permanent pacific arrangement with Great Britain. The British authorities, disavowing all right to control the territory north of the Vaal, but still claiming the allegi-

ance of the Aficanders resident therein, appointed commissioners to negotiate with Mr. Pretorius and other representatives of the Transvaal group of emigrants. Subsequently the home authorities of the British government appointed and sent out Sir George R. Clark, K. C. B., as "Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for settling the affairs of the Orange River Sovereignty." Having conferred with all who were concerned personally in the affairs of the Sovereignty, Sir George, in a meeting held at Sand River in 1852, concluded a convention with the commandant and delegates of the Aficanders living north of the Vaal.

In the provisions of this convention the British government expressly "guaranteed to the emigrant-farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British government," and it permitted the emigrants to purchase ammunition in the British colonies in South Africa. It also disclaimed "all alliances with any of the colored nations north of the Vaal River," and stipulated that "no slavery is or shall be permitted or practiced by the farmers north of the Vaal River."

The Transvaal Republic, called, later, the South African Republic, dates its independence from this convention, concluded at Sand River in 1852. It also, by the same instrument, severed itself and its interests from the Africander emigrants living in the Sovereignty south of the Vaal—an act which their southern brethren deemed little short of a betrayal.

For a few months after the convention of 1852 the Sovereignty continued British, and might have done so for many years but for a serious defeat of the British arms in that territory by the Basutos. General Cathcart, who had just been installed as governor of the Cape, rashly attacked the Basutos with a strong force of regulars, was led into an ambush and suffered so great a disaster that further hostile operations were impossible without a new and larger army. The politic Moshesh saw in the situation an opportunity to make peace with the English on favorable terms, which he at once proceeded to do.

This crushing reverse called out a report to the British ministers relative to the condition of affairs in the Sovereignty, and a statement of the policy he favored in reference to that part of her majesty's dominions, from Sir George Clark, the

special commissioner appointed to settle the affairs thereof. The closing paragraphs of that report read as follows :

“The more I consider the position, relative both to the Cape colony and its (the Sovereignty’s) own internal circumstances, the more I feel assured of its inutility as an acquisition, and am impressed with a sense of the vain conceit of continuing to supply it with civil and military establishments in a manner becoming the character of the British Government, and advantageous to our resources.

“It is a vast territory, possessing nothing that can sanction its being permanently added to a frontier already inconveniently extended. It secures no genuine interests ; it is recommended by no prudent or justifiable motive ; it answers no really beneficial purpose ; it imparts no strength to the British Government, no credit to its character, no lustre to the crown. To remain here, therefore, to superintend or to countenance this extension of British dominion, or to take part in any administrative measure for the furtherance of so unessential an object, would, I conceive, be tantamount to my encouraging a serious evil, and participating in one of the most signal fallacies which has ever come under my notice in the

course of nearly thirty years devoted to the public service."

The British Government, weary of the perpetual native wars, disgusted at the late defeat of the British regulars by Moshesh and his Basutos, and influenced by the emphatic and very significant report of their special commissioner, which report was heartily indorsed by Governor Cathcart, decided to abandon the Orange River Sovereignty altogether. An act of parliament in accordance with that decision was passed. Later, when there were vehement protests against the abandonment—protests from the missionaries who feared for the welfare of the natives, and from English settlers in the Sovereignty who desired to remain subject to the British crown—a motion was made in the House of Commons begging the Queen to reconsider the renunciation of her sovereignty over the Orange River territory, but the motion found no support at all, and had to be withdrawn. Instead, parliament voted £48,000 to compensate any who might suffer loss in the coming change, so eager were the authorities to be rid of this large territory with its constant vexations and its costliness. And thus it was that independence was literally forced upon the Orange River country.

By the convention of the 23d of February, 1854, signed at Bloemfontein, the British government "guaranteed the future independence of the country and its government," and covenanted that they should be, "to all intents and purposes, a free and independent people." It further provided that the Orange River government was to be free to purchase ammunition in the British South African colonies, and that liberal privileges were to be granted it in connection with import duties. As in the case of the Transvaal, so in this convention it was stipulated, that no slavery or trade in slaves was to be permitted north of the Orange River. The name given to the new nation was "The Orange River Free State."

It cannot be denied that these conventions of 1852 and 1854 created two new and independent states. Nor can it be denied that in consenting to their creation the action of the British government was taken under no pressure of war, under no powerful foreign interference, but altogether of its own free will, and with the conviction that in cutting loose from undesirable and disputed territory it was acting for the good of the empire.

Canon Knox Little, in his "South Africa," calls this action of the British government "a serious blunder." Be that as it may, the Afri-



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canders acted in perfect consistency with all their former aspirations and claims, and they made no blunders in the negotiations that secured to them independent national existence. The British "blunder"—if blunder it was—was written in a formal official document, and subscribed by the authorized representatives of the government, appointed expressly to give effect to imperial legislation, and can no more be repudiated righteously than can a written contract between private individuals.

CHAPTER VII.

THE AFRICANDER'S SECOND TREK TO THE NORTH.

The purview intended to be given in these pages requires that we now look back to Natal, and to the condition and movements of the Afrianders living in that region after it became British territory. As has been stated in chapter V., the English took forcible possession of Natal in 1843. Two years later it was made a dependency of the older colony at the Cape; in 1856 it was constituted a separate colony, and so remains to this day.

A small minority of the Afrianders—about five hundred families—being greatly attached to the homes they had founded in that most attractive part of South Africa, reconciled themselves to the British administration and remained. But the majority, including all the fiercer and more restless spirits, took their families and goods, their flocks and herds, and once more trekked in

search of independence. Their course lay north-westward across the mountains to the elevated plateaus of the Orange River district and the Transvaal.

Very reluctantly the Africanders abandoned sunny and fruitful Natal, and the one hold they had ever gained of a part of the coast. But a goodly land and access to the sea, to be of great value in their esteem, must be associated with freedom to govern themselves and to deal with the native population as an inferior and servile race not entitled to civil equality with the whites.

The Africander love of independence, and their reasonable objection to be civilly on a level with the ignorant and savage blacks, command respect and admiration; but their treatment of the natives, where unrestrained by British rule, was anything but creditable. They may be excused for many wars with Bushmen and Kaffirs, for their very lives depended on either reducing these to submission or driving them to a safe distance from the white settlements. But the enslaving of men and women, and, later, of children under the subterfuge of apprenticeship for a term of years, cannot be justified; it was monstrously incompatible with the insistent demand for personal freedom for themselves so conspicu-

ous in the Africander race. The one extenuating circumstance is the fact that, leading an isolated life, they were slower than other civilized peoples in catching the spirit of the age—a spirit that makes for freedom, and a growing betterment in the condition of every man.

The exodus of Natal Africanders between 1843 and 1848 encouraged an immense influx of Kaffirs, who repopulated the country so plentifully that the proportion of blacks to whites has been as ten to one ever since.

The emigrants who settled north of the Vaal, both those of the Great Trek and those from Natal who began to join them in 1843, were rude and uneducated as compared to their brethren of the Orange River region. The northern group had less of English blood in their veins, and because of distance and difficulty of communication they were not at all affected by intercourse with the more cultured people of Cape Colony.

Lacking the upward lead that contact with a progressive civilization would have given, there took place a marked degeneration of character in these more northern emigrants. Their love of independence was developed into a spirit of faction and dissension among themselves. Their lionlike bravery was perverted into a too great

readiness to fight on the smallest provocation, and a disposition to prey upon their weaker native neighbors. Through a desire to enlarge their grazing lands they became greedy as to territory, and were almost constantly engaged in bloody strife with the native occupants of the regions they insisted on annexing.

The almost patriarchal mode of life they followed had the effect of segregating them into family groups widely separated from one another, largely exempted from any control of magistrates and law courts, and susceptible to family feuds and bitter personal rivalries between faction leaders. This absence of efficient control was a cause of further evil in encouraging an influx of unprincipled adventurers from other parts of South Africa. These went about through the more unsettled parts and along the border, cheating and often violently illtreating the natives to the great peril of peace both in the Transvaal and in the contiguous British provinces. As an example of the turmoil in which the people lived and participated, the following account is introduced of an Africander expedition under Acting Commandant-General Scholtz against Secheli, chief of the Baquaines, a tribe of Zulus. It also covers the incident of the plundering of Doctor

Livingstone's house by the force under General Scholtz.

The matter of complaint was that the Ba-quaines had been constantly disturbing the country by thefts and threatenings, and that they were sheltering a turbulent chief named Mosolele. In order to punish and reduce them to obedience a commando was sent against them. After some petty encounters with scouts the Africander force drew near to Secheli's town, in the direction of the Great Lake, on the 25th of August, 1852. Two days' further march brought them so near that the Africander scouts discovered and reported that Secheli was making every preparation for defense.

On the 28th Scholtz marched close by the town where Secheli was fortified, and camped beside the town-water, a little distance from the intrenchments. It being Saturday Scholtz resolved to do nothing to provoke a battle before Monday, being desirous of keeping the Lord's Day in quiet. He did, however, dispatch a letter to Secheli demanding the surrender of Mosolele, in the following terms :

"Friend Secheli: As an upright friend, I would advise you not to allow yourself to be misled by Mosolele, who has fled to you because

he has done wrong. Rather give him back to me, that he may answer for his offense. I am also prepared to enter into the best arrangements with you. Come over to me, and we shall arrange everything for the best, even were it this evening. Your friend,

“P. E. SCHOLTZ, Act. Com.-Gen.”

To this Secheli replied :

“Wait till Monday. I shall not deliver up Mosolele. * * * But I challenge you on Monday to show which is the strongest man. I am, like yourself, provided with arms and ammunition, and have more fighting people than you. I should not have allowed you thus to come in, and would assuredly have fired upon you ; but I have looked in the book, upon which I reserved my fire. I am myself provided with cannon. Keep yourself quiet to-morrow, and do not quarrel for water till Monday ; then we shall see who is the strongest man. You are already in my pot ; I shall only have to put the lid on it on Monday.

On Sunday Secheli sent two men to the camp to borrow some sugar—which Scholtz regarded as bravado. The messengers also brought word from Secheli directing Scholtz to take good care that the oxen did not pasture on the poisonous

grass in the neighborhood of his camp, for he now looked upon them as his own.

On Monday Scholtz sent messengers to Secheli to ascertain his intentions and to renew the offers of peace. The Zulu chieftain replied that he required no peace, that he now challenged Scholtz to fight, and added, "If you have not sufficient ammunition, I will lend you some."

After some further exchanges of diplomatic courtesies between the African and the Afri-cander the battle began. By six hours of hard fighting Scholtz carried all the native intrenchments, killed a large number of the warriors, and captured many guns and prisoners. The Zulus still held one fortified ridge of rocks when night-fall put an end to the battle. In the morning it was found that Secheli had retreated from his stronghold under cover of night. Scholtz sent out a force in pursuit, who inflicted further punishment on the fugitives and returned the next day without loss of a man.

General Scholtz's official report of this expedition contains the following remarkable statement regarding the looting of Doctor Livingstone's house:

"On the 1st of September I dispatched Commandant P. Schutte with a patrol to Secheli's



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old town ; but he found it evacuated, and the missionary residence broken open by the Kaffirs. The commandant found, however, two percussion rifles ; and the Kaffir prisoners declared that Livingstone's house, which was still locked, contained ammunition, and that shortly before he had exchanged thirteen guns with Secheli, which I had also learnt two weeks previously, the missionaries Inglis and Edwards having related it to the burghers, A. Bytel and J. Synman ; and that Livingstone's house had been broken open by Secheli to get powder and lead. I therefore resolved to open the house that was still locked, in which we found several half-finished guns and a gunmaker's shop with abundance of tools. We here found more guns and tools than Bibles, so that the place had more the appearance of a gunmaker's shop than a mission-station, and more of a smuggling-shop than a school place."

Doctor Livingstone's character is too well known in all the civilized world to need even a word of vindication. General Scholtz, being taken as sincere in his statements, fell into an egregious and well-nigh inexcusable error concerning the tools found in the doctor's house and the guns in various stages of completeness. In those parts, so distant from carpenters, wagon-

makers and smiths, it was absolutely necessary for the explorer to have with him all tools required in making or repairing wagons, harness, guns, and whatever else belonged to his outfit. It is impossible to account for General Scholtz's statements concerning the altogether blameless Doctor Livingstone in any other way than to ascribe them to prejudice. It is well known that there was in the Africander mind a deep-rooted hostility against the missionaries, of whom David Livingstone was chief, because they denounced the practice of slavery and reported the cruelties incident to it. Had General Scholtz been entirely free from the prejudice due to this cause he would have seen on Doctor Livingstone's premises not an illicit gun factory, but an honest repair shop such as any pioneer in those parts must have.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE INDEPENDENT AFRICANDER AND SLAVERY.

It will be remembered that the conventions of 1852 and 1854, by which the absolute independence of the Africanders living beyond the Vaal River and of those resident in the Orange River district was guaranteed, bound them to renounce the practice of slavery. They did not find it easy, however, to keep either the letter or the spirit of that covenant. For generations both the men and the women had been accustomed to immunity from the more severe and disagreeable work of life. Twice had they trekked, largely to get away from British power because it would no longer tolerate slavery on British soil. But now they had accepted independent national life, and were in honor bound to carry out the stipulation of the treaties which guaranteed their independence, by liberating such slaves as they possessed and by acquiring no more. It is next in order, therefore, to consider the manner in which these obligations were carried out.

Whatever outward appearances there may have been of ceasing to enforce servitude from the blacks, there is indubitable evidence that little more than a change of name for it was effected—the thing went on. A new system of virtual slavery was invented and prevailed extensively under the plausible name of “apprenticeship,” and “registration” of prisoners taken in war with the natives; and it is to be feared that many predatory expeditions were undertaken chiefly to secure fresh victims for this new method of enforcing unpaid service—all of which was in flagrant violation of the treaties by which the republics were established and guaranteed independence.

The new system was defended by those who devised it and profited by it, as a benevolent institution, because it took the orphan children of the Kaffirs—for whom their own people made no provision—and apprenticed them to Africander masters for a limited period, to terminate in every case at twenty-one years of age. But when it is understood that in many cases the Kaffir bond-children had been made orphans by Africander bullets the benevolence of the institution becomes a vanishing quantity. And it is to be remembered, in judging of this matter, that these igno-

rant Kaffir apprentices had no means of knowing their own age, nor was there any one to speak and act for them when the proper time for their release from bondage came. The new system was slavery under a less repulsive name, and was so regarded by its victims.

It is only fair to the Africanders to trace their conduct in this matter back to the convictions and principles honestly held by them, and by which they justified to themselves their practices toward the natives. Almost without exception they were men of intense religiousness and devout regard for the Bible. It was a great misfortune to themselves and to the natives of South Africa they had found their standard of ethics, not in any of the moral precepts of the New Testament or the Old, but in their own deductions from scraps of Old Testament history which were never intended to furnish ideals and standards of virtue and righteousness for later generations. Thus, they looked upon the dark races about them as the yet "accursed" sons of Canaan the son of Ham, doomed by heaven to perpetual servitude to any people who might care to enslave them, because of the sin of their forefather, Ham. They seem to have forgotten, too easily, that the divine entail of evil consequences to fol-

low certain sins was limited to "the third and fourth generation," and insisted without warrant of any kind on bringing it over to and enforcing it upon the one hundred and thirtieth generation. Holding such views, they considered themselves as doing service to God when they inflicted the degradations, hardships and cruelties of slavery upon the offspring of Ham. It was their custom to meet for prayer before going on one of their forays, to implore the help and protection of the Almighty in what they were about to do; then they went forth heartened and emboldened by the conviction that the coming battle was the Lords, and to fall therein would be a sure passport to heaven. It would be untrue to say that all the Africanders were of this belief and practice, but undoubtedly the majority of them so believed and so acted.

Many of the whites quarreled with their ministers because they persisted in teaching Christianity to the people held to be accursed—by their masters. The Dutch term *Zendeling*, originally signifying "missionary," was turned into an epithet of reproach, bearing the new interpretation of a petty artisan and pedlar, who, under pretense of instructing the natives, wandered

about prosecuting a secular business for gain—a man to be despised and shunned.

Instances are not wanting in the records of this period to show that the spirit and practice of some Africanders were as set forth above. Mr. Holden, in the appendix to his “History of Natal,” quotes from a friend of the enslaved blacks as follows :

“As to slavery, in spite of the treaty with the Assistant Commissioner, two Kaffir boys have this very week been sold here—the one for a hundred rix-dollars to a Boer, and the other for a hundred and fifty rix-dollars to a dealer at Rustenburg. Last month, also, two were sold to Messrs. S. and G. Maritz, traders of Natal, and were immediately ‘booked’ (*ingeboek*) with the Landdrost of Potchesetroom for twenty-five years each! Is this according to treaty? If not, why does not Governor Cathcart interfere by force, if reasoning be unavailing? For, without some force, I see little prospect of the natives being saved from utter and universal slavery.”

Mr. Holden also quotes from the “Grahams-town Journal” of September 24, 1853, the following significant incident :

“We are credibly informed that, in a private interview with Sir G. R. Clark, one of the most

respectable and loyal Boers, resident on a confiscated farm in the most disaffected district, '*inter alias res*,' plainly told Sir George that he had some twenty or thirty Bushman children on his place; and that if government withdrew he must sell them, as, if he did not do so, other persons would come and take them, and sell them. The reply, as stated to us, was to the effect, 'You have been too long a good subject to lead me to think you would do such a thing now.' To this the answer was, 'I have been a good subject; but if government will *make* me a rascal, I cannot help it.' "

These testimonies coming from separate and widely distant sources, and giving the particulars of direct and positive slavery practiced under another name, leave no reasonable doubt that the spirit of the compact between the British government and the Africanders was being violated.

It has been thought that the account of the same matter given by Mr. Theal, in his "South Africa," puts an entirely different aspect on the practice of "apprenticeship."

"At this time," he writes (1857), "complaints were beginning to be heard that the practice of transferring apprentices, or selling indenturès, was becoming frequent. It was rumored also

that several lawless individuals were engaged in obtaining black children from neighboring tribes, and disposing of them under the name of apprentices. How many such cases occurred cannot be stated with any pretension to accuracy, but the number was not great. The condition of the country made it almost impossible to detain any one capable of performing service longer than he chose to remain with a white master, so that even if the farmers in general had been inclined to become slaveholders, they could not carry such inclinations into practice. The acts of a few of the most unruly individuals in the country might, however, endanger the peace and even the independence of the republic. The president, therefore, on the 29th of September, 1857, issued a proclamation pointing out that the sale or barter of black children was forbidden by the recently adopted constitution, and prohibiting transfers of apprenticeships, except when made before land-drosts."

Treating of a later period (1864-65), he returns to this matter, saying:

"A subject that was much discussed in Europe, as well as in South Africa, during this period was the existence of slavery in the republic. Charges against the burghers of reducing

weak and helpless blacks to a condition of servitude were numerous and boldly stated on one side, and were indignantly denied on the other. That the laws were clearly against slavery goes for nothing, because in a time of anarchy law is a dead letter. There is overwhelming evidence that blacks were transferred openly from one individual to another, and there are the strongest assertions from men of undoubted integrity that there was no slavery. To people in Europe it seemed impossible that both should be true, and the opinion was generally held that the farmers of the interior of South Africa were certainly slave-holders.

“Since 1877 much concerning this matter that was previously doubtful has been set at rest. On the 12th of April of that year the South African republic was proclaimed British territory, and when, soon afterward, investigation was made, not a single slave was set free, because there was not one in the country. In the very heart of the territory kraals of blacks were found in as prosperous a condition as in any part of South Africa. It was ascertained that these blacks had always lived in peace with the white inhabitants, and that they had no complaints to make. Quite as strong was the evidence afforded by the number

of the Bantu. In 1877 there were, at the lowest estimate, six times as many black people living in a state of semi-independence within the borders of the South African Republic as there had been on the same ground forty years before. Surely these people would not have moved in if the character of the burghers was such as most Englishmen believed it to be. A statement of actual facts is thus much more likely now to gain credence abroad than would have been the case in 1864.

“The individuals who were termed slaves by the missionary party were termed apprentices by the farmers. The great majority—probably nineteen out of every twenty—were children who had been made prisoners in the wars which the tribes were continually waging with each other. In olden days it had been the custom for the conquering tribe to put all the conquered to death, except the girls and a few boys who could be made useful as carriers. More recently they had become less inhuman, from having found out that for smaller children they could obtain beads and other merchandise.

“With a number of tribes bordering on the republic ready to sell their captives, with the Betshuana everywhere prepared to dispose of the

children of their hereditary slaves, a few adventurous Europeans were found willing to embark in the odious traffic. Wagon loads of children were brought into the republic, where they were apprenticed for a term of years to the first holder, and the deeds of apprenticeship could afterward be transferred before a landdrost. This was the slavery of the South African Republic. Its equivalent was to be found a few years earlier in the Cape colony, when negroes taken in slave-ships were apprenticed to individuals. There would have been danger in the system if the demand for apprentices had been greater. In that case the tribes might have attacked each other purposely to obtain captives for sale. But the demand was very limited, for the service of a raw black apprentice was of no great value. A herd boy might be worth something more than his food, clothing, and a few head of cattle which were given him when his apprenticeship expired; but no other class of raw native was.

“It is an open question whether it was better that these children should remain with the destroyers of their parents, and according to chance grow up either as slaves or as adopted members of the conquering tribe; or that they should serve ten or fifteen years as apprentices to white people,

acquire some of the habits of European life, and then settle down as freemen with a little property. It was answered in 1864, and will be answered to-day according to the bias of the individual."

After all, Mr. Theal's account of it does not materially change the aspect of the system of enforced servitude that prevailed in the Afri-cander communities after they became independent. These bond-children were either captured or bought from dealers in children; they were held under bill of sale and indenture; and they were sold from master to master by legal transfer of indenture before a magistrate.

Mr. Theal's low estimate of the value of the services that could be rendered by raw black children, and of the limited demand for them, is not in harmony with his own statement that such children were brought into the republic in wagon loads, nor with the testimony, quoted by Mr. Holden, covering two specific cases wherein one Kaffir boy was sold for one hundred, and another for one hundred and fifty rix-dollars. And his averment that in 1877 the British authorities could not find a single slave to liberate in all the territory of the South African Republic is simply amusing when viewed in the light of what he states on the next page—that this system of en-

forced servitude under indentures that were legally merchantable "was the slavery of the South African Republic." Undoubtedly; and, so far as is known, no other form of slavery was ever seriously charged against the Afrianders after their independence was established. It is matter of surprise, however, that the British conscience of this period was not able to scent the malodor of slavery under the new form and title of "apprenticeship" which covered a marketable property-right in the human chattel.

CHAPTER IX.

THIRD CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON—IN
THE ORANGE FREE STATE.

The "Great Trek" of 1836 and 1838 removed from the old colony at the Cape an element in the population which, however worthy in some regards, was unrestful and disaffected, leaving abundant room for a new immigration from Europe. It was some years, however, before there was any considerable influx from continental Europe. Judged by the grim rumors that were afloat everywhere, South Africa was a dangerous country to live in because of the warlike and merciless Kaffirs; and the trend of British emigration was yet towards America.

About 1845 the tide of fortune-seeking people was turned towards Cape Colony. The British government of this time stimulated immigration to that field so liberally that in five years between four and five thousand loyal subjects from the mother country removed to the Cape. Later,

a considerable number of disbanded German soldiers who had served under the British colors in the Crimean war were sent there as citizens, and in 1858 over two thousand German civilians of the peasant order were settled along the south coast on lands once occupied by the Kaffirs.

Industries natural to the climate and soil were slowly but steadily developed. Sheep and cattle raising, and agriculture to a limited extent, became sources of wealth, and correspondingly expanded the export trade. Public finances were gradually restored to a healthy state, churches and schools sprang up, and there was no serious drawback to the progress of the colony but the frequent Kaffir invasions across the eastern border. These cost much loss of life and property to the raided settlements, but the expense of the resulting wars was borne by the home government. Under British rule the population had increased from 26,000 Europeans in 1806 to 182,000 in 1865.

With the growth of population there came changes in the form of government. The earlier governors exercised almost autocratic power, fearing nothing but a possible appeal against their acts to the Colonial Office in London. It should be stated, however, that the colonists



GENERAL JOUBERT.

found as frequent cause to complain of the home government as of their governors. The occasional irritation which broke out into open protest was caused, for the most part, by difficulties with the natives. The Europeans, dwelling among an inferior race, naturally looked upon the natives as existing for their benefit, and bitterly resented the disposition of both the imperial authorities and the governors to give equal civil rights and protection to the blacks. The missionaries were the special objects of this resentment, because they held themselves bound by their sacred office to denounce the wrongs inflicted on the Kaffirs, and to even defend their conduct in rebelling against oppression.

These unfortunate dissensions had the effect of uniting the English and the Dutch colonists in questions of policy and government regarding the natives. After various attempts to satisfy the people with a governor appointed by the crown and a Legislative Council constituted by the governor's nomination and imperial appointment, the home authorities, in 1854, yielded to the public demand for representative institutions.

A legislature, consisting of a Legislative Council and a House of Assembly, was established, both to be elected on a franchise wide

enough to include people of any race or color holding the reasonable property qualification. The sole check upon the colonial legislature retained by the imperial government was the right of the British crown to disallow any of its acts considered objectionable, on constitutional or other grounds, by her Majesty's ministers. The executive power remained, for a time, with the governor and his council, who were appointed by the crown and in no way responsible to the colonial houses. Later, the executive power was taken from the governors and vested in a cabinet of ministers responsible to the colonial legislature and holding office during its pleasure.

The range of industries followed by the people of Cape Colony was not enlarged until the discovery of diamonds in 1869. This brought in a sudden rush of population from Europe and America and so inflated trade that the colonial revenue was more than doubled in the next five years. Then began that unparalleled development of mineral resources in South Africa which created immense wealth and furnished the elements of a political situation whose outcome the wisest cannot foresee.

With this general view of the condition of Cape Colony in the three decades succeeding the

Great Trek of the Africanders, we turn again to the special study proposed and consider the chain of events that led up to the third unfriendly contact between Boer and Briton—this time beginning in the Orange Free State.

By the conventions of 1852 and 1854 Great Britain formally relinquished all claim to that part of the interior of South Africa lying to the north of Cape Colony, and recognized the republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. There can be no doubt of the sincerity of the British government in taking this action. The prevailing desires actuating both the parliament and the executive were to be rid of the responsibility and expense of governing these regions, and to leave the two new Africander republics to work out their own destiny in their own way.

For a few years the relations of the Cape government and its northern neighbors were friendly. The first occurrence that disturbed the welcome peace and harmony was a serious war which broke out in 1858 between the Basutos under Moshesh and the Orange Free State. The Basutos laid claim to certain farms, held under English titles, in Harrismith, Wynburg and Smithfield districts. These were taken pos-

session of by the petty Basuto captains, and when attempts were made to eject the intruders, Moshesh, the paramount chief, and his eldest son Letsie, assumed the right to interfere. This episode, together with other unfriendly acts on the part of the Basutos, brought on a condition which, it became evident, nothing but war could remedy. Accordingly, the Volksraad of the Orange Free State authorized the President, Mr. Roshof, to take any steps necessary to prevent intrusion upon the territory of the State. After much and very insincere diplomatic correspondence, the time of which was used by the Free State government in collecting the forces of its western and northern divisions, and by the Basutos in assembling their warriors, petty raids began the conflict and led on to hostilities on a larger scale near the end of March, 1858.

By the 26th of April Mr. Boshof became convinced that the Free State could not hold its own against the Basutos, and that the salvation of the country from being overrun by its enemies depended upon obtaining aid from some quarter. Acting on this conviction, on the 24th of April Mr. Boshof wrote Sir George Grey, governor of Cape Colony, informing him of the critical condition of the Free State, and imploring his media-

tion. Sir George, after obtaining the sanction of the House Assembly to such a course, immediately tendered his services as mediator to Mr. Boshof and Moshesh, and was unconditionally and cordially accepted by both. Thereupon a cessation of hostilities was agreed to pending the arrangement of final terms of peace by Sir George.

In the meantime, the Free State was being ravaged on its western border by petty chiefs, who saw in the struggle between the whites and the powerful Basutos a favorable opportunity to enrich themselves with spoil. In the distress occasioned by these forays the Free State was aided by a force of burghers from the Transvaal Republic, under Commandant Paul Kruger.

Out of this friendly act there grew up a desire and even a proposition to unite the two republics in one. President Pretorius, Commandant Paul Kruger, and about twenty other representatives from the Transvaal visited Bloemfontein to confer with the Free State Volksraad on the matter of union—a measure considered by many the only means of saving the country from its savage foes.

While the conference on union was in progress there arrived, on the 11th of June, a letter

from Sir George Grey announcing that in case an agreement to unite the two republics were concluded, the conventions of 1852 and 1854—guaranteeing their separate independence—would no longer be considered binding by Great Britain. Undoubtedly this action evinced a desire, not to say a determination, that the Free State should find safety not by union with the sister republic to the north, but by coming again under British sovereignty and forming one of a group of colonies to be united in a great British Dominion in South Africa. The negotiations for union were dropped on the receipt of Sir George's letter, and both parties resolved to appoint commissioners to confer with him after peace with the Basutos should be arranged.

It was not until the 20th of August that Sir George Grey arrived at Bloemfontein to act as mediator between Moshesh and the Free State. While preliminaries were being discussed the governor received urgent dispatches from London ordering him to send all available troops to India, where the Sepoy rebellion was raging. It became, therefore, a matter of supreme importance to establish peace between the Free State and the Basutos at once—for not a soldier could safely be spared until that was accomplished.

On the 29th of September the treaty was completed and signed. It settled a new frontier for the Free State next to Basutoland, and bound Moshesh to either punish marauders of his people himself, or consent that the Free State authorities should do so.

This peace lasted only seven years. In 1865 new troubles arose leading to a renewal of war between the Free State and Moshesh. Again the governor of Cape Colony acted as mediator, but his decisions were rejected by the Basutos, and new hostilities began. This time, by a heroic effort made in 1868, the whites defeated and scattered the Basutos with great slaughter, and were at the point of utterly breaking their power, when the always politic Moshesh appealed to the British High Commissioner at the Cape to take his people under British protection.

The commissioner doubtless considered the interests of Cape Colony which, in the event of a dispersion of the Basutos, might be overrun by the fugitives, and suffer injury thereby. And it is evident that he was unwilling that the Free State should strengthen itself, beyond the necessity of ever seeking readmission to the British dominions, by the annexation of Basutoland. So, looking to the safety of the old colony, and to the

hope of some day adding thereto the Orange Free State, the commissioner took the defeated Basutos under the wing of the imperial government and declared them British subjects.

The Free State was allowed to retain a considerable area of good land which it had conquered on the north side of the Caledon River, but the adjustment reached was anything but satisfactory. The British had now established their authority to the south of the republic all the way from Cape Colony to Natal, and, thus, had extinguished a second time the persistent Afrikaner hope of extending their territory to the sea. Thus, in 1869, recommenced the British advance toward the interior.

Another momentous step towards enlarging the sphere of British influence was taken almost immediately. Diamonds were discovered in 1869, in a district lying between the Modder and the Vaal rivers, where the present town of Kimberley stands. Within a few months thousands of diggers and speculators from all parts of South Africa, Europe, America, and from some parts of Asia, thronged into the region and transformed it into a place of surpassing value and interest. The question of ownership was raised at once. The Orange Free State claimed it. The Trans-

vaal Republic claimed it. It was claimed by Nicholas Waterboer, a Griqua captain, son of old Andries Waterboer; his claim being based on an abortive treaty made with the elder Waterboer in 1834, when, at Doctor Philip's suggestion, the attempt was made to interpose between the old colony and the northern populations a line of three native states under British protection. And it was claimed by a native Batlapin chief.

Three of these claimant—the Transvaal Republic, Nicholas Waterboer for the Grikwas, and the Batlapin chief for his clan—agreed to settle the conflict by arbitration, naming the governor of Natal as arbitrator. The governor promptly awarded the disputed ownership to Nicholas Waterboer the Griqua, who as promptly placed himself under the British government, which, with equal promptitude, constituted the district a crown colony under the name of Griqualand. The Orange Free State, not having been a party to the arbitration, protested, and was afterwards sustained by the decision of a British court, which found that Waterboer's claim to the territory was null and void. But the colony had been constituted and the British flag unfurled over it before the finding of the court could stay proceedings.

Without admitting or denying the Free State's contention, the British government obtained a quitclaim title for a money consideration. It was represented that a district so difficult to keep in order, because of the transient and turbulent character of the population, should be under the control of a more vigorous government than that of the Free State. Finally, the British offered and the Free State authorities accepted, £90,000 in settlement of any claim the republic might have to the territory of Griqualand.

The incident closed with the payment and acceptance, in 1876, of the price agreed upon. But the Africanders of the Free State had the feeling at the time—and it never ceased to rankle in their breasts—that they had been made the victims of sharp practice; that the diamond-bearing territory had been rushed into the possession of the British and made a crown colony without giving them a fair opportunity to prove their claim to it; and that, while the price offered and paid was a tacit recognition of the validity of their claim, it was so infinitesimal in proportion to the rights conveyed as to imply that in British practice not only is possession nine points in ten of the law but that it also justifies the holder in keeping back nine parts out of ten of the value.

Nor was this the only British grievance complained of at this time by the Free State. The project of uniting the two republics for greater strength and mutual safety had been vetoed for no apparent reason than to keep them weak so that they might the sooner become willing to re-enter the British dominions in South Africa. And the British High Commissioner at the Cape had taken the vanquished Basutos and their territory under imperial protection at the moment when the victorious Free State was about to reduce them to permanent submission, and to extend its territory to the sea—again interposing the arm of Great Britain to prevent the strengthening of the republic by its proposed acquisition of Basutoland and the gaining of a seaport at the mouth of the St. John River.

Nevertheless, the Orange Free State accepted the situation philosophically and, outwardly, continued on friendly terms with the British government until the outbreak of war between that power and the Afrianders of the Transvaal in 1899.

CHAPTER X.

THIRD CONTACT OF AFRICANDER AND BRITON—IN
THE TRANSVAAL.

The aggressive policy of the British, which had served to widen and deepen the breach between them and the Afrianders of the Free State, was felt in the Transvaal Republic, also, and led to an open rupture in 1880. It will be necessary to trace somewhat carefully the conditions and events which brought on that conflict.

The Afrianders who had settled beyond the Vaal River were of a ruder sort than their brethren of the Orange River district. Moreover, the reckless, unprincipled, and even criminal classes were attracted to the Transvaal from various parts of South Africa, seeking freedom from the restraints experienced under the stricter government prevailing in the British colonies. These occasioned much scandal, and provoked many conflicts with the Kaffirs by their lawlessness and violence along the border and in the wilder districts of the territory.

The farmers of the Vaal in a general way considered themselves one people, but had become grouped in several districts separated by considerable distances. Thus, in 1852, there were four separate communities—Potchefstroom, Utrecht, Lydenburg, and Zoutspansberg, each having its volksraad and president. There was no co-ordinate action of the whole for internal administration and public improvement, but for defense against the natives there was a sort of federative union—more a matter of mutual understanding and consent than of loyalty to a formal written document. That there was occasional independent action by a single community in reference to outside matters is evident from the invasion of the Orange Free State by the people of the Potchefstroom district in 1857, under the leadership of Mr. Pretorius. The object was to conquer the Free State, and was abandoned only when it was found that the young sister republic was disposed and prepared to defend itself. This invasion resulted in a treaty by which the independence, boundaries and mutual obligations of the two republics were fully defined and recognized.

In 1858 a single volksraad was chosen for all the four districts north of the Vaal, and the

“Grondwet” on Fundamental Law—an instrument in the nature of a federal constitution—was prepared by delegates specially elected for that purpose. This was adopted at once by Potchefstroom and Zoutspansberg. In 1860 Lydenburg and Utrecht followed their example. Although it has been contended that the “Grondwet” is not to be regarded as a fixed constitution, like that of the United States of America, the people of the Transvaal have looked upon it as a sufficient federative bond for the union of the four semi-independent districts in one nationality. The practical union of all was delayed, however, by a civil war which broke out in 1862, and had a most disastrous influence on the future of the country.

This internal strife grew out of the election of the president of the Transvaal Republic, the younger Pretorius, to the presidency of the Orange Free State. It was hoped by his partisans in both republics that the dual presidency would help to bring about the desired union of the Free State and the Transvaal under one government. While Mr. Pretorius was absent in the Free State, on a six months’ leave granted by the volksraad of the Transvaal, a faction hostile to him began to protest against this double dig-

nity being enjoyed by any one man, and to argue that the advantages of union would be largely with the Free State. Hostility to Mr. Pretorius grew apace until it was strong enough to get a resolution passed in the volksraad forbidding him to perform any executive act north of the Vaal during the six months of his stay in the Free State, and requiring him to give an account of his proceedings at the expiration of his leave.


On the 10th of September, 1860, Mr. Pretorius appeared before the volksraad of the Transvaal, accompanied by a commission from the Free State appointed to ask for a further leave of absence for the president, and to further the interests of union. When Pretorius offered to give an account of his proceedings as president of the Free State, the opposition raised the point that it was manifestly illegal for any one to be president of the Transvaal Republic and of the Orange Free State at the same time, for it was provided in their constitution that during his term of office the president should follow no other occupation, and Mr. Pretorius was pressed to resign one office or the other.

Pretorius at once resigned the presidency of the Transvaal; but his partisans held a mass meeting at Potchefstroom, on the 8th and 9th of

October, at which revolutionary proceedings were taken. It was resolved, almost unanimously, that the volksraad no longer enjoyed the confidence of the people they represented and must be held as having ceased to exist; that Mr. Pretorius should remain president of the Transvaal Republic and have a year's leave of absence to bring about union with the Free State, Mr. Stephanas Schoeman—instead of Mr. Grobbee—to be acting president during his absence; and that before the return of Mr. Pretorius to resume his duties a new volksraad should be elected.

The new election was so manipulated that only a thousand burghers voted, and of these more than seven hundred declared in favor of the resolutions of the Potchefstroom meeting. The committee that effected this clever political strategy was composed of Messrs. D. Steyn, Preller, Lombard, Spruyt, and Bodestein. The new acting president, Mr. Schoeman, assumed official duty immediately.

With amazing inconsistency—for he was thought to be a loyal friend of Mr. Pretorius—Schoeman called a meeting of the old volksraad that had been dissolved by the revolution. He held his office from the same authority that had declared this body to have forfeited confidence,



PETERMARTZBURG, VIEW FROM THE NORTH.

PETERMARTZBURG.

and to be non-existent, and yet he acknowledged its legal existence. The old volksraad met on the 14th of January, 1861, and after a session of two hours the majority of the members resigned, being convinced of the general antagonism of the people. Not content to let matters rest in a peaceful acquiescence in the revolution, Mr. Schoeman called the old volksraad together a second time, under armed protection, and procured an order for legal proceedings to be instituted against the committee that had carried out the Potchefstroom resolutions. A court consisting of two landdrosts—one of whom was Cornelius Potgieter, their bitterest political enemy—tried the committee for sedition, on the 14th of February, found them guilty and sentenced each to pay a fine of £100, except Mr. Bodenstein, whose fine was only £15.

These proceedings led to great disturbances throughout the republic, and, finally, to war. Schoeman assembled an armed force to support his authority. Thereupon, Commandant Paul Kruger, of Rustenburg, called out the burghers of his district and marched to Pretoria for the purpose of driving out Schoeman and establishing a better government.

Among the expedients resorted to to prevent

bloodshed, a new volksraad was elected, a new acting president was appointed, and for several months there were two rival governments in the Transvaal. Acting President Schoeman, supported by a strong party, persisted in endeavors to rule the country. So grievous a state of anarchy prevailed that Kruger resolved to put an end to it by the strong hand. Schoeman and his partisans retreated from Pretoria to Potchefstroom, where he was besieged by the burgher force under Kruger. The loss of life in the bombardment, and one sortie by the garrison, was not great; but Schoeman became disheartened and fled, on the night of the 9th of October, into the Free State, accompanied by his principal adherents.

A few days later, Kruger having moved his force to Klip River, Schoeman re-entered Potchefstroom, rallied some eight hundred men around him, and Kruger returned to give him battle. At this critical point President Pretorius interposed as mediator, and an agreement was reached by which immediate hostilities were prevented. Schoeman, however, continued to agitate.

Under the terms of agreement new elections were held by which W. C. Janse Van Rensburg

was chosen president over Mr. Pretorius, and Paul Kruger was made Commandant-General.

But the tribulations of the Transvaal were by no means over. On the pretense that the ballot papers had been tampered with the standard of revolt was again raised—this time by Jan Viljoen. The first encounter was against Kruger, who had underestimated the strength of the new rebellion. Later, on the 5th of January, 1864, a battle was fought in which Viljoen was defeated and compelled to retreat to a fortified camp on the Limpopo.

Again Mr. Pretorius offered himself as mediator, and by common consent a new election was held in which Pretorius was chosen president by a large majority over Van Rensburg. With Pretorius as president, and Paul Kruger as commandant-general, the government was of such harmony and strength as prevented any further open rebellion on the part of disaffected burghers.

But though the civil strife was ended, the injury it had inflicted was well nigh incurable. It is to be reckoned chief among the causes of the weakness in after years that made it possible—and, in the judgment of some, necessary and justifiable—for the British government to thrust in its strong hand and subvert the independent but

tottering republic that it might substitute therefor a more stable colonial administration. The treasury had been impoverished. Taxes were uncollected and irrecoverable. Salaries and other public liabilities were heavily in arrears. Worse than all these, the republic had forfeited the confidence of other nations to that degree that no one believed in its stability. Even its nearest neighbor and sister republic, the Orange Free State, no longer desired union, preferring to stand alone before the constant menace of the Basutos rather than to be joined with a country wherein efficient government seemed to have perished. To make matters still worse, the discord among the whites was turned to advantage by their colored foes.

When the several factions in the Transvaal united on Mr. Pretorius as their executive head, in 1864, the white population, all told, did not exceed 30,000—less than one person to three square miles—while the blacks in the same territory numbered hundreds of thousands. During the three years succeeding 1861 the prevailing anarchy made it impossible to give attention to cessions of land agreed to by the Zulu chiefs. In consequence, the boundaries had not been fixed, and these districts remained unoccupied by the

whites. With the restoration of something like order in 1864, the government realized that its relations with some of its native neighbors required definition and formal settlement. This was successfully done, and the lines mutually agreed upon between the whites and the native authorities were duly marked.

A leading spirit among the Zulus of this time was Cetawayo, a chief of remarkable subtlety and power. In less than two months after the settlement and marking of boundaries in the southern region of the Transvaal Cetawayo found some pretext for repudiating his bargain, appeared on the borders of Utrecht at the head of a Zulu army, in February, 1865, and removed the landmarks so lately set up. During the negotiations that followed, Cetawayo did not appear at any conference, but the presence of his force on the border so far affected the final settlement that the boundary was changed near the Pongolo River, restoring a small district in that region to Zululand.

This was a time of perpetual struggle with the blacks. Some of the tribes had been made tributary to the Republic, others were practically independent, and with these frequent and cruel wars were waged. Unspeakable atrocities were

perpetrated on both sides—the Kaffirs slaughtering without mercy such white families as they were able to surprise in a defenseless state, and the Africanders inflicting vengeance without mercy when they came upon the savages in kraal or mountain stronghold.

The whites could always defeat the natives in a pitched battle, but to hold so vast a number in subjection was beyond their power. And they seem to have relished everything connected with an expedition against the blacks but the expense; they had an invincible dislike to paying taxes for any purpose.

In a rude way these Transvaal Africanders lived in the enjoyment of plenty derived from their flocks and herds, but metal currency was almost unknown to them. Such business as they transacted was mostly in the nature of barter. They were yet too crude and primitive in their ideas to value aright the benefits secured to a civilized community by a well organized and firmly administered government controlling fiscal and other domestic matters of general interest, as well as directing foreign policies.

The public treasury was in a state of chronic emptiness. The paper currency depreciated more and more till in 1870 its purchasing value

was only twenty-five per cent of its face value. Public works and proper internal administration were unknown. Largely, every man's will was his law, which he was disposed to enforce upon others—whether black or white—by the strong hand.

In 1872 Mr. Pretorius became cordially disliked by the people and was forced to resign the presidency, because he had accepted the finding of the arbitration which awarded the diamond fields to Nicholas Waterboer instead of to the Transvaal Republic. His successor, Mr. Burgess, a native of Cape Colony and an unfrocked clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, was an unfortunate choice. Learned, eloquent and energetic, he was nevertheless deficient in practical business wisdom and in political acumen, and he was much distrusted by the burghers on account of his theological opinions. Some of them charged that he was guilty of maintaining that the real Devil differed from the pictures of him in the old Dutch Bibles, in that he had no tail. For this and worse forms of heterodoxy he was blamed as the cause of the calamities experienced by the nation during his presidency. Mr. Burgess is said to have formed many visionary though patriotic plans for the development

of his country and the extension of the African-der power over the whole of South Africa, but his people were not of the sort that could appreciate them, nor had he command of resources sufficient to carry them out.

Then drew near the culmination of evil—the inevitable consequence of weakness in numbers; of indisposition to submit to a strong government; of a treasury impoverished by civil war; of continual conflict with the savage blacks; and, withal, of a state of anarchy among themselves. In 1876 the portents of approaching calamity multiplied. In a war with Sikukuni, a powerful Kaffir chief paramount in the mountainous district to the northeast, the Africanders were worsted so completely that they returned to their homes disheartened and in confusion. On the southeast their border was threatened by hordes of Zulus under Cetawayo, now manifesting a decided disposition to attack.

In fact, the weak and disordered condition of the republic exposed its own people—many of whom were British subjects—to immediate and frightful danger. Moreover, it constituted a danger to all the European communities in South Africa. In the event of two such chiefs as Sikukuni and Cetawayo joining forces against the

whites and prevailing, as they seemed able and likely to do, over the frontier civilization in the Transvaal Republic, nothing could prevent them from moving in strength against the Free State on the south, and Natal on the southeast, and later, against Cape Colony itself.

It was not without cause, therefore, that the British government resolved to avert the threatened conflict. There were two possible ways of doing this. Britain might have taken the field as a friendly ally, making common cause with the Transvaal Republic against a common danger, and leaving its independence intact. The other way was to annex the Transvaal territory, subvert its republican government, and give it the status and administration of a British colony. There is no record to show that the British government ever entertained the thought of acting as the ally of the republic. On the contrary, Sir Theophilus Shepstone was appointed as imperial commissioner to visit the scene of danger and examine into the state of the country. He was secretly instructed and authorized to proclaim the immediate annexation of the Transvaal territory to the British dominions in South Africa in case he deemed it necessary for the general safety

to do so, and if, in his judgment, a majority of the people would favor the step.

After three months spent in observing and studying the situation Sir Theophilus Shepstone, acting under the secret instructions given him, on the 12th of April, 1877, declared The Transvaal Republic annexed, for protection, to British dominions in South Africa. His act was indorsed officially by the resident British High Commissioner at the Cape, and by the Secretary of the Colonial Office in England. In 1879 the Territory was declared a crown colony of Great Britain. Thus, in the third contact of Boer and Briton, an independent republic was deprived of its independence by the self-same power that had guaranteed it in 1852, and was reduced to the status of a crown colony without the formal consent of its people and against the protests of many of them.

Before closing this chapter of events connected with this arbitrary and startling measure, it will be well to consider some further facts which belong to the setting in which the act should be viewed. Mr. Burgers, the president, had repeatedly warned the people that unless certain reforms could be effected they must lose their independence. They agreed with him, but did noth-

ing to carry out the necessary reforms, nor would they pay taxes. Mr. Burgers was not strong with any party in the country. One section of the people were for Paul Kruger, his rival candidate for the approaching presidential election. Another party—principally English settlers—favored annexation. Besides, he had estranged the great body of the people by his heterodox opinions in theology. Being helpless, Mr. Burgers recorded his personal protest against annexation and returned to the Cape, where he lived on a pension granted him in consideration of his having spent all his private fortune in the service of his country.

Mr. Kruger—then the vice-president, the entire executive council, and the volksraad, all protested against the annexation; and delegates were sent to London to carry the protest to the foot of the British throne. The mass of the people made no resistance at the time, nor did they express much displeasure; but, a little later, a large majority of them signed a petition praying for a reversal of the act of annexation. Their temporary acquiescence in the loss of independence was due, no doubt, to the depressing fears that had so lately burdened them, and a sense of

relief in knowing that now the Kaffir invasion that had threatened their very existence would be repelled by the military power of Great Britain.

CHAPTER XI.

THE AFRICANDER'S FIRST WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Notwithstanding their native love of independence, and their protest to the British throne against the act of annexation, the Afrianders of the Transvaal might have acquiesced in the British rule had they been fairly treated. There was a good promise of peace at first. The finances of the country were at once relieved by the expenditure of English money in liberal amounts. Numbers of the leading Afrianders retained their official positions at the request of the British commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. It is only reasonable to suppose that the people at large would have settled down to permanent content as British subjects had the affairs of the newly constituted colony been administered to the satisfaction of the leaders.

But, instead of following a policy dictated alike by wisdom and righteousness, the very opposite seems to have been the rule observed in

the attempt to govern these new and most difficult subjects of the British crown. A number of mistakes—so called—were made which, as even Canon Knox Little admits, were a sufficient justification of the Africander leaders in plotting and agitating against the British connection.

The first of these mistakes was the too early recall of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who had so deftly managed the bloodless though arbitrary annexation, who knew the country well and was much respected by the people. In place of his rule as special commissioner was substituted an administration under Sir Bartle Frere as governor of Cape Colony and British High Commissioner for South Africa. There being no representative government in the Transvaal after annexation, the administration became, perhaps necessarily, autocratic both in form and in spirit. Sir William Owen Lanyon, who had been appointed governor of the Transvaal, was an officer of some renown in dealing successfully with native uprisings, but proved totally unfit for the delicate management required in governing the Africanders. He has been described as haughty and arrogant in mind, indisposed to excuse the rudeness of the Transvaal farmers, and incapable of tolerating the social equality so dear to them.

His swarthy complexion, also, made against his popularity, for it suggested the possibility of a strain of black blood in his veins—a blemish unpardonable in the eyes of any slaveholding people. Under his rule complaints were ignored, taxes were levied and peremptorily collected by distraint, and soon the latent discontent broke out into open and active disaffection.

The second mistake—if it does not deserve a harsher name—was the failure to institute the local self-government by representatives promised by Sir Theophilus Shepstone when he proclaimed annexation. The text of that part of the proclamation reads thus :

“And I further proclaim and make known that the Transvaal will remain a separate government, with its own Laws and Legislature, and that it is the wish of her Most Gracious Majesty that it shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of the people. That arrangement will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as much the official language as the English. All laws, proclamations and government notices will be published in the Dutch language; and in the courts of law the same may be done at the option of suitors to a

case. The laws so in force in the State will be retained until altered by competent legislative authority."

Not one of these promises was ever fulfilled. The volksraad was never convened. The promised constitution of local self-government was never promulgated. Instead of redeeming these promises the Transvaal was put upon the status of a crown colony in 1879, and the legislature proposed for it was to consist of some crown officials and six members—all to be the nominees of the governor.

Mr. Bryce, in his "Impressions of South Africa," calls this failure to redeem a promise authoritatively made as a concession to a people whose independence was being arbitrarily subverted, a "*blunder*." Canon Little uses a still softer term, calling it a "*mistake*"; and adds, "It was given in good faith, and in good faith was received. Sir Theophilus Shepstone tried to fulfill it. He at once submitted his views as to the necessary legislative arrangements. No action whatever was taken on it, either by Conservatives or Liberals, and his dispatch is probably lying uncared for in the Colonial Office now!"—(1899.)

And so, in the mutations of language as cur-



CECIL J. RHODES.

rently used in history and in Christian ethics, it has come to pass that this piece of national treachery—this treachery of the strong against the weak—this treachery implicating both of the leading political parties of Great Britain and their chiefs, is only a “blunder,” a “mistake”!

One real and very serious blunder was committed, if one judges of it from the view point of the policy intended to be pursued in the Transvaal by the British government. The Africans had accepted, under protest, the act of annexation mainly because they were in mortal fear of the Zulus. That reason for submission the British proceeded to remove by overthrowing the Zulu power.

In the northeast Sir Garnet Wolseley defeated Sikukuni and established what promised to be a permanent peace. In 1879 Sir Bartle Frere inflicted a like reverse upon Cetewayo, in the southeast, and so completed the subjugation of the Zulus. The blunder in taking this course declared itself when, after subduing the natives at great cost of blood and treasure, the British found that in so doing they had relieved the Africans of the one fear that thus far had prevented them from reasserting their independence.

Many people, both in England and in South

Africa, regarded the annexation of the Transvaal as final. But leading members of the Liberal party, then in opposition, had emphatically condemned it, and this had raised hopes in the Transvaal Afrianders and their sympathizers in England that when Gladstone came into power again the things which they regarded as wrong would be righted. Such hopes were doomed to disappointment.

In 1880 the Liberals carried the country and took office in April of that year. Guided by information derived from the crown officials in South Africa, the new ministers were misled as to the measure of discontent in the Transvaal, and declared that the act of annexation would not be reversed.

This flat refusal brought matters to an immediate issue. The Transvaal burghers, though they had continued to agitate and protest and memorialize the throne, had waited with considerable patience for three years, hoping for either a restoration of their independence or—as the next best thing—the instituting of such a representative local government as had been promised them by the imperial authorities. But now the new Liberal government, after using the Transvaal grievances for electioneering pur-

poses, had refused to consider and redress those grievances; the military administration of a mere crown colony continued in full force under the detested Sir William Owen Lanyon; and there appeared to be no hope that the promises made to mollify their indignation when their independence was being subverted would ever be fulfilled.

It has been said, in extenuation, that the British government of this time was too busy with other pressing matters to give the attention necessary to a correct understanding of the condition, and the rights and the wrongs, of the Transvaal Afrianders. And it has been said, in further extenuation, that there was an honest intention on the part of the government to fulfill the promises made—some time—as soon as the authorities could get to it. Be that as it may, at the end of three years, which had brought no betterment of their state, the burghers concluded that their protests and their patience had been wasted, and determined to wait no longer.

Accordingly a mass-meeting was held at Paardekraal, in December, 1880, at which it was resolved to appeal to arms. The burghers elected Messrs. Pretorius, Paul Kruger and Joubert to proclaim for them the re-establishment of their former government as the South African

Republic, which was done in Heidelberg, and the national flag was raised, on the 16th of December, 1880.

The first battles of this war were little more than skirmishes. The British troops were scattered through the country in small detachments, which the Africanders—every man of whom was a marksman and an experienced fighter—found it easy to either cut off or drive before them to positions that could be fortified.

The nearest available British troops, besides those already in the Transvaal, were in Natal. General Sir George Colley, governor of that colony, raised what force he could and marched northward to check the uprising. Before he could enter the Transvaal, however, Commandant-General Joubert crossed the border into Natal and took up a strong position at Laing's Nek. This now historic spot is a steep ridge forming the watershed between the Klip River, a tributary of the Vaal, and Buafflo River, a confluent of the Tugela, which flows into the Indian Ocean. Here a sanguinary battle was fought on the 28th of January, 1881. The British attacked the Africanders with great spirit, but Joubert's position was invulnerable. The ridge protected his men from the artillery fire of the Brit-

ish, while they, in charging up the slope, were cut down by the accurate rifle fire of the Afrianders, and forced to retreat. On the 8th of February, in the same neighborhood, on the Ingogo heights, the British were again defeated after suffering severe loss.

General Colley now decided to seize by night Majuba Hill, which is really a considerable mountain, rising nearly 2,000 feet above Laing's Nek, and commanding that ridge for the purpose of artillery fighting. On the night of February 26th, leaving the main body of his army in camp, and unaccountably forgetting to order it to advance on the enemy so as to divert attention from his tactical movement, General Colley led a smaller division to the top of Majuba Hill.

The burgher force was thrown into temporary dismay when they first observed British soldiers in that commanding position. But when there was no advance against them in front, and no artillery fire from the top of Majuba, they sent out a volunteer party to storm the hill. The story of that charge has gone into history to stay as an example, on the one side, of rugged bravery and splendid courage achieving victory, and on the other of equal bravery and courage strangely betrayed by some one's blunder into defeat and

ruinous disaster. Why the main force of the British army was not ordered to co-operate in the movement, why there were no entrenchments thrown up on the hill, why the order, "Charge bayonets," so eagerly looked for by the British soldiers on the hill-top, was never given, General Colley did not live to tell—no one else knew. The Africanders scaled the hill, shooting as they went up every man that showed on the sky line—themselves protected by the steep declivities above them, and carried the hill-top, routing and almost annihilating the British force. General Colley and ninety-two of his men were killed, and fifty-nine were made prisoners.

In the meanwhile additional British troops were hurrying to the scene of conflict, under command of Sir Evelyn Wood. What the outcome would have been of further hostilities between the Africanders and the greatly increased British force no one can tell. The sudden and surprising action of the British government, that put an end to the war, was not based upon any estimate of the probable issue of continued conflict, but altogether upon the moral aspects of the situation as seen by Mr. Gladstone and his associates in the British cabinet. Before Sir Evelyn Wood could strike a single blow toward wiping

out the disgrace of Majuba Hill, the home government, on the 5th of March, 1881, ordered an armistice, and on the 23d agreed to terms of peace by which the Transvaal was restored to its former political independence in all regards, save that it was to be under the suzerainty of the British crown.

In August, 1881, a more formal convention was held at Pretoria, when it was agreed that the Transvaal government should be independent in the management of its internal affairs; that the Republic should respect the independence of the Swazies, a tribe of natives on the eastern border of the Transvaal; that British troops should be allowed to pass through the territory of the Republic in time of war; and that the British sovereign should be acknowledged as suzerain of the Republic and have a veto power over all treaties between the government of the Transvaal and foreign nations.

Several of the stipulations in this convention were very distasteful to Paul Kruger and other leading spirits in the Transvaal, and also to the volksraad. Negotiations for desired changes were continued until 1884, when, on the 27th of February, a revision called the London Conven-


tion was made and signed, formulating the obligations of the Republic as follows :

The Sovereign of Great Britain was to have, for the space of six months after their date, a veto power over all treaties between the Republic and any native tribes to the eastward and westward of its territory, and between it and any foreign state or nation except the Orange Free State.

The stipulations of the two previous conventions respecting slavery, those of 1852 and 1881, were to be observed by the Republic.

And the Republic was to accord to Great Britain the treatment of a most favored nation, and to deal kindly with strangers entering its territory.

Nothing whatever was said in this latest convention of the suzerainty of the British Sovereign mentioned in that of 1881, and, as this instrument, negotiated in London with Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, was understood to take the place of all former conventions, the Africans of the Transvaal have contended very reasonably that the omission is sufficient evidence of the renunciation of suzerainty by the British government. Furthermore, by the London Convention of 1884, the British crown for the first time conceded to the Transvaal the title of "The



RAAD ZAAL (GOVERNMENT BUILDING), PRETORIA.

South African Republic," by which name it has ever since been designated in all diplomatic transactions and correspondence between it and other states.

CHAPTER XII.

THE AFRICANDER REPUBLICS AND BRITISH
POLICY.

The surprising policy pursued by the British government in arbitrarily annexing the Transvaal in 1877, and in restoring its independence in 1881, after a brief and indecisive conflict at arms, and when strong re-enforcements had placed the imperial troops in position to crush the African-der uprising, caused widespread dissatisfaction and bitter controversy both in England and in South Africa. Why had the country been annexed at all? And seeing it had been annexed, why was it so ignominiously yielded up immediately after the disgrace of Majuba Hill? There were many at home and in the South African colonies who would have been satisfied to restore the independence of the Transvaal—but only after having inflicted on the African-der forces at least one crushing defeat.

The only reply of the Liberal government

was to the effect that the annexation, and the refusal to reverse it, had been due to misapprehension of the facts ; that the officers of the crown in South Africa, partly through ignorance and partly through prejudice, had reported that there was no such passionate desire for independence among the Afrianders as was pretended by their leaders, and as was proved to exist by the uprising ; that as soon as the facts were known it became the duty of a liberty-loving people like the English to honor their own principles by the immediate retrocession of the Transvaal without waiting to first avenge defeats and vindicate the military superiority of Great Britain ; and that a great country better illustrated her greatness by doing justice and showing mercy, even at great cost to herself, than by taking a bloody revenge for reverses suffered on the fields of war in trying to enforce a policy now seen to be morally wrong.

Moreover, associated with these moral considerations were reasons of statecraft that made it appear wise as well as right to let the Transvaal go. The Afrianders of the Orange Free State, of Cape Colony, of Natal, were known to be in warm sympathy with their brethren of the Transvaal. Of course, the power of Great Britain could crush, in time, a rebellion as extensive as

the whole Dutch-speaking population of South Africa, but at what cost of treasure and blood and bitter disloyalty to the British crown! In comparison to the inevitable results of a general civil war the loss of the Transvaal was as nothing. How well grounded were these fears of a general uprising in 1881 may be seen in the earlier events of the second Afrikaner War of Independence in 1899. With no late grievance against Great Britain to redress, the Orange Free State made common cause with the South African Republic from the first, and the Afrianders of Cape Colony and Natal were more than suspected of aiding and abetting in a covert way the cause for which the two republics had taken the field.

If the British ministers counted upon some recognition of the magnanimity displayed in making the retrocession immediately after defeat—of the humanity which renounced revenge for the humiliation of Majuba Hill when it was within easy reach—they were disappointed. The Afrianders saw not generosity, not humanity, but only fear as the motive for the sudden and easy yielding of the British; and to their natural exultation they added contempt for their late antagonists, and so became and have continued very unpleasant neighbors for so proud-spirited

a people as the English. And this is the principal reason why the English in all South Africa have always condemned the restoration of independence to the Transvaal—and, most of all, the time and manner of the act. They have not been able to forget the fact that the terms of peace were, in a way, dictated by the Afrianders as victorious invaders and holders of British territory in the colony of Natal.

In order to view intelligently the causes of the second Afriander War of Independence, it is necessary to consider the general trend of events in South Africa, and the conflicting policies sought to be carried out there during the few years following the restitution of independence to the Transvaal.

The South African Republic emerged from its brief and successful struggle for independence impoverished and in a state of political chaos, but rejoicing, nevertheless, in a sense of national freedom, and more than ever confident that it enjoyed the special favor of Heaven. The old constitution, or Grondwet, was revived, the volksraad was convoked, and an election was held, resulting in the choice of Mr. Paul Kruger to be president. Mr. Kruger immediately

planned for bold and far-reaching movements on three sides of the republic's territory.

A great trek to the north for the occupation of Mashonaland was projected but never carried out. To the south Zululand was now open, and into it went a number of adventurers as trekkers, followed, a little later, by others who took service under one of the warring native chiefs. When these took steps to set up a government of their own in the northern districts of Zululand the British authorities interfered and restricted their claim to a small territory of about three thousand square miles, which enjoyed an independent existence as the New Republic from 1886 to 1888, when it was annexed by the Transvaal.

Other bands of Africanders raided parts of Bechuanaland, to the west, taking forcible possession of territory or obtaining grants of land by devices not always honorable. These intimidated the native chiefs into an acknowledgment of their authority and established two small republics, Stella and Goshen, to the north of Kimberley.

These proceedings opened the eyes of the British government to the policy upon which the South African Republic had entered—to annex Bechuanaland and close the way of British com-

munication with regions still farther north in which the nation had become interested. To check these designs in time, a military expedition under Sir Charles Warren entered Bechuanaland toward the end of 1884, expelled the Afrianders without bloodshed, and proclaimed the whole region a crown colony under the name of British Bechuanaland. This territory was annexed to Cape Colony in 1895. In 1885 a British protectorate was established over a still more northerly region, covering the whole country as far as the borders of Matabeleland. In 1888 the British hold was made yet more secure by a treaty with the king of the Matabele, Lo Bengula, by which he bound himself to cede no territory to, and to make no treaty with, any foreign power without the approval of the British High Commissioner.

The raising of the British flag at St. Lucia Bay, on the Indian Ocean, in 1884, and a treaty with the Tonga tribes, binding them to make no treaties with any other power than the English, completed the hold of the British crown on the eastern coast line up to the southern border of the Portuguese possessions.

The Afrianders, denied expansion on the north, sought compensation in the acquisition of

Swaziland, to the east of the Transvaal republic—a small but fertile region and possessing considerable mineral wealth. It was inhabited by some 70,000 Kaffirs, near of kin but hostile to the Zulus. After long negotiations, in which the South African Republic, Cetawayo of the Zulus, and the British authorities took part, the Afrianders secured a concession of right to build a railway through the marshy region lying between Swaziland and the sea to the coast at Kosi Bay; this concession was granted in 1890 and laid in abeyance awaiting the acquisition of Swaziland itself, through which the railway must run. In 1894 the whole territory of Swaziland was placed under the control of the South African Republic, subject to a formal guaranty of protection to the natives.

It is difficult to determine whether it was Afriander dullness or British sharpness, or both, that omitted from the Swaziland convention of 1894 the concession to the South African Republic, granted in 1890, of a right to construct a railway to the sea through the marshy district of Tongaland lying next the coast line. But it was omitted from that instrument, and it was held that, as the later convention superseded and voided the earlier one, the provision for access

to the sea had lapsed. Whereupon the British government promptly secured the consent of the three Tonga chiefs concerned, and proclaimed a protectorate over the whole strip of land lying between Swaziland and the ocean, up to the southern portion of the Portuguese territory. Thus by a stroke of statecraft the access of the Afrianders to the sea by railway communication entirely under their own control was effectually stopped.

Within nine years the British control established in Bechuanaland in 1885 was extended over the whole unappropriated country as far north as the Zambesi. By a new treaty made with Lo Bengula in 1888 the sphere of British influence was further expanded to embrace not only Matabeleland, but Mashonaland also—a partially explored territory to the eastward, over which Lo Bengula claimed some authority.

The next step in working out the policy of the British in South Africa was the granting of a royal charter to a corporation known as the British South African Company, formed to develop this eastern and undefined region of Lo Bengula's territory. Mr. Cecil Rhodes was conspicuous as the leader in this movement. The purpose of the company was twofold: To de-

velop the gold fields supposed to exist there, and to forestall the Transvaal Africanders in taking possession of the country. The charter not only invested the company with the rights of a trading corporation, but also with administrative powers as representative of the British crown. In 1890 the pioneer emigrants under this management began to arrive in the chartered territory and commenced to found settlements and build forts along the eastern plateau.

With the conflicts which arose between the British South African Company and the Portuguese—complicated by alliances with the natives, with the wars which arose therefrom, and with the final adjustments and treaties that followed—we have nothing to do in these pages. The one fact that is of interest to us in closing this chapter of conflict in statecraft is that at last the British succeeded in isolating the Africanders from the sea, and in throwing around them a perfect cordon of British territories and pre-emptions. By chartering the British South African Company to the north of the Transvaal the last link in the chain that inclosed the two Africander republics was completed. For there had been left no possibility of advance toward the sea eastward on the part of the Transvaal Republic—in the Ar-

bitration Treaty of 1872 Great Britain had obtained pre-emption rights over the Portuguese colonial possessions.

CHAPTER XIII.

CAUSES OF THE AFRICANDERS' SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

In one sense the causes of the Second War of Independence, like those of the first, were as remote as the British seizure of Cape Colony in 1795, and as the years between 1814 and 1836, which saw the accumulation of grievances that led to the "Great Trek." Seeds of dislike to the English were then sown in the Afriander mind which have never ceased to propagate themselves—an ominous heredity—from father to son through all the intervening generations.

The immediate causes of that war were of a more recent date. Tracing backward, the war was brought about by the alleged grievances of a multitude of foreigners—vastly outnumbering the citizens—who, for their own purposes, had entered the territory of the South African Republic within a single decade; these foreigners went there in the pursuit of wealth; the wealth

that enticed them there was in the rich gold deposits of the Witwatersrand district of the Transvaal. If the gold had not been there, or had not been discovered, the excess of foreigners would not have pressed into the country; if the foreigners had not flocked into it in great excess of numbers over the citizens, there would have been no alleged grievances to redress, and therefore no war, unless one or both of the parties to it had predetermined to bring about a conflict at this time and found some other pretext.

Tracing from cause to effect up to the war, we begin with unimportant discoveries of gold near the eastern border of the Transvaal between 1867 and 1872. Though these were not rich in themselves, they encouraged more vigorous and extensive prospecting than had been practiced theretofore. This led to the discovery, in 1885, of the marvelously rich deposits of the precious metal in beds of conglomerate in the Witwatersrand district. The influx of strangers had been considerable from 1882, but from 1885 to 1895 the foreign additions to the population of the Transvaal threatened to submerge the native Africander citizens, for the newcomers were mostly men, and largely exceeded in number the

entire Afrikaner population, including the women and the children.

The first result of the new mining industry and the rapid growth of the towns was pleasant enough—the revenues of the needy republic were increased, and there was a promise of unprecedented prosperity. Nevertheless, in the tidal wave of incoming aliens from the British colonies in South Africa, from Europe and from America—most of them British, and nearly all speaking English—the far-seeing president, Paul Kruger, and other leaders of political life in the Transvaal, early recognized an element of peril to their cherished domestic institutions.

As a defense against the passing of controlling power into the hands of transient settlers, the electoral franchise was somewhat restricted. Up to the convention of 1881 the probation of an alien seeking enfranchisement in the Transvaal Republic was a residence in the country for two years. At that time, with the arbitrary annexation of 1877 fresh in their minds, and knowing that the British authorities had been solicited to take that step by English residents in the Transvaal, it is a matter of no surprise that the Afrikaners extended the probation for franchise to five years—the period required in the United

States of America. That provision was in force when the London Convention was signed, in 1884; it passed unquestioned by the British government, and was still in force in 1890. Up to that date the franchise had kept the native Afri-cander element in a safe majority.

As a concession to demands on the part of foreigners for a reduction of the period of residence required for naturalization, Mr. Kruger proposed, in 1890, to divide the volksraad, which consisted of forty-eight members, into two chambers of twenty-four members each, the first to retain supreme power, the second to be competent to legislate in all matters local to the new industrial population gathered, principally, in and about Johannesburg, and its acts to be subject always to the veto of the first volksraad. The measure provided, also, that in electing members of the second volksraad only two years' residence and the ordinary process of naturalization should be required of aliens, their franchise for the first volksraad still being subject to an additional five years' probation.

This measure was passed by the volksraad after a good deal of opposition by the more conservative members. It has been condemned as clumsy and inadequate; but it is worth while to

weigh Mr. Kruger's own words explanatory of his purpose in it. "I intend this second volksraad," he said, "to act as a bridge. I want my burghers to see that the new population may safely be trusted to take part in the government of the country. When they see that this is done, and that no harm happens, then the two volksraads may come together again, and the distinction between the old and the new population can be obliterated." It should be remembered, however, that the two years' franchise gave the citizen no vote in the election of the president and the executive council—for that privilege he had to fill out the additional five years' probation—and that no naturalized burgher could become a member of the first volksraad.

Discontent continued to spread among the new industrial population, who complained bitterly of exclusion from important political rights, and of grievances which they and the mining industry suffered under the existing laws and administration. As a means of redress a reform association was formed in 1893. It is necessary to a correct judgment of the situation at this time to consider the statements of both sides as to the causes of complaint.



THE RIGHT HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN



According to Canon Little, who cannot be accused of favoring the Africanders—

“The grievances of the Uitlanders were these:

“1. That the customs tariff was excessive, making food shamefully dear, and that the charges for railway freights were unduly heavy.

“2. That the duties on machinery and chemicals were extortionate.

“3. That these and the dynamite monopoly made the expense of all mining operations excessive.

“4. The extreme unfairness as to the vexatious laws touching on education and the use of language.”

Over against these allegations are the statements of Mr. F. Reginald Statham in his “South Africa as It Is.” Mr. Statham writes from the Africander viewpoint, but gives some guaranty of sincerity and of confidence in his own averments by an appeal to figures—which can always be verified. Speaking in a general way of the conditions prevailing at this period, he says:

“The idea of the persecuted and oppressed Uitlanders has become so fixed in the minds of English people—thanks to the efforts of those who were occupied in preparing and justifying a revolt—that even the plainest statement of facts

seems powerless to dispossess it. No one will claim, no one ever has claimed, that the government of the South African Republic is perfect. Having regard to the extraordinary changes that have come over the country during the last ten years, it is really a marvel that the government is not much more imperfect than it is. The present position of the Transvaal executive has been not inaptly compared to the position of the crew of a collier brig who might suddenly find themselves in control of a first-class mail steamer. However desirous they might be of doing their best, they could hardly avoid making some mistakes. If the foreign population had much more to complain of than they have, it ought not to cause either surprise or indignation.

“And what have they to complain of? Really, the life of the average foreigner in Johannesburg is the freest imaginable. He can follow his trade, he can follow his profession, no matter what it is, without any question or hindrance from the government. His position as an Uitlander in no way hinders him from investing in property, from practicing as a lawyer in the courts, from undertaking, in fact, as freely as he could undertake in his own country, any lawful kind of business or occupation. If he pays a high rent for his house,

that is not the fault of the government, but of the land speculators who have bought up building stands. If his water supply is somewhat defective, it is the fault of the big foreign capitalists, who think more of the dividends they put in their own pockets than of the water they put into the people's mouths.

"A government which depends on the goodwill of a strictly sabbatarian population allows the Uitlander to spend his Sunday exactly as he pleases. He may play lawn tennis if he likes—and, indeed, he generally does so; he may engage in cricket matches, he can attend so-called sacred concerts, the programmes of which are drawn from the music hall or the comic opera. If he is in a gayer mood he may witness on a Sunday evening displays of "living pictures" which certainly would not be tolerated at the Royal Aquarium. To put it shortly, allowing for little drawbacks of climate and the expense of living, the Uitlander can live more at his ease in Johannesburg or Pretoria than in almost any other city under the sun.

"But he is taxed.

"How is he taxed? There is probably no one in the Transvaal, rich or poor, whose personal taxes amount to more than £5 a year. If it is

complained that he is taxed through his interest in the gold industry it is easy to make an appeal to published figures. In 1895 the Crown Reef Gold Mining Company produced gold worth upward of £420,000, and distributed nearly £97,000 in profits. Its payment to the Government for rents, licenses, and all other privileges and rights amounted to £1,191 9s 10d. In the same year the Robinson Company, which had produced £651,000 in gold and distributed £346,000 in dividends, paid to the government £395 11s 8d. The New Chimes Company, producing £93,000 in gold and distributing £32,000 in profits, paid under the head of rates and licenses, together with insurance premiums, £664 16s 5d. The Transvaal Coal Trust produced 266,945 tons of coal, and paid the government £53 15s, while the Consolidated Land and Exploration Company, in which the Ecksteins are the largest shareholders, and which owns more than 250 farms of 6,000 acres each, paid to the government in the shape of taxes, including absentee tax, no more than £722 2s 6d.

“These figures are sufficiently eloquent by themselves. They become more eloquent when they are placed beside the 50 per cent impost

claimed by the Chartered Company on all gold-mining enterprise in Rhodesia.

“But what about indirect taxation? Here are the facts:

“All machinery for mining purposes is subject to only $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent impost dues, the term machinery being stretched by the government to its uttermost possibilities to meet the mining industry, and it is made to include sheet lead, cyanide, etc. All other articles not specially rated are subject to an *ad valorem* duty of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, the Cape Colonist paying an *ad valorem* duty of 12 per cent. Specially rated articles affecting the white miners, such as tea, coffee, butter, rice, soap, sugar, are in most cases subject to lower, and only in one instance to higher, duties than in Cape Colony.

“Here is a comparison:

Cape Colony.	Transvaal.
Butter.....3d per lb.	5s 0d per 100 lbs.
Cheese.....3d per lb.	5s 0d per 100 lbs.
Coffee.....12s 6d per 100 lbs.	2s 6d per 100 lbs.
Rice.....3s 6d per 100 lbs.	1s 6d per 100 lbs.
Soap.....4s 2d per 100 lbs.	5s 0d per 100 lbs.
Sugar.....6s 3d per 100 lbs.	3s 6d per 100 lbs.
Tea.....8d per lb.	2s 6d per 100 lbs.
Guns.....£1 per barrel.	10s 0d per barrel.

“As regards monopolies and concessions, the dynamite monopoly is often quoted as an in-

stance of the manner in which monopolies are granted, to the detriment of the mining interest. It has been complained that the government retains a right to charge 90s a case for what can be produced for 30s a case. These figures, however, are exaggerated both ways. The government charge is 85s a case, and as the dynamite used by De Beers, at Kimberley, costs more than 60s a case laid down there, it can hardly be held that 85s is a high charge in Johannesburg, having regard to the much greater distance of Johannesburg from the sea. In this matter of the dynamite concession, moreover, it was a choice between a foreign monopoly and a local monopoly, while in the reports of mining companies in which explosives are separately accounted for it is shown that while total working expenses run up to over 30s per ton, the cost of explosives is less than 1s 3d per ton.

“As regards the railway concessions, the truth of the matter is that the Transvaal Railway Company—the Netherlands South African Railway Company, that is—by providing competing routes to Johannesburg from Natal and Delagoa Bay, keeps in check the monopoly which would certainly be taken great advantage of by

the Cape Colony if the only route to Johannesburg was from Cape ports."

It may be allowed—it must be—that the old saw, "figures will not lie," is unsound. In the hands of capable and unscrupulous persons they will lie like Ananias and Sapphira. But, like that of Ananias and Sapphira, the lie in figures brings swift detection and punishment. It ought to be easy, therefore, for those who have filled the ears of the world with charges of Africander oppression practiced upon the foreigners in the way of "excessive customs tariff," "extortionate duties on machinery," and the "dynamite monopoly that made the expense of all mining operations excessive," to convince the world-jury to which they have appealed that they have a case. They ought at least to be able to show that in British Rhodesia the impost on the profits of gold mining was *not* 50 per cent, while in the Transvaal it was about 8 per cent thereof; that in British Cape Colony the *ad valorem* duty on articles not specially rated was *not* 12 per cent, while in the Transvaal it was $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; that in British Cape Colony specially rated articles affecting the white miner as to expense of living were *not* taxed all the way from 100 to 500 per cent higher than in the Transvaal, with the single exception

of soap ; that an import duty of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on mining machinery was extortionate as compared with the tariff of other nations, or that a higher duty than $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent was collected in the Transvaal ; and that a profit of 25s a case on dynamite, less the cost of transportation from Kimberley to Johannesburg, and only causing the expense for explosives used in mining to be 1s 3d per ton of ore out of a total cost of 30s per ton, was an oppressive monopoly causing the cost of mining to be excessive.

Concerning the other grounds of complaint Mr. Statham writes :

“There are, besides the material grievances alluded to above, what may be called the political grievances, such as (1) the alleged government of the country by a small faction of Hollanders, (2) the language grievance, (3) the educational grievance, and (4) the franchise grievance.

“As regards the first mentioned of these, an honest and impartial person would search for evidence of it in vain. All the members of the executive, with one exception, are South African born ; so are the majority of heads and sub-heads of departments. * * * The only Hollander of any distinction in the government

is the state secretary, Dr. Leyds, a man of exceptional ability and integrity, who, in spite of enormous difficulties and constant attacks, has deserved and retained the confidence both of the president and the volksraad. To say that he is the ablest and most cultured official in South Africa is to say what is simply true, and if his ability has excited jealousy and resentment, it is only what a general study of human nature would lead one to expect.

“As regards the language question and the education question, consideration has to be paid to the language most usually spoken in the country. Entirely misleading ideas are liable to be formed on this point, owing to the erroneous impression as to the relative strength of the Dutch and the foreign population. A habit has arisen of speaking as if the foreign population greatly outnumbered the burgher population. The case is quite the opposite of this. The census of Johannesburg taken in 1896 by the Johannesburg Sanitary Commission showed that the population of the place had been greatly overestimated, the male European population of all ages amounting to 31,000. As there are 25,000 burghers on the military register of the republic, it seems fair to assume that the burgher population is at least

150,000, while the foreign population is probably not more than half of that. Of the 150,000 burghers and their families fully two-thirds do not understand English. Is it, then, unreasonable to claim that the official language, the language of official documents, shall be the language spoken by two-thirds of the people, or do the women and children count for nothing? But although the official language by law is Dutch, there is not a single government office in which there is not English or German spoken to those who cannot speak Dutch. In the higher courts the judges frequently shut their eyes to the use of the English language in the witness-box, and in the lower courts English is invariably spoken by English litigants.

“As regards the education question, there is not now much need to discuss it. The volksraad during the session of 1896 passed a law in further expansion of the principles laid down in the law of 1892, and under the regulations drawn up in accordance with the law, as now expanded, state schools, in which English-speaking children will be taught in English, and which are placed under the control of representative school boards, have been established in the gold-mining districts.

“The franchise question has been made the

subject of special complaint. Here, however, there are several difficulties in the way. In the first place, the majority of the foreign population do not want the franchise, because they are quite content with their position as it is and do not want to become—as they would have to do if they exercised the franchise—burghers of the South African Republic. The very agitation over the question has increased the difficulty, for the more there seems to be a possibility of a serious misunderstanding between the Transvaal and Great Britain, the less disposed British subjects become to place themselves in a position which might compel them to fight against their own countrymen. Meantime the government and the volksraad have been compelled to the conclusion that the agitation for the franchise is not genuine—that it has not been encouraged with the view to obtaining a concession, but with the object of establishing a grievance. They have seen, too, that to grant wholesale political privileges to the foreign residents in Johannesburg, even if those foreign residents were willing to become naturalized, would be to a great extent to deliver up the interests of all the dependent classes—the shopkeepers, the miners, the professional men—into the hands of a small group of

capitalists, who would use their influence, as they have used it elsewhere, to corrupt the political atmosphere and to subject the interests of every individual to their own. The political tyranny that exists in Kimberley, where employes of De Beers are compelled to vote to order on pain of dismissal, supplies a sufficient illustration of what would happen in Johannesburg if once the financial conspirators secured political control. A further and most significant illustration is supplied by a well-known incident in connection with the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg, when miners under the control of the leading conspirators were ordered to take up arms under penalty of forfeiting their wages. That in the great majority of cases they preferred the latter course is in itself a complete exposure of the hollowness of the whole revolutionary movement. In all known cases of revolution arising from discontent on the part of a mining population it has been the miners who have taken the lead and dragged others in with them. In this case the miners, who had never dreamed of discontent, were ordered to take up arms and refused.

“Out of the facts of the position actually existing in Johannesburg and other gold-mining

centers it was utterly impossible for any honest man to manufacture a serious complaint, least of all such a complaint as would in any respect justify a revolution to secure redress. So far from being treated with unfairness or hardship, the foreign residents in the Transvaal have been treated with marked consideration. The interests of the gold industry have been consulted in every possible way. If the government has not in some instances been able to do all it might have wished to do, it has been because the reckless language of a portion of the press and the overbearing attitude of the capitalist agitators have aroused the suspicion and the resentment of the volksraad.

“Yet out of this position of things a case had to be got up against the Transvaal government in order to justify the revolutionary movement that had been planned in the interest of the small groups of capitalists who had determined to make themselves as supreme over the gold industry in Johannesburg as they had become over the diamond industry in Kimberley.”

It has seemed necessary to quote Mr. Statham thus at length in order that the alleged grievances of the foreigners in the Transvaal, and the Africander answer thereto may be considered

side by side. To say the least, Mr. Statham has not dealt in vague generalities. His assertions are specific and his figures can easily be investigated. It is for those who sympathize with the complaints which led to prolonged agitation and finally to war, to show that Mr. Statham was in error. Until they shall have done so charges of "oppressive" and "extortionate" imposts, taxes and tariffs will lie, not against the South African Republic, but against the British administration in Cape Colony, Natal and Rhodesia.

Mr. Statham's contention that the Dutch ought to be the official language of the Transvaal seems well founded. The account he gives of a somewhat tardy provision—made after the raid of December, 1895—for the instruction of English children in the English language evinces a disposition to meet the reasonable demands of the foreigners in that regard; but the delay in doing so is to be regretted. The matter of franchise became the subject of acrimonious diplomatic negotiation and the immediate cause of war, which will be treated of more fully in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAUSES OF THE AFRICANDERS' SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.—CONTINUED.

The foreigners' Reform Association, sometimes called the National Union, was organized at Johannesburg in 1893. Its professed object was to secure redress of grievances. This is always allowable in a free country; but it is matter of record that the spirit and methods of this particular association were not calculated to propitiate the people to whom they must look for any relief from the sufferings of which they complained.

Two incidents will sufficiently illustrate this. In 1894 Lord Loch, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, visited the Transvaal to conduct certain negotiations with the executive concerning Swaziland. The presence of this distinguished Crown Official in the Transvaal was made the occasion by the association of offering a public insult to President Kruger in Pretoria, of promoting a violent outburst of pro-British

and anti-Africander sentiment in Johannesburg, and of a conference between Lord Loch and Mr. Lionel Phillips, a member of one of the leading financial houses in Johannesburg, in which was considered the propriety of assembling a body of imperial troops on the borders of the Transvaal for the support of any revolutionary movement that might be made. These proceedings were reminiscent to the Africanders of an earlier demonstration, prior to the forming of the National Union. In 1890 President Kruger visited Johannesburg to confer with leading citizens on the mitigation of the grievances complained of. The foreigners celebrated his coming in that friendly way by drinking to excess, by singing in his ears "God Save the Queen" as a suitable song of welcome to the President of the South African Republic, and by tearing down the national flag of the Transvaal which was floating in front of the house in which the conference was being held. With a moderation not to be expected from Paul Kruger, the president charitably attributed the offensive proceedings to "long drinks"; but the people in general and their representatives were much embittered by them, and the effect was unfavorable to the carrying of any measures for the benefit of the foreigners.



MONTEPOTIN, O. S. MOUNTAIN, FROM SOUTH.

MONTEPOTIN.

Throughout 1894 and 1895, both on the surface of things and beneath it, appearances were ominous of coming disturbance. On the surface there was, from Cape Town, an open advocacy of violent measures in Johannesburg, should such be found necessary to bring about the desired changes in favor of the foreigners. Mr. Edmund Garrett, editor of the "Cape Times," openly stated at Bloemfontein, in 1895, that his presence in South Africa was connected with a purpose on the part of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, premier of Cape Colony, and his associates, to "force the pace." And it was at this time that, as before stated, the British authorities suddenly annexed the Tongaland territory, through which the Afrianders had secured a concession and projected a railway to the sea—thus deepening the impression to a painful and alarming certainty that the Imperial Government was intentionally unfriendly to that of the South African Republic.

Under the surface very momentous things were going on. In Rhodesia a volunteer police force was being enrolled by Sir John Willoughby. This gentleman, speaking for his superior, Doctor Jameson, assured the men that they would only be required to serve in a "camp of exercise"

once a year, and that they would not be taken beyond the borders of Rhodesia.

Fitting in very significantly with this movement, the Bechuanaland Protectorate—lying next neighbor to Rhodesia on the south and to the Transvaal on the west—was transferred to the Chartered Company controlling Rhodesia, a measure that enabled Doctor Jameson to station his volunteer police force on the Transvaal border without taking them out of the enlarged Rhodesia.

Meantime, rifles, ammunition and Maxim guns were smuggled across the border from Kimberley to Johannesburg, to be in readiness for an armed uprising of the foreigners on a date to be agreed upon. Over in the British territory of Rhodesia, Doctor Jameson's force—ostensibly for local police purposes—was armed and near the border, ready to co-operate with the revolt about to be initiated at Johannesburg. As a provision for the sustenance of the invading force, a number of so-called "canteens," said to be for the convenience of a projected stage line, but really stores of food for Jameson's troopers and their horses, were established at convenient distances along the road over which the force was to advance upon Johannesburg.

At the same time, the official opening of the new railway from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay was made the occasion of such marked congratulation from the Imperial Government as implied nothing but the most friendly relations. Afterwards the Afrianders held that the Imperial congratulations were sincere, and that the fact of their being sent was evidence that the policy of implacable hostility toward the South African Republic being pursued by Mr. Cecil Rhodes was in no sense the policy of the British government.

It is almost past belief, however, that so small a matter as the closing of a ford, or "drift," across the Vaal River could be made the subject of international dispute, and become the cause of ill-will between two nations on terms of perfect amity and good will; but so it was. In a rate war between the Cape Government Railway system and the Transvaal Railway Company, in order to force the hand of the Transvaal Company, the Cape authorities adopted the practice of unloading freight on the south side of the Vaal, on Free State soil, and sending it on by ox-wagons across the "drift" and so transporting it over the more than fifty miles to Johannesburg—this to deprive the Transvaal section of the through railway of the carrying trade from

the border to Johannesburg until it submitted to a certain prescribed rate. In order to protect a railway enterprise in which it was a partner, the Transvaal government promptly proclaimed the "drift" closed to traffic. The Cape government then complained to the imperial authorities, and obtained from the Colonial Office a decision that the closing of the "drift" was a breach of the London Convention, of 1884, and must be reversed. To avoid trouble over so paltry a matter the Transvaal government withdrew the proclamation, but there was bitter feeling occasioned by this interference, naturally in inverse ratio to the petty cause of it. The resentment was as widespread as the two Africander Republics. It was this incident, together with the Jameson raid of a few months later, that decided the Free State to dissolve all partnership with Cape Colony as to railway interests, and to use its option of buying the Free State section of this trunk line at cost price. As this was the most profitable part of the whole system, the Cape government was a heavy loser—to the extent of 7 per cent out of 11 per cent profits previously derived from the road;—but if the ultimate object sought by those who directed the movement was to create a

strong prejudice in England against the Transvaal government, it was gained.

As time went on preparations for the contemplated uprising were matured. Ostensibly to participate in the taking over of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Doctor Jameson and his police were brought down to the vicinity of the Transvaal frontier. Simultaneously, mutterings of the coming earthquake—as it was intended to be—began to be heard. At the meeting of the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, held on the 20th of November, 1895, Mr. Lionel Phillips, in an incendiary speech, declared that “capital was always on the side of order, but there was a limit to endurance, though there was nothing further from their desires than an upheaval which would end in bloodshed.” How this was understood, even in Europe, may be seen from the following reference to it in a letter from a gentleman in Hamburg, written on the 6th of December, and quoted by Mr. Statham in his “South Africa as It Is”:

“Master Lionel’s speech has been very foolish, and is likely to do a great deal of harm and no good—unless his instructions are to incite to bloodshed—and I can scarcely imagine such instructions to have gone out while the boom is

lasting. If there is anything that is likely to put Paul Kruger's back up, it is threats; and unless Cecil Rhodes is prepared to back up with his Matabele heroes those threats, you will find the Volksraad of 1896 give an unmistakable answer to what they will wrongly call 'British threats.'"

How the real state of things was comprehended locally is evinced in the answer to that letter, dated December the 10th:

"Your remark concerning Rhodes' Matabele heroes is probably more prophetic than you yourself are aware of. South Africa is, as you say, the land of surprises."

Among the parties privy to the conspiracy the date of uprising was spoken of as the "day of flotation." It was carefully discussed, as was the use that could be made of the British crown officials at the Cape. Arms and ammunition for the use of the revolutionists continued to arrive at Johannesburg, concealed in coal trucks and oil tanks. It looked like an appointment when, on the 21st of December, Colonel Rhodes, brother and representative of Cecil Rhodes at Johannesburg, telegraphed to the Cape that a high official, whom he called the "Chairman," should interfere at the earliest possible moment, and that he and Mr. Cecil Rhodes should start

from Cape Town for Johannesburg on the "day of flotation."

This telegram has been interpreted to mean that the conspirators wanted to create just enough of disturbance to justify alarming telegrams and calls for help, but not so prolonged and violent as to make it necessary for them to lead a hand-to-hand fight against the burghers in the streets of Johannesburg. They would have the Jameson force near enough to take the brunt of the fighting, and the High Commissioner to come in opportunely to mediate a peace favoring the re-establishment of British control in the Transvaal.

Strangely enough, at the last moment divisions arose among the local conspirators at Johannesburg; they hesitated, and were lost. To some, the project which had been much talked of—that of re-establishing British rule—became suddenly distasteful, the principal reason being that the desired control of capital over legislation could not be as complete under British colonial administration as it might be made under some other regime. They had appealed to the sentiment of British loyalty in persuading English recruits to enter their ranks, but they began to see that this sentiment, carried to its legitimate frui-

tion, would defeat the chief end of the capitalists in seeking the overthrow of the Kruger government. Christmas day of 1895 found the Johannesburg reformers so divided in feeling that most of them were in favor of postponing all action until some definite assurance could be obtained as to what, and for whom, they were to fight. To this end the President of the National Union, Mr. Charles Leonard, was sent off to Cape Town to confer with Mr. Cecil Rhodes.

In enlisting Doctor Jameson and his police force in this movement an uncertain and dangerous factor had been included. The situation became critical. Jameson, who had been warned that he must on no account make any move until he received further orders, grew restive and eager for the fray. In Johannesburg the conspirators were in a state of indecision and alarm. Mr. Cecil Rhodes himself was halting between the two opinions, whether to abandon the enterprise altogether or to precipitate the struggle regardless of the divided counsels at Johannesburg.

Then the factor of danger declared itself. On the night of the 29th of December, 1895, Doctor Jameson broke his tether and, presumably without orders, invaded the territory of the South African Republic from the British territory of

Bechuanaland, at the head of about six hundred men.

Just why Jameson moved at that time probably never will be known. He has himself assumed the entire responsibility; Mr. Rhodes and Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner, have disavowed it utterly. There are few who believe that his invasion was intended to initiate the revolution. A probable solution of the mystery is that the revolutionary programme included (1) a collision between the conspirators in Johannesburg and the burgher police, (2) the calling in of the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, as mediator, (3) the ordering up of Jameson and his force to support the High Commissioner in any course he might decide upon, and that Jameson thought he could time his arrival aright without waiting for further orders.

But the skillfully arranged programme was spoiled by the shrewdness of President Kruger. There was no initial conflict in the streets of Johannesburg. Penetrating the design, the president withdrew all the Transvaal police from the streets of the city; there was no one to exchange shots with, and therefore no reason to justify a call for outside interference.

By cutting the telegraph wires Jameson made it impossible for friend or foe to know his whereabouts, but the report got abroad that he was coming. In Johannesburg some desired, some feared, his coming. A member of the committee of the National Union assembled a hundred of the malcontents and attempted to lead them out to co-operate with the invaders, but they tamely surrendered to a burgher force without firing a shot. As for Jameson, on Wednesday, the 1st of January, 1896, he was checked near Krugersdorp by a few hundred burghers hastily collected, and on the next day was surrounded near Doornkop and forced to surrender. Thus ended the attempt at revolution.

During the few days which closed 1895 and opened 1896, there was a state of social, political and financial chaos in Johannesburg. All that was left visible of the reform association was confined within the walls of a single clubhouse—a resort of the leading spirits in the conspiracy. The European population at large seemed to be unaware of anything connected with the affair but the, to them, unaccountable situation—full of peril to life and property—which had been created they knew not how. The state of panic was sustained and intensified by the wildest rumors of

what Jameson was to do, of thousands of burghers assembling to lay siege to the town, of a purpose to bombard the city from the forts, of a new government about to be proclaimed—indeed, anything and everything might happen.

When it leaked out that the principal actors in the revolutionary movement had secretly removed their families from the city—which was to be the storm-center of the expected disturbance—there was a general stampede. Men and women fought for place on the outgoing trains. In one tragical instance an overladen train left the track, and forty persons, mostly women and children, perished. To exaggerate the misery and disaster to innocent and peaceable people, caused by this unfortunate and abortive uprising, would be impossible.

The immediate effect of the raid was most unfavorable to the return of anything like good feeling between the British and the Africanders. The historic cablegram of the German Emperor to President Kruger, congratulating him on the prompt and easy suppression of the rebellion, was construed as evidence that the South African Republic was secretly conniving at a German rivalry to Great Britain as the paramount power in South Africa. On the other hand, every

burgher in the Transvaal saw in the conspiracy a new indication of the inexorable hostility of the British to their independence, and of a relentless purpose to subvert it again by any means necessary to accomplish their end, however unjust or violent. The effect on the burghers of the raid was much the same as that of the blowing up of the Maine on the citizens of the United States—a feeling that relations had been created which nothing could finally adjust but war.

Notwithstanding the intensified bitterness between the two peoples, no one was put to death, nor was any one very seriously punished for taking up arms against the Transvaal government. This is to be credited not to any doubt or extenuation of their guilt, but to urgent intercession on the part of the British authorities, and to the wisdom of those who administered the government whose territory had been invaded from the soil of a professedly friendly nation, whose very existence had been conspired against by resident aliens, and which had in its power both the invaders and the resident conspirators.

CHAPTER XV.

CAUSES OF THE AFRICANDERS' SECOND WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE.—CONTINUED.

After the conspiracy and raid of 1895-1896 the peace of South Africa and the final paramountcy of Great Britain therein by the mere force of a superior civilization and of preponderating financial and diplomatic resources, depended upon a policy which was not followed.

If the British authorities had eliminated Mr. Cecil Rhodes and his schemes from the situation, and had suffered matters in South Africa to return to the state which prevailed in 1887, the end would have been different, and better. At that time the country was being allowed to move in an unforced way toward a destiny of settled peace between the two races. A genuine but unaggressive loyalty in the British colonies was beginning to develop a reciprocal good will on the part of the two republics, giving promise of a pleasant fellowship of nations in South Africa.

The result would not have been a confederated South Africa under the British crown; that was and is impossible, both for geographical and political reasons. But there might have been brought about acquaintanceship and mutual esteem between Great Britain, the would-be Paramount Power, and the Africander race throughout the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the British colonies of Natal and the Cape—which race is and will long continue to be the dominant factor in South Africa. Out of that friendly relationship might have come a paramount power to Great Britain well worth the having, and in every way consistent with the honor of the British crown and the continued independence of the Africander republics.

But Mr. Rhodes and his projects were not eliminated from the situation. By force of almost unequalled genius for acquisition and intrigue, and of great powers in no least degree controlled by moral considerations, he continued to dominate—both locally and in England—the British policy in South Africa. His presence and influence made final peace in the country impossible on any condition other than the subjugation of the Africander Republics. Probably two-thirds of the European population of South

Africa believed that he was the chief criminal—though unpunished—in connection with the conspiracy and raid of 1895-1896. His influence, therefore, had the effect of intensifying the race enmities, already the too vigorous growth of a century, and of warning every Africander in the two republics to stand armed and ready to defend the independence of his country. And these men, to whom Mr. Rhodes' presence and activities were a constant irritation and threat, loved freedom after the fashion of their Netherland forefathers who worsted Spain in diplomacy and war in the sixteenth century, and after the fashion of their Huguenot forefathers who counted no sacrifice too great to make for liberty.

During 1896 there was a temporary lull in the agitation for reforms in the Transvaal. Investigations had become an international necessity, for appearance's sake if for no other reason; but they led to nothing except the rehabilitation of the principal leaders in the conspiracy which had miscarried. Of necessity Doctor Jameson, and his immediate associates in conducting the invasion, were condemned to death by the Transvaal authorities, for they were taken in the act, and confessed themselves guilty of a capital

crime. After a time the death sentences were reversed, and the offenders were set free.

By the opening of 1897 a good degree of order had replaced the state of chaos into which the uprising had thrown the foreign population and interests in the Transvaal. Then the agitation for reforms was renewed, and the claims of the foreigners were backed up and pressed diplomatically by the British government, of which the exponent in the long controversy was the Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

It is not necessary to trace, step by step, the diplomatic correspondence on the subject of reforms in the Transvaal during 1897, 1898 and the first two months of 1899. The whole situation—including every subject in dispute between the two governments—will come into view in the discussions and negotiations immediately preceding the outbreak of the *Africanders' Second War of Independence*, in October, 1899.

On the 20th of March, 1899, in reply to a question by Sir E. Ashmead Bartlett as to Great Britain's right to interfere with the affairs of the South African Republic, Mr. Chamberlain, from his place in parliament, said :



GENERAL CRONJE.

"There are certain cases where we can intervene, and rightly intervene, in Transvaal affairs.

"1. In the first place, we may intervene if there is any breach of the convention.

"2. There is no doubt we should have the usual right of interference if * * * the treatment of British subjects in the Transvaal was of such nature as would give us the right to interfere as to the treatment of British subjects in France or Germany.

"3. Then there is only one other case—the third case. We can make friendly recommendations to the Transvaal for the benefit of South Africa generally and in the interests of peace."

In concluding Mr. Chamberlain said: "I do not feel at the moment that any case has arisen which would justify me in taking the strong action suggested"; the reference being to the sending of an ultimatum.

The next important development was a petition to the Imperial Government, signed by 21,684 British subjects in the Transvaal, praying for interference in their behalf. This was forwarded through Mr. Conyngham Greene, the British agent at Pretoria, to Sir Alfred Milner, Governor of Cape Colony, who transmitted it to London,

where it was received by Mr. Chamberlain on the 14th of April.

Summarized, the complaints of the petitioners were as follows :

1. The great majority of the uitlander population consists of British subjects who have no share in the government.

2. Petitions of the uitlanders to the Transvaal government have either failed or have been scornfully rejected.

3. Instead of redressing uitlander grievances, the Transvaal government, after the Jameson raid, passed laws making their position more irksome—i. e., the immigration of aliens act, the press law, the aliens expulsion law. The immigration act was suspended at the insistence of the British government, but the others remain in force.

4. The Transvaal government exercises the power of suppressing publications devoted to the interests of British uitlanders.

5. British subjects are expelled from the Transvaal without the right of appeal to the high court.

6. The promise of municipal government for the city of Johannesburg has been kept in appearance only. There are 1,039 burghers resi-

dent of Johannesburg, and 23,503 uitlanders, but the law giving each ward of the city two members of the council also requires that one of them must be a burgher, and the Burgomaster, who is appointed by the government, has the casting vote.

7. The city of Johannesburg is menaced by forts occupied by strong Boer garrisons.

8. The uitlanders of Johannesburg are denied the right to police their own city.

9. Trial by jury is a farce, as uitlanders can be tried by burghers only.

10. The uitlanders are deprived of political representation; are taxed beyond the requirements of the Transvaal government.

11. The education of uitlander children is made subject to impossible conditions.

12. The Boer police give no protection to lives and property in the city of Johannesburg.

It will be noted that this petition, dealing with political and other grievances, makes no mention of the dynamite monopoly, extortionate railway charges, burdensome tariffs on imported foodstuffs, and other industrial and commercial grievances of which complaints had been made at an earlier date. And in judging of this list of complaints it should be considered that, with the

exception of the eleventh, concerning the education of children—which is fatally indefinite in expression—most of the conditions complained of are exactly such as would be imposed on a city lately in insurrection, and yet inhabited by the same persons who had conspired to overthrow the government.

The dangerous tension already existing was greatly heightened by a long telegraphic communication from Sir Alfred Milner, Governor of Cape Colony, to Mr. Chamberlain, on the 5th of May. After reviewing the situation, and reiterating the grievances which British subjects were said to be suffering, and declaring that the spectacle presented “does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain,” Sir Alfred revealed the true inwardness of the struggle already begun between the Africanders and the British by saying:

“A certain section of the press, not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which in case of war it would receive from a section of her Majesty’s subjects.

"I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but some striking proof of the intention of her Majesty's government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa."

Sir Alfred's reference in the last two paragraphs is to the "Africander Bund," a society whose ramifications were to be found throughout Natal, Cape Colony, and, indeed, wherever members of the Africander race were to be found.

He that runneth may read and understand these luminous words in Sir Alfred Milner's dispatch. The coming struggle was not to be about some foreigners in the Transvaal, but to defeat, in time, the republican aspirations of the whole Africander race, including those in the two republics already established and "a section of her Majesty's subjects" in the British territories of Natal and Cape Colony; and the issue was understood to be either "a republic embracing all South Africa"—involving the expulsion of the British government "from its position in South Africa"—or the defeat of those aspirations in the establishing of a confederated South Africa under the British crown.

In the light of Sir Alfred's dispatch one ceases to wonder that all negotiations about the uit-

lander grievances, and that the repeated concessions as to the franchise offered by the Transvaal, were without effect. It is evident that both parties saw inevitable war approaching on quite another and a much larger question.

The response of the British government to the uitlanders' petition, and to Sir Alfred Milner's appeal for intervention, was a suggestion that President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner should meet at Pretoria and confer concerning the chief matters in dispute between the two governments. Afterward, upon the invitation of Mr. Steyn, president of the Orange Free State, it was decided to hold the conference at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State Republic. In accepting the invitation to this conference in a telegram dated the 17th of May, Mr. Kruger said:

"I remain disposed to come to Bloemfontein and will gladly discuss every proposal in a friendly way that can conduce to a good understanding between the South African Republic and England, and to the maintenance of peace in South Africa, provided that the independence of this republic is not impugned."

The date selected for the first meeting between Mr. Kruger and Sir Alfred was the 31st of May. On the 22d Sir Alfred telegraphed Mr.

Chamberlain asking for final instructions to guide him in the approaching conference, and outlining his own views of the situation thus:

"It is my own inclination to put in the foreground the question of the uitlanders' grievances, treating it as broadly as possible, and insisting that it is necessary, in order to relieve the situation, that uitlanders should obtain some substantial degree of representation by legislation to be passed this session. Following would be the general line:

"Franchise after six years, retroactive, and at least seven members for the Rand" (the mining district). "Present number of Volksraad of South Africa being twenty-eight, this would make one-fifth of it uitlander members.

"If President Kruger will not agree to anything like this, I should try municipal government for the whole Rand as an alternative, with wide powers, including control of police.

"If he rejects this, too, I do not see much use in discussing the various outstanding questions between the two governments in detail, such as dynamite, violations of Zululand boundary, 'Critic' case, Cape boys and Indians, though it would be desirable to allude to them in course

of discussion, and point out the gravity of having so many subjects of dispute unsettled.”

In a telegram, dated the 24th of May, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir Alfred Milner, in part, as follows :

“I think personally you should lay all stress on the question of franchise in first instance. Other reforms are less pressing and will come in time if this can be arranged satisfactorily and form of oath modified. Redistribution is reasonable, and you might accept a moderate concession.

“If fair terms of franchise are refused by President Kruger it is hardly worth while to bring forward other matters, such as aliens, colored people, education, dynamite, etc., at the conference, and the whole situation must be reconsidered.”

On the 31st of May, 1899, Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger met in conference at Bloemfontein. Their negotiations form one of the most interesting features of the controversy between the two governments. The results of the conference, in brief, were as follows. For the uitlanders, Sir Alfred demanded that :

“Every foreigner who can prove satisfactorily that he has been a resident in the country for five

years; that he desires to make it his permanent place of residence; that he is prepared to take the oath to obey the laws, to undertake all obligations of citizenship, and to defend the independence of the country; should be allowed to become a citizen on taking that oath."

Sir Alfred Milner modified these proposals by suggesting that the franchise be restricted to persons possessing a specific amount of property or of yearly wages, and who have good characters. He asked, further, that "in order to make that proposal of any real use for the new citizens, who mostly live in one district, * * * there should be a certain number of new constituencies created," and that "the number of these districts should not be so small as to leave the representatives of the new population in a contemptible minority."

President Kruger did not accept Sir Alfred's proposals, and submitted counter proposals as follows:

"1. Every person who fixes his residence in the South African Republic has to get himself registered on the Field Cornet's books within fourteen days after his arrival, according to the existing law. He will be able after complying with the conditions under 'A' and after the lapse

of two years to get himself naturalized, and will, five years after naturalization, on complying with the conditions under 'B,' obtain the full franchise.

"A.

"1. Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalization. 2. Two years' continuous residence. 3. Residence in the South African Republic during that time. 4. No dishonoring sentence. 5. Proof of obedience to laws; no act against the government or independence. 6. Proof of full state citizenship and franchise or title thereto in former country. 7. Possession of unmortgaged property to the value of £150; or occupation of house to the rental of £50 per annum; or yearly income of at least £200. Nothing, however, shall prevent the government from granting naturalization to persons who have not satisfied this condition. 8. Taking of an oath similar to that of the Orange Free State.

"B.

"1. Continuous registration for five years after naturalization. 2. Continuous residence during that period. 3. No dishonoring sentence. 4. Proof of obedience to laws. 5. Proof that applicant still complies with the condition of A 7."

In a memorandum which is a part of the records of the conference Sir Alfred Milner admitted

that President Kruger's proposals were "a considerable advance upon the existing provisions as to franchise." But he intimated that they stopped far short of the solution he had suggested, and which, he said, "alone appeared to be adequate to the needs of the case." He also declared it a waste of time to discuss further details; and so the conference ended in failure.

Notwithstanding the failure of the conference, the Volksraad of the South African Republic passed a seven years' retroactive franchise law on the 19th of July, 1899. This law was somewhat modified from the proposals submitted by President Kruger at the conference. It also gave the uitlanders additional representation in both raads, which President Kruger announced on the 27th of July as follows:

"By virtue of the powers conferred upon them the Executive Council yesterday decided to give three new members in each Volksraad for the Witwatersrand gold fields. That is to say, there are at present two members for both raads; the number will be increased to eight, four to sit in the first and four in the second raad. With the De Kaap representative, there will now be five members to represent the mining industry in a

proposed enlarged legislature of thirty-one members.

In London it was believed that the action of the Volksraad was a long stride toward a peaceful solution of the difficulties. In the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain, after reading a telegram from Sir Alfred Milner announcing the action of the Volksraad, said:

"I have no official information as to the redistribution, but it has been stated that the government of the South African Republic proposes to give seven new seats to the district chiefly inhabited by aliens.

"If this report is confirmed this important change in the proposals of President Kruger, coupled with previous amendments, leads the government to hope that the new law may prove a basis of a settlement on the lines laid down by Sir Alfred Milner at the Bloemfontein conference."

But somewhere in the counsels by which the British authorities acted at this time there was an element of suspicion and of yet unsatisfied aggression, which did not make for a peaceful settlement. After the Volksraad of the South African Republic had passed the seven years' franchise law, together with enlarged representation

of the uitlanders in both raads, and after Mr. Chamberlain had made his hopeful announcement in the House of Commons, the whole subject was reopened by a new request. The Transvaal government was asked to agree that a joint commission of inquiry, made up of expert delegates representing the Transvaal and the British government, should be appointed to investigate the exact effect of the new franchise law.

It is not surprising that this request fell as a shock upon a government which had received from the power making this and other extraordinary demands a guaranty, in the convention of 1884, that it should be in every sense independent in the management of its internal affairs. On the 21st of August President Kruger formally declined to accede to the request for a joint committee to investigate the effect of the new franchise law, and submitted an alternative proposition: The South African Republic would give a five years' retroactive franchise, eight new seats in the Volksraad and a vote for President and Commandant-General, conditioned upon Great Britain consenting:

"1. In the future not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal Republic. 2. Not

to insist further on its assertion of the existence of suzerainty. 3. To agree to arbitration."

In a dispatch dated the 2d of September, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain, having rejected President Kruger's alternative proposals, suggested another conference, to be held at Cape Town, and ended with the significant statement:

"Her Majesty's government also desires to remind the government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration."

In dispatches printed on the 7th of September President Kruger signified a willingness to attend the Cape Town conference, and, while holding that no good could come of a joint inquiry into the effect of the new franchise law, he would agree that British representatives should make an independent inquiry, after which any suggestions they might make would be submitted to the raad. Concerning suzerainty he announced the unalterable purpose of his people to adhere absolutely to the convention of 1884.

On the 8th of September the British cabinet formulated a note to the South African Republic

very much in the nature of an ultimatum, refusing point blank to entertain the proposal that Great Britain should relinquish suzerainty over the Transvaal and pointedly intimating that the offer of a joint inquiry into the effect of the seven years' franchise law would not remain open indefinitely.

The Transvaal's rejoinder, printed unofficially on the 16th of September, announced that the South African Republic withdrew the proposal to give a five years' franchise, that it would adhere to the original seven years' law already passed by the Volksraad, and that it would, if necessary, adopt any suggestions Great Britain might make with reference to the practical workings of the law.

On the 25th of September, after three days' consideration, the British cabinet gave out the text of another note to the South African Republic, which read as follows :


"The object Her Majesty's government had in view in the recent negotiations has been stated in a manner which cannot admit of misunderstanding—viz.: To obtain such substantial and immediate representation for the outlanders as will enable them to secure for themselves that fair and just treatment which was formally promised

them in 1881, and which Her Majesty intended to secure for them when she granted privileges of self-government to the Transvaal.

“No conditions less comprehensive than those contained in the telegram of September 8 can be relied on to effect this object.

“The refusal of the South African government to entertain the offer thus made—coming, as it does, after four months of protracted negotiations, themselves the climax of five years of extended agitation—makes it useless to further pursue the discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and the imperial government is now compelled to consider the situation afresh and formulate its own proposals for a final settlement of the issues which have been created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed by the government of South Africa.

“They will communicate the result of their deliberations in a later dispatch.”



PRICHARD STREET, LOOKING EAST, JOHANNESBURG.

CHAPTER XVI.

CAUSES OF THE AFRICANDERS' SECOND WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.—CONCLUDED.

The "later dispatch" promised by the British cabinet was never sent. The answer to it of the Transvaal government was, therefore, delayed for several days, awaiting the new proposals that were to come as the result of further deliberations on the part of Her Majesty's government. At last, on the eve of the outbreak of war, Mr. Chamberlain gave out, on the 10th of October, the text of the republic's rejoinder to the British cabinet's note of the 25th of September. It was transmitted by cable, through Sir Alfred Milner, and read thus:

"DEAR SIR: The government of the South African Republic feels itself compelled to refer the government of Her Majesty, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, once more to the convention of London, 1884, concluded between this republic and the United Kingdom, and which, in Ar-

ticle XIV., secures certain specific rights to the white population of this republic—namely: That all persons other than natives, on conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic—

“A—Will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel or reside in any part of the South African Republic.

“B—They will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and other premises.

“C—They may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ.

“D—They shall not be subject, in respect of their premises or property or in respect of their commerce and industry, to any taxes other than those which are or may be imposed upon the citizens of the said republic.

“This government wishes further to observe that these are the only rights which Her Majesty’s government has reserved in the above convention with regard to the outlander population of this republic, and that a violation only of those rights could give that government a right to diplomatic representations or intervention; while, moreover, the regulation of all other questions

affecting the position of the rights of the outlander population under the above-mentioned convention is handed over to the government and representatives of the people of the South African Republic.

“Among the questions the regulation of which falls exclusively within the competence of this government and of the Volksraad are included those of the franchise and the representation of the people in this republic; and, although this exclusive right of this government and of the Volksraad for the regulation of the franchise and the representation of the people is indisputable, yet this government has found occasion to discuss, in friendly fashion, the franchise and representation of the people with Her Majesty’s government—without, however, recognizing any right thereto on the part of Her Majesty’s government.

“This government has also, by the formulation of the now existing franchise law and by a resolution with regard to the representation, constantly held these friendly discussions before its eyes. On the part of Her Majesty’s government, however, the friendly nature of these discussions has assumed more and more a threatening tone, and the minds of the people of this republic and

the whole of South Africa have been excited and a condition of extreme tension has been created, owing to the fact that Her Majesty's government could no longer agree to the legislation respecting the franchise and the resolution respecting representation in this republic, and, finally, by your note of Sept. 25, 1899, which broke off all friendly correspondence on the subject and intimated that Her Majesty's government must now proceed to formulate its own proposals for the final settlement.

"This government can only see in the above intimation from Her Majesty's government a new violation of the convention of London, 1884, which does not reserve to Her Majesty's government the right to a unilateral settlement of a question which is exclusively a domestic one for this government, and which has been already regulated by this government.

"On account of the strained situation and the consequent serious loss in and interruption of trade in general, which the correspondence respecting franchise and the representation of the people of this republic has carried in its train, Her Majesty's government has recently pressed for an early settlement, and finally pressed, by your intervention, for an answer within forty-

eight hours, a demand subsequently somewhat modified, to your note of September 12, replied to by the note of this government of September 15, and to your note of September 25, 1899, and thereafter further friendly negotiations were broken off, this government receiving an intimation that a proposal for a final settlement would shortly be made.

“Although this promise was once more repeated, the proposal, up to now, has not reached this government.

“Even while this friendly correspondence was still going on the increase of troops on a large scale was introduced by Her Majesty’s government, the troops being stationed in the neighborhood of the borders of this republic.

“Having regard to occurrences in the history of this republic, which it is unnecessary here to call to mind, this republic felt obliged to regard this military force in the neighborhood of its borders as a threat against the independence of the South African Republic, since it was aware of no circumstances which could justify the presence of such a military force in South Africa and in the neighborhood of its borders.

“In answer to an inquiry with respect thereto, addressed to His Excellency, the High Commis-

sioner, this government received, to its great astonishment, in answer a veiled insinuation that from the side of the republic an attack was being made on Her Majesty's colonies, and, at the same time, a mysterious reference to possibilities whereby this government was strengthened in its suspicion that the independence of this republic was being threatened.

"As a defensive measure this government was, therefore, obliged to send a portion of the burghers of this republic in order to offer requisite resistance to similar possibilities."

It will be seen from this correspondence that the British government had failed to send the formulation of "its own proposals for a final settlement" promised in the note of September 25, and that active preparations for war, even to the mobilization of troops, had been going on—on both sides—for some weeks.

On the 7th of August, forty-nine days before the British cabinet engaged to prolong friendly diplomatic correspondence on the subjects at issue by promising a later dispatch containing its own proposals for a final settlement, Mr. Chamberlain delivered a speech in the House of Commons which has become historic—a speech which signified past all possibility of mistake that at

that early date war was a foregone conclusion. After deprecating the use of the word "war" unless it were absolutely necessary, he went on to say:

"The government had stated that they recognized the grievances under which their subjects in Africa were laboring. They had stated that they found those grievances not only in themselves a serious cause for interposition, but a source of danger to the whole of South Africa.

"They (the government) said that their predominance, which both sides of the House had constantly asserted, was menaced by the action of the Transvaal government in refusing the redress of grievances, and in refusing any consideration of the requests hitherto put in the most moderate language of the suzerain power. They said that that was a state of things which could not be long tolerated. They had said: 'We have put our hands to the plow and we will not turn back,' and with that statement I propose to rest content."

Language could not be plainer. It was the British government's demand that the South African Republic must accept British control of her internal affairs—of affairs so purely domestic as the franchise and the representation of her citi-

zens—or fight. It is not a little remarkable in this connection that Germany, France, the United States of America and other powerful nations whose subjects were mingled with the English in that vast foreign population in the Transvaal, heard of no grievances inflicted on their subjects by the South African Republic sufficient to call forth even a friendly diplomatic representation and request for redress.

On the morning of August the 8th, the day after Mr. Chamberlain's warlike speech, the London papers announced that the Liverpool and Manchester regiments, then at the Cape, had been ordered to Natal; that the Fifteenth Hussars were to embark on the 23d of August, and that troops were to be massed along the Transvaal frontier. On the 11th of August it was announced that 12,000 British troops were to be dispatched from India to South Africa, and on the same day a large consignment of war stores, including medical requisites, was given out from the royal arsenal, Woolwich, for shipment to Natal, and the sum of \$2,000,000 in gold was sent to South Africa for the War Office account. British troops began to arrive in South Africa from India and from England in the first week of October. By the 10th some 15,000 had landed.

These were hurried to the frontiers of the Orange Free State—both west and east—most of them being concentrated along the northern boundary of Natal, convenient to the southern frontier of the Transvaal.

The government of the South African Republic made no mistake as to the meaning of Chamberlain's belligerent speech in the House of Commons. On the 8th of August orders were given for the purchase of 1,000 trek oxen, to be used in the operations of the commissary department. On the 11th the German steamer Reichstag arrived at Lorenzo Marquez with 401 cases of ammunition. On the 12th it was decided to proceed at once with the construction of fortified camps at Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill, and orders were issued for the preparation of armored trains. The mobilization of artillery was begun on the 13th, and the next day that force went into camps of instruction to learn the handling of guns of the latest pattern. On the 14th of August the Field Cornets were ordered to distribute Mauser rifles to the burghers, and the government began the purchase of mules, provisions and general war supplies. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were dispatched on the 15th of August to Oudtshoorn, Aliwal Bethany,

and other points in Cape Colony and the Orange Free State for the use of any Afrianders who should rise against Great Britain when hostilities began. On the 19th of August another German steamer, the *König*, arrived in Delagoa Bay with 2,000 cases of cartridges for the Transvaal government. The same day fifty cases of ammunition each were dispatched to Kimberley, Jagersfontein and Aliwal North for the arming of sympathizers in those districts of Cape Colony. On the same day 300 Transvaal artillerymen, with guns, ammunition and camp equipage, left Johannesburg for Komati Pass, in the Libombo Mountains.

And so it went on during the "friendly diplomatic correspondence," which terminated on the 25th of September—awaiting the "later dispatch" from the British cabinet, which never came; both sides arming and maneuvering for strategic advantages in preparation for the struggle that was seen to be inevitable.

Perceiving that all the days spent in waiting for that "later dispatch" were being used by Great Britain in massing her gigantic powers of war in South Africa and along the Transvaal frontier, and believing that no such dispatch would now come until the points of war were all

secured by his great antagonist, President Kruger at last astonished the world—and, most of all, Great Britain—by issuing an ultimatum sufficiently bold and defiant to have come from any of the first-rate powers of the earth.

The document was dated 5 o'clock, p. m., on Monday, October the 9th, and read as follows:

“Her Majesty’s unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this republic, in conflict with the London convention of 1884, and by the extraordinary strengthening of her troops in the neighborhood of the borders of this republic, has caused an intolerable condition of things to arise, to which this government feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this republic, but also of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible.

“This government feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things, and to request Her Majesty’s government to give assurances upon the following four demands:

“First—That all points of mutual difference be regulated by friendly recourse to arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this government and Her Majesty’s government.

“Second—That all troops on the borders of this republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

“Third—That all re-enforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since June 1, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this government, and with the mutual assurance and guaranty on the part of this government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the possessions of the British government shall be made by this republic during the further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the governments; and this government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the burghers of this republic from the borders.

“Fourth—That Her Majesty’s troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.

“This government presses for an immediate and an affirmative answer to these four questions and earnestly requests Her Majesty’s government to return an answer before or upon Wednesday, October 11, 1899, not later than 5 o’clock p. m.

“It desires further to add that in the unexpected event of an answer not satisfactory being

received by it within the interval, it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's government as a formal declaration of war and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that, in the event of any further movement of troops occurring within the above-mentioned time in a nearer direction to our borders, this government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war."

This document was signed by F. W. Reitz, State Secretary, and handed by him to Mr. Conyngham Greene, Her Majesty's agent at Pretoria. On Wednesday afternoon, October the 11th, at 3 o'clock, Mr. Greene delivered the reply of his government, which read thus:

"Her Majesty's government declines even to consider the peremptory demands of the Transvaal government."

Within an hour the telegraphic wires had flashed through all the South African Republic the ominous word, "Oorlog"—war!

Mr. Conyngham Greene at once asked for his passport, and on the next day, October the 12th, with his family, he was sent, attended by a guard of honor, to the border of the Orange Free State,

where a similar guard received and conducted him to British territory in Cape Colony.

Thursday, the 12th of October, was a busy and exciting day in both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—for the two republics stood as one in the struggle. That night—twenty-four hours after war had been declared—30,000 burghers were on the borders ready to do battle. Of these 20,000 invaded Natal under General Joubert, and the vanguard under General Kock occupied Newcastle on the 13th of October. The other 10,000, under General Peit Cronje, crossed the western border into British Bechuanaland and marched on Mafeking.

Thus, and for the causes set forth, began the *Africanders' Second War of Independence*. It was not in the proposed scope of this book to treat of its fortunes. The prospect is that it will be a long and sanguinary war. The story of it will afford abundant and interesting matter for a later volume.

It only remains to show that in all the matters in dispute between the government of the Transvaal and that of Great Britain, and in the war which resulted therefrom, the two *Africander* republics acted in solidarity. Early in November, 1899, the President of the Orange Free State

announced this to his people and to the world in the following proclamation :

“BURGHERS OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE: The time which we had so much desired to avoid—the moment when we as a nation are compelled with arms to oppose injustice and shameless violence—is at hand. Our sister republic to the north of the Vaal river is about to be attacked by an unscrupulous enemy, who for many years has prepared herself and sought pretexts for the violence of which he is now guilty, whose purpose is to destroy the existence of the Africander race.

“With our sister republic we are not only bound by ties of blood, of sympathy and of common interests, but also by formal treaty which has been necessitated by circumstances. This treaty demands of us that we assist her if she should be unjustly attacked, which we unfortunately for a long time have had too much reason to expect. We therefore cannot passively look on while injustice is done her, and while also our own dearly bought freedom is endangered, but are called as men to resist, trusting the Almighty, firmly believing that He will never permit injustice and unrighteousness to triumph.

“Now that we thus resist a powerful enemy, with whom it has always been our highest de-

sire to live in friendship, notwithstanding injustice and wrong done by him to us in the past, we solemnly declare in the presence of the Almighty God that we are compelled thereto by the injustice done to our kinsmen and by the consciousness that the end of their independence will make our existence as an independent state of no significance, and that their fate, should they be obliged to bend under an overwhelming power, will also soon after be our own fate.

"Solemn treaties have not protected our sister republic against annexation, against conspiracy, against the claim of an abolished suzerainty, against continuous oppression and interference, and now against a renewed attack which aims only at her downfall. *

"Our own unfortunate experiences in the past have also made it sufficiently clear to us that we cannot rely on the most solemn promises and agreements of Great Britain, when she has at her helm a government prepared to trample on treaties, to look for feigned pretexts for every violation of good faith by her committed. This is proved among other things by the unjust and unlawful British intervention, after we had overcome an armed and barbarous black tribe on our eastern frontier, as also by the forcible appropri-

tion of the dominion over part of our territory where the discovery of diamonds had caused the desire for this appropriation, although contrary to existing treaties. The desire and intention to trample on our rights as an independent and sovereign nation, notwithstanding a solemn convention existing between this state and Great Britain, have also been more than once and are now again shown by the present government, by giving expressions in public documents to an unfounded claim of paramountcy over the whole of South Africa, and therefore also over this state.

“With regard to the South African Republic, Great Britain has moreover refused until the present to allow her to regain her original position in respect to foreign affairs, a position which she had lost in no sense by her own faults. The original intention of the conventions to which the republic had consented under pressure and circumstances has been perverted and continually been used by the present British administration as a means for the practice of tyranny and of injustice, and, among other things, for the support of a revolutionary propaganda within the republic in favor of Great Britain.

“And while no redress has been offered, as justice demands, for injustice done to the South

African Republic on the part of the British government; and while no gratitude is exhibited for the magnanimity shown at the request of the British government to British subjects who had forfeited under the laws of the republic their lives and property, yet no feeling of shame has prevented the British government, now that the gold mines of immense value have been discovered in the country, to make claims of the republic, the consequence of which, if allowed, will be that those who—or whose forefathers—have saved the country from barbarism and have won it for civilization with their blood and their tears, will lose their control over the interests of the country to which they are justly entitled according to divine and human laws. The consequence of these claims would be, moreover, that the greater part of the power will be placed in the hands of those who, foreigners by birth, enjoy the privilege of depriving the country of its chief treasure, while they have never shown any loyalty to a foreign government. Besides, the inevitable consequence of the acceptance of these claims would be that the independence of the country as a self-governing, independent sovereign republic would be irreparably lost. For years past British troops in great numbers have been placed on the

frontiers of our sister republic in order to compel her by fear to accede to the demands which would be pressed upon her, and in order to encourage revolutionary disturbances and the cunning plans of those whose greed for gold is the cause of their shameless undertakings.

"Those plans have now reached their climax in the open violence to which the present British government now resorts. While we readily acknowledge the honorable character of thousands of Englishmen who loathe such deeds of robbery and wrong, we cannot but abhor the shameless breaking of treaties, the feigned pretexts for the transgression of law, the violation of international law and of justice and the numerous right-rending deeds of the British statesmen, who will now force a war upon the South African Republic. On their heads be the guilt of blood, and may a just Providence reward all as they deserve.

"Burghers of the Orange Free State, rise as one man against the oppressor and the violator of right!

"In the strife to which we are now driven have care to commit no deed unworthy of a Christian and of a burgher of the Orange Free State. Let us look forward with confidence to a fortunate end of this conflict, trusting to the

Higher Power without whose help human weapons are of no avail.

“May He bless our arms. Under His banner we advance to battle for liberty and for fatherland. M. T. STEYN, State President.”

CHAPTER XVII.

THE COUNTRY OF THE AFRICANDERS.

Some knowledge of the physical structure of South Africa is necessary to an understanding of its resources, economic conditions and the long-standing political problems which, to all appearance, are now nearing a final solution.

Nature has divided that part of Africa lying south of the Zambesi River into three distinct and well-defined regions. A strip of lowland skirts the coast of the Indian Ocean all the way from Cape Town around to Natal, Delagoa Bay and still northeast to the mouths of the Zambesi. Between Durban, the principal port of Natal, and Cape Town this strip is very narrow in places—the hills coming down almost to the margin of the sea. Beyond Durban, to the northeast, the low plain grows wider. This belt of lowland is more or less swampy, and from Durban northward is exceedingly malarious and unhealthful. This feature is a prime factor in the physical

structure of the country and has had much to do with shaping its history.

The second region is composed of the elevated and much broken surface presented by the Drakensburg or Quathlamba range of mountains, reaching from Cape Town to the Zambesi Valley—a distance of sixteen hundred miles. In traveling inland, after leaving the level belt, at from thirty to sixty miles from the sea the hills rise higher and higher—from three thousand to six thousand feet. These hills are only the spurs of the principal range, some of whose peaks rise to an elevation of eleven thousand feet.

Beyond the Quathlamba Mountains, to the west and north, is the third natural division of South Africa—a vast tableland or plateau, varying from three thousand to five thousand feet above the sea level. This region occupies about seven-eighths of the area of South Africa.

To a bird's-eye view of the country the physical scheme is exceedingly simple—a great plateau filling the interior, a belt of lowland bordering the Indian Ocean and one principal mountain range between the two.

Geologically considered, the oldest formation is found in the northern part of the tableland and toward the northeastern end of the Quathlamba

Mountains. The principal formations in this region are granite and gneiss, believed to be of great antiquity—probably of the same age as the Laurentian formations in America. The rocks of the Karoo district are not so ancient. There are no traces anywhere in South Africa of late volcanic action, nor has any active volcano been discovered there; but eruptive rocks of ancient date—porphyries and greenstones—are found overlying the sedimentary deposits in the Karoo district and in the mountain systems of Basutoland and the Orange Free State.

The African coast is notably poor in harbors. There is no haven between Cape Town and Durban. From Durban to the Zambesi there are but two good ports—that of Delagoa Bay and Beira. With the exception of Saldanha Bay, twenty miles north of Cape Town, the western coast, for a thousand miles, has no harbor.

The temperature in Southern Africa is much lower than the latitude would lead one to expect. This is accounted for by the fact that there is a vast preponderance of water in the southern hemisphere, which has the effect of giving a cooler temperature than prevails in a corresponding northern latitude. The difference in both heat and cold represents over two degrees of dif-

ference in latitude. Thus, Cape Town, 34° S., has a lower temperature in both summer and winter than Gibraltar and Aleppo, in 36° N. Nevertheless, the thermometer registers high in some parts of South Africa. Even at Durban, in latitude 30° S., the heat is often severe, and the northern part of the Transvaal and the British territories to the north of it lie within the Tropic of Capricorn. The mean temperature in South Africa proper is 70° Fahrenheit in January and 80° in July.

Over most of the country the climate is exceptionally dry. In the region of Cape Colony there are well-defined summer and winter; but in the rest of South Africa for about two-thirds of the year there is only a dry season, when the weather is cooler, and a wet season of four or five months, when the sun is the highest and the heat is most intense. The rainy season is not so continuous, nor is there so great a precipitation, as in some other hot countries. In the parts where the rainfall is heaviest, averaging over thirty inches in the year, the moisture soon disappears by evaporation and absorption, and the surface remains parched till the next wet season. As a consequence of this the air is generally dry, clear and stimulating.



CATTLE ON THE VAIL RIVER.

It is interesting to note the effect upon climate of the physical structure described above. The prevailing and rain-bringing winds are from the east and the southeast. They bring sufficient moisture to the low plain along the sea coast, and passing inland the rain-bearing clouds water the foothills of the Quathlamba Mountains and precipitate snow on the loftier peaks beyond them. A portion of the moisture is carried still farther to the west and falls in showers on the eastern part of the plateau—the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the eastern border of Bechuanaland and the region northward toward the Zambesi. Sections farther to the north and west receive but little of the annual rainfall, ranging from five to ten inches in the year. That little is soon dissipated, the surface becomes dry and hard, and such vegetation as springs up under the brief showers soon dies. Much of this region is a desert, and so must remain until more and more continuous moisture is supplied, either by artificial irrigation or by some favorable change in natural conditions.

From these permanent physical features—the lowlands along the coast, the elevated plateau in the interior, the mountain range running between them, a burning sun and a dry atmosphere

—have developed many of the other natural phenomena of South Africa.

The rivers of that country—laid down in great numbers on the maps—are not rivers during much of the year. In the dry season they are either without water altogether or consist of a succession of little pools scarcely sufficient to supply the cattle on their banks with drink. And when they are rivers they are, most of the time, such as can neither be forded nor navigated; the violent rains—continuing for hours and sometimes for many days—have converted them into roaring torrents.

Now, if that country could have been entered by waterways, as were North and South America, it would not have remained an unknown land so long. But there was no other means of penetrating it than the lumbering ox-wagon, making at best a dozen miles a day, with frequent long halts in the neighborhood of good grass in order to rest and recuperate the cattle. It is this lack of navigable rivers that now compels the people to depend exclusively on railways for internal transportation and travel. With the exception of tidal streams there is no internal water communication of any value.

Another peculiarity of the east coast rivers

arises out of the nearness of the Quathlamba Mountains to the sea. Such rivers as take their rise in the mountains have very short courses, and the few that come from beyond, finding channels through the mountain passes, are so obstructed by rapids and cataracts at the point of descent from the higher levels that no boat can ascend them.

South Africa presents to the foreigner from cooler climates no serious danger as to health. The sun-heat would be trying were it not for the dryness of the atmosphere and the invariable coolness of the nights, which have the effect of a refreshing tonic. With due care in providing sufficient wraps for the occasional cold day in the dry season, and the means of comfortable sleep during the cool nights, there is nothing to fear.

The much-dreaded malarial fever has its habitat in the lowlands of both the east and the west coast. Persons who are not *immune* to it can choose their place of residence on the higher lands, or take refuge in quinine.

The dryness and purity of the air in many parts of South Africa—notably Ceres, Kimberley, Beauport West and other places in the interior plateau—make it peculiarly suitable for

persons suffering from any form of chest disease—always excepting tuberculosis, for which the sure remedy has not yet been discovered. But even the victims of that malady find atmospheric and other conditions friendly to a prolongation of life in the salubrious air and sunshine of the South African tablelands.

On the whole, there can be no question as to the general good effect upon health of the South African climate. Europeans and Americans living therein pursue their athletic sports with all the zest experienced in their native climates, and the descendants of the original Dutch and Huguenot settlers—now in the sixth and seventh generations—have lost nothing of the stature nor of the physical energy that characterized their forefathers.

South Africa used to be the habitat of an unusually rich fauna. The lion, leopard, elephant, giraffe, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, antelope in thirty-one species, zebra, quagga, buffalo and various other wild creatures—some of them savage, and all of them beautiful after their kind—abounded. But of late years all this has been changed. Since firearms have been greatly improved and cheapened and the country has been opened to the Nimrods of the world and the

swarming natives have procured guns and learned to use them, the wild animals have been thinned out. There are now but two regions in South Africa where big game can be killed in any great numbers—the Portuguese territory from the Zambesi to Delagoa Bay, and the adjoining eastern frontier of the Transvaal.

Snakes of various kinds and sizes, from the poisonous black momba to the python that grows to over twenty feet in length, used to infest many parts of the country, but they have almost disappeared from the temperate regions inhabited by the whites.

The farmers' worst enemies are not now the great beasts and reptiles of former years, but the baboons, which gather in the more rocky districts and kill the lambs, and two species of insects—the white ants and the locusts—which sometimes ravage the eastern coast.

Beyond that of most countries in the world of equal extent the flora of South Africa is rich in both genera and species. The neighborhood of Cape Town and the warm, sub-tropical regions of eastern Cape Colony and Natal are specially affluent in beautiful flowers. In the Karoo district, and northeastward over the plateau into Bechuanaland and the Transvaal, vegetation pre-

sents but little variety of aspect, owing in part to the general sameness of geological formations and in part to the prevailing dryness of the surface.

In general, South Africa is comparatively bare of forests—a fact for which denudation by man cannot account, for it is yet a country new to civilization. Some primitive forests are to be found on the south coast of Cape Colony and in Natal. These have been put under the care of a Forest Department of the government. In the great Knysna forest wild elephants still roam at large. The trees, however, even in the preserved forests, are small, few of them being more than fifty or sixty feet in height. The yellow-wood grows the tallest, but the less lofty sneezewood is the most useful to man. Up the hillsides north of Graham's Town and King William's Town are immense tracts of scrub from four to eight feet high, with occasional patches of prickly pear—a formidable invader from America, through which both men and cattle make their passage at the cost of much effort and many irritating wounds from the sharp spines. A large part of this region, being suitable for little else, has been utilized for ostrich farming.

In the Karoo district and northward through

Cape Colony, western Bechuanaland and the German possessions in Namaqualand and Damaraland—a desert region—there are few trees except small and thorny mimosas. Farther east, where there is a greater rainfall, the trees are more numerous and less thorny. The plain around Kimberley, once well wooded, has been stripped of its trees to furnish props for the diamond mines and fuel.

The lack of forests is one of the principal drawbacks to the development of South Africa. Timber is everywhere costly; the rainfall is less than it would be if the country were well wooded; and when rains do come the moisture is more rapidly dissipated by absorption, evaporation and sudden freshets because of the absence of shade. Of late energetic measures have been taken to supply nature's lack by artificial forestry. On the great veldt plateau in the vicinity of Kimberley and of Pretoria and in other localities the people have planted the Australian gum tree, the eucalyptus and several varieties of European trees, including the oak, which, besides being useful, is very beautiful. If the practice be continued the country will reap an incalculable benefit, not only in appearance, but also in climatic conditions.

The largest political division of South Africa is Cape Colony. The area is about 292,000 square miles and the population, white and native, is 2,011,305. The whites number about 400,000. But little of it is suitable for agriculture, and considerable portions of it are too arid for stock raising. Including the natives the population is only about seven to the square mile. On the lowlands skirting the sea on the south and west are some fruitful regions that give a profitable yield of grapes and corn. On the tableland of the interior there is a rainfall of only from five to fifteen inches in the year. As a consequence the surface is dry and unfriendly to vegetable life. In an area of three hundred miles by one hundred and fifty there is not a stream having a current throughout the year, nor is there any moisture at all in the dry season except some shallow pools which are soon dried up by evaporation. Nevertheless, in this desert, bare of trees and of herbage, there is abundance of prickly shrubs, which are sufficiently succulent when they sprout under the summer rains to afford good browsing for goats and sheep. In the northwestern part of the interior and northward to Kimberley and Mafeking, the country is better watered than the more westerly regions, and

grazing animals find a generous growth of grass as well as nutritious shrubs. In the southeastern part the rainfall is still heavier. The foothills of the Quathlamba Range toward the sea are covered in places with forests, the grass is more abundant and much of the land can be tilled to profit without artificial irrigation. In 1899 there were about 3,000 miles of railway and nearly 7,000 miles of telegraph open in the colony. The number of vessels entering the ports of Cape Colony in 1897 was 1,093, with a total tonnage of 2,694,370 tons; in addition to this there were 1,278 vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, with a tonnage of 3,725,831 tons. The foreign commerce of Cape Colony is large, including, as it does, the bulk of the import and export trade of all South Africa. The total importation of merchandise for 1897 was \$80,127,495, and the exports, including a large proportion of the gold and diamond products of Kimberley and the Transvaal, amounted, in 1898, to \$123,213,458.

Natal, beyond any other part of South Africa, is favored by natural advantages. It lies on the seaward slope of the Quathlamba Mountains, and its scenery is charmingly diversified by some of the lesser peaks and the foothills of that range. It is well watered by perennial streams

fed by the snows and springs of the mountains. While the higher altitudes to the west are bare, there is abundance of grass lower down and toward the coast there is plenty of wood. The climate in general is much warmer than that of Cape Colony; in the low strip bordering the sea it is almost tropical. This high temperature is not caused so much by latitude as by the current in the Mozambique Channel, which brings from the tropical regions of the Indian Ocean a vast stream of warm water, which acts on the climate of Natal as does the Gulf Stream on that of Georgia and the Carolinas. Nearly the whole of Natal may be counted temperate; the soil is rich, the scenery is beautiful, and, with the exception of certain malarious districts at the north, the climate is healthful. Foreigners from Europe and America may reasonably hope to enjoy long life and prosperity in it. The principal crop for export is sugar, but cereals of all kinds, coffee, indigo, arrowroot, ginger, tobacco, rice, pepper, cotton and tea are grown to profit. The coal fields of the colony are large, the output in 1897 being 244,000 tons. There are 487 miles of railway, built and operated by the government. The imports in 1897 amounted to nearly \$30,000,000. Pop. 828,500; whites, 61,000.

The Orange Free State, in its entire area of 48,000 square miles, is on the great interior plateau at an altitude of from 4,000 to 5,000 feet above the sea level. The surface is mostly level, but there are occasional hills—some of them rising to a height of 6,000 feet. The land is, for the most part, bare of trees, but affords good grazing for two-thirds of the year. The air is remarkably pure and bracing. There are no blizzards to encounter. There are, however, occasional violent thunderstorms, which precipitate enormous hailstones—large enough to kill the smaller animals, and even men. Notwithstanding the generally parched appearance of the country, the larger streams do not dry up in winter. The southeastern part of the Free State, particularly the valley of the Caledon River, is one of the best corn-growing regions in Africa. In the main, however, with the exception of the river valleys, the land is more suitable for pasture than for tillage. The grazing farms are large and require the services of but few men; as a consequence the population increases slowly. The Free State, corresponding in size to the State of New York, has only about 80,000 white inhabitants and 130,000 natives. The chief industry is agriculture and stock-raising. A rail-

way, constructed by the Cape Colony government, connects Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, with the ports of Cape Colony and Natal, and with Pretoria, the capital of the South African Republic.

The South African Republic, commonly called the Transvaal, is 119,139 square miles in area. The white population, numbering 345,397, is largely concentrated in the Witwatersrand mining district. The native inhabitants number 748,759. All the Transvaal territory belongs to the interior plateau, with the exception of a strip of lower land on the eastern and northern borders. This lower section is malarious. It is thought, however, that drainage and cultivation will correct this, as they have done in other fever districts. Like the Free State, the Transvaal is principally a grazing country. The few trees that exist in the more sheltered parts are of little value, except those in the lower valleys. The winters are severely cold, and the burning sun of summer soon dries up the moisture and bakes the soil, causing the grass to be stunted and yellow during most of the year. Until about sixteen years ago there was little in the surface appearance and known resources of the Transvaal to attract settlers, and nothing to make it a de-

sirable possession to any other people than its Africander inhabitants. In 1884 discoveries of gold were made, the first of which that excited the world being some rich auriferous veins on the Sterkfontein farm. In a little time it became known that probably the richest deposit of gold in the world was in the Witwatersrand district of the Transvaal. Later, in 1897, diamonds were discovered in the Transvaal, the first stone having been picked up at Reitfontein, near the Vaal River, in August of that year. Since then the precious crystals have been found in the Pretoria district, in Roodeplaats on the Pienaars River, at Kameelfontein and at Buffelsduff. The output of gold in 1898 was \$68,154,000, and of diamonds \$212,812.01. The total output of gold since it was first discovered amounts to over \$300,000,000, with \$3,500,000,000 "in sight," as valued by experts. The commerce of the South African Republic, while necessarily great because of the large number of people employed by the mining industries, cannot be as accurately stated as that of states whose imports are all received through a given port or ports. Foreign goods reach it through several ports in Cape Colony, Natal, Portuguese East Africa, and in smaller quantities from other ports on the coast.

The total imports for 1897 are estimated at \$107,575,000.

Griqualand West, a British possession bordering on Cape Colony on the south and on the Free State on the east, owes its chief importance to the Kimberley diamond mines, near the western boundary of the Free State and 600 miles from Cape Town. These mines were opened in 1868 and 1869. It is estimated that since that time \$350,000,000 worth of diamonds in the rough—worth double that sum after cutting—have been taken out. This enormous production would have been greatly exceeded had not the owners of the various mines in the group formed an agreement by which the annual output was limited to a small excess over the annual demand in the world's diamond markets. So plentiful is the supply, and so inexpensive, comparatively, is the cost of mining that other diamond-producing works have almost entirely withdrawn from the industry since the South African mines were opened. It has been estimated that ninety-eight per cent of the diamonds of commerce are now supplied by these mines.

The British protectorate of Bechuanaland, lying to the north of Cape Colony and Griqualand and to the west of the Transvaal, has an

area of about 213,000 square miles, with a population of 200,000—mostly natives. A railway and telegraph line connect it with Cape Colony on the south and Rhodesia on the north.

Rhodesia includes the territory formerly known as British South Africa and a large part of that known as British East Africa. The area is about 750,000 square miles—equal to about one-fourth of the area of the United States of America, excluding Alaska. No exact statement of population can be made; estimates range from 1,000,000 to 2,000,000, of which only about 6,000 are whites. The entire territory is under the administration of the British South African Company, organized and incorporated in 1889, subject to the British High Commissioner at Cape Town. Rhodesia lies chiefly within the tablelands of South Africa and has large but yet undeveloped resources, including grazing and agricultural lands and important mining districts. Owing to the newness of the country to civilization no definite statement can be made relative to its commerce. In all probability Rhodesia will open a field wherein enterprise along the lines favored by its natural resources and conditions will be richly rewarded.

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